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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents evidence on the associations between family ownership, 
corporate governance, political connections and firm performance. In doing so, a 
sample of 155 non-financial listed companies in Bangladesh is used for the period 
2005 to 2009. The data analysis is based on multivariate regression analyses. 
Agency theory, resource dependence theory and evolutionary psychology theory 
provide the theoretical underpinnings for the study. The thesis is presented as a 
series of three studies. 
 
The first study in this thesis investigates whether there are significant 
differences in corporate board structures between listed family and non-family 
firms. The second study examines the relationship between board structure and 
firm performance of family and non-family firms. The third and final study of this 
thesis investigates whether family ownership is a significant moderating variable 
affecting the link between the political connections of the board and firm 
performance.  
 
There are several primary motivations for this set of three studies that are 
related yet distinct in terms of their contributions to the literature. First, it is 
argued that Bangladesh is an emerging economy characterised by concentrated 
ownership and poor investor protection and a weak legal system. In particular, 
corporate ownership in Bangladesh is largely concentrated in the hands of only a 
few people, and the top shareholders belong mostly to wealthy, high profile 
families. It is contended that family dominance has given rise to a corporate 
culture where internal governance mechanisms tend to be downplayed and that 
x 
 
the use of monitoring mechanisms as adopted in non-family public-listed firms 
may in fact be both ineffective and inefficient. There is, however, scant evidence 
in this area. Second, the implications for firm performance of a number of board 
characteristics which are more idiosyncratic to developing capital markets in the 
Asian region, such as the emerging participation of women on boards and the 
growing number of foreign directors remain largely unexplored. Third, few 
studies have examined the impact of political connections on firm performance, 
and in Bangladesh many of the families in the post-colonial era have formed 
strong political connections to help build their business with the politicians 
themselves being the main controlling shareholder in many such entities. 
However, there are no studies examining the moderating effect of family 
ownership on political connections and firm performance. 
 
The data analysis of the first study suggests that family firms in Bangladesh 
adopt a distinctly different board structure from non-family firms. In particular, 
this study finds that family firms have a lower proportion of independent directors 
and foreign directors than non-family firms. Further, family firms have smaller 
boards than non-family firms. However, family firms are likely to have more CEO 
duality and female directors than their non-family counterparts. The second study 
finds that several board characteristics, namely, board independence, board size, 
female directors and foreign directors, have a weaker impact on performance of 
family firms compared to non-family firms. However, CEO duality is found to 
have a stronger impact on performance of family firms than in their non-family 
counterparts. 
 
xi 
 
The third and final study finds significant interaction between political 
connections and family ownership which has an effect on firm performance. 
While, for family firms, political connections are seen to have a positive impact 
on firm performance, the opposite, that is, a negative impact is evident for non-
family firms. The analysis further reveals inter-generational differences within 
family firms, where political connections and firm performance are associated 
positively only when founder members act as CEOs or chairmen. When 
descendants serve as CEOs or chairmen, political connections are associated with 
poorer firm performance. 
 
Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that family ownership in 
Bangladesh plays a major role in shaping corporate governance structure. 
Theoretically, it draws on a multi-theoretic approach for informing research on 
board structure and firm performance where the impact of different board 
variables and political connections are considered in relation to family firm 
performance. There are also a number of practical implications where the findings 
suggest regulators and corporate watchdogs may need to better assess the levels of 
disclosure, and the expertise of women on boards, as well as undertaking greater 
scrutiny over political connections and their impact on minority shareholders. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, an extensive body of literature has developed around 
ownership structure, corporate governance and firm performance. The impetus for 
this body of research lies in early studies, such as Berle and Means (1932), which 
contend that diffuse shareholdings can be detrimental to firm performance as a 
widening shareholder interests will reduce the ability to scrutinise managerial 
decision-making. Their view was subsequently contested by researchers such as 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), who argue that the 
ownership structure that emerges, whether concentrated or diffused, is influenced 
by the profit maximising interest of the shareholders, and, as such, ownership 
characteristics will, in fact, have little impact on firm performance. Subsequently, 
a number of studies that have emerged in this area specially examine different 
types of ownership, their concentration levels and their impact on firm 
performance. In particular, prior studies have assessed the impact of government 
ownership (Ang and Ding, 2006); CEO ownership (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 
2005), managerial ownership (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998) and institutional 
ownership (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) on firm performance. It is argued that 
each type of ownership tends to have motivations that serve the owners’ self-
interest, and, that the higher the level of their ownership, the greater their ability 
to influence the structure and decision-making processes of the governing board 
and, ultimately, firm performance. 
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However, there are three critical gaps in this burgeoning body of literature. 
The first critical gap is that firm ownership by families and its effects on both 
corporate governance and firm performance remain unclear with scant empirical 
evidence1. Family ownership has been chosen as the focal variable for this thesis 
based on the two important justifications.  
 
First, family firms2 form a large proportion of businesses (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999), and have a significant impact on the 
economy through their effects on GDP, job creation and financing of new 
ventures (Glassop and Waddell, 2005). For example, over 80 per cent of business 
enterprises are family-owned or family-controlled in the USA, Europe and Latin 
America (Poza, 2007). Family businesses in the USA contribute 64 per cent of the 
GDP, or A$5.9 trillion (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003), and, in Australia, family 
businesses generate more than half of Australia’s employment growth and 
contribute around A$3.6 trillion to the Australian economy (Smyrnios and 
Walker, 2003). Family businesses in Asian countries also make significant 
contributions to their economies. For example, their total exports contribute as 
                                                 
1 Anderson and Reeb (2004) examine the impact of independent and affiliated directors on 
performance of family firms in the US. Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the impact of family 
ownership, control, and management on firm value in publicly traded US firms. Setia-Atmaja, 
Tanewski and Skully (2009) investigate the interacting role that dividends, debt and boards of 
directors play in the corporate governance decisions of family firms in Australia. Ibrahim and 
Samad (2011) examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
performance between family and non-family firms in Malaysia. Navarro and Anson (2009) 
explore the significant differences in some board structure variables between family and non-
family firms in Spain. 
2 There is no common definition of or criteria for family firms since multiple research approaches 
are adopted by prior literature. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) define family firms as 
those with family ownership or family presence on the board of directors. Maury (2006) identifies 
a firm as a family firm if the largest controlling shareholder of that firm, who is either a family 
member or an individual, holds at least 10 per cent of the voting rights. Cascino, Pugliese, 
Mussolino and Sansone (2010) identify family firms as those in which 50 per cent of the voting 
rights or outstanding shares (either direct or indirect) are held by a family block holder, and at least 
one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position. Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) 
categorize a firm as a family controlled firm if the founding family or family member or private 
individual controls 20 per cent or more equity, and is involved in the top management of the firm. 
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much as 56 per cent in Taiwan, 50 per cent in China and 42 per cent in South 
Korea (Sithole, 2006). In India, family businesses account for 70 per cent of the 
total sales and net profits of the 250 biggest private sector companies (Sethia, 
2008). 
 
Second, a significant proportion of public-listed firms are also family-
owned, thus, the performance of such family firms has direct relevance for 
financial market efficiency. For example, in the United States, family firms 
constitute over 35 per cent of the S&P 500 (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), while in 
South-East Asia, the proportion of listed firms owned by families is even higher, 
for example, 68 per cent in Indonesia, and around 57 per cent in Thailand and 
Malaysia (Chau and Leung, 2006). A better understanding of the idiosyncrasies of 
family firms, therefore, in terms of firm behaviour and performance, will have 
implications for the overall capital market efficiency. 
 
The second critical gap in this area of the literature is that much of the 
extant empirical evidence on family ownership, governance structure and firm 
performance is from developed nations (for example, Anderson and Reeb, 2004, 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006, and Braun and Sharma, 2007, in the USA; and Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009, and Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006, in Australia). Given 
that developing countries tend to have a high proportion of family-owned and 
controlled public-listed firms (Chau and Leung, 2006; Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang, 2000) but poorer legal and regulatory institutions with lower investor 
protection, generalisability of past studies is limited. For instance, it can be argued 
that family firms in developing nations are more likely to be in a stronger position 
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than those in developed nations to influence governance structures and decision-
making to optimise their benefit because of the lower regulatory oversight. 
However, evidence is scant and further research within this context is well-
justified to better understand the generalisability of past findings to such 
countries. 
 
The third critical gap in the literature is that most of the empirical evidence 
on the links between family ownership, board structure and firm performance has 
placed emphasis on board structure in terms of the proportion of independent 
directors, board size and CEO duality. However, recent literature emphasise the 
need for greater board diversity for better quality governance and firm 
performance (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003), and in particular identify the 
participation by females and foreign directors as key board variables. Empirical 
evidence, on the other hand, on the existence of systematic differences in board 
composition by female and foreign directors between family and non-family firms 
remain neglected. Furthermore, although prior studies suggest systematic 
variations in board characteristics such as membership of independent directors 
and CEO duality may exist between family and non-family firms (Bartholomeusz 
and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Navarro and Anson, 2009), the 
evidence is rather unclear. In some studies a lower proportion of independent 
directors on boards is seen to exist in family firms relative to non-family firms 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et 
al., 2009), but in other studies, such as Navarro and Anson (2009), no such 
difference was evident. Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) and Setia-Atmaja et 
al. (2009) find no variation in board size between family and non-family firms, 
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whereas Navarro and Anson (2009) document that family firm boards are smaller 
than those in non-family firms. Much of the extant evidence is also from a 
developed nation context where historically the pool of female and foreign 
directors may differ in numbers and in their experience compared to that in 
younger, developing nations. Thus, further investigation with additional board 
variables within a developing nation context will provide a better understanding 
of any systematic differences in the board structure (e.g., board independence, 
size and CEO duality) of family as opposed to non-family firms in such countries. 
Such evidence is important as board characteristics have implications for the 
quality of the board’s monitoring outcomes. 
 
In addition, empirical evidence on the relationship between board structure 
and performance in family firms is also unclear (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chen, 
Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong, 2005; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Setia-Atmaja et 
al., 2009; Lam and Lee, 2008). For example, Anderson and Reeb (2004) find a 
positive relationship between board independence and performance of family 
firms. They argue that independent directors may provide better monitoring in 
family firms, particularly in safeguarding minority shareholder interests. On the 
other hand, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) find a negative relationship between board 
independence and performance in family firms. They argue that a strong presence 
of family dominance reduces effective monitoring by independent directors. In 
relation to CEO duality, Braun and Sharma (2007) reveal that such duality has a 
significant positive impact on performance in family firms. They argue that 
leaders with greater discretion would be able to improve their strategic decisions. 
However, Lam and Lee (2008) find that CEO duality is negatively related to 
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performance of family firms, whereas it is positively related in non-family firms. 
They contend that in family firms, the potential costs of CEO duality, such as 
managerial entrenchment, and expropriation of minority shareholders, outweighs 
the potential benefits. Villalonga and Amit (2006) indicate that family ownership 
creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm, or as 
Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting 
agreements, however, were found to have a negative impact on the founder's 
premium. Interestingly, when descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is 
significantly reduced. No doubt, given this mixed set of findings, further research 
is warranted in this area. In particular, the use of a more multi-theoretic approach 
(such as complementary agency theory framework with resource dependency 
explanation) may provide a more deep understanding of the relationship between 
board structure and performance in family firms (Christopher, 2010).  
 
Objectives of the Present Study 
In light of the fore mentioned gaps in the literature, this thesis aims to 
examine whether family owned firms significantly differ from non-family owned 
firms in terms of their governing board characteristics and firm performance, 
within the context of the Bangladeshi capital market. More specifically, the thesis 
is structured in a three-essay format with each essay pertaining to distinct research 
issues, as follows: 
x The first study assesses whether there are significant differences in the 
governing board structures (namely, the level of board independence, 
board size, CEO duality, female director and foreign director) between 
family and non-family firms. 
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x The second study investigates the relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q and Return 
on Assets (ROA) of family companies compared to non-family firms. 
x The third and final study examines whether family ownership moderates 
the relationship between political connections and firm performance. 
 
1.1.1 Why Bangladesh? 
The justification for choosing public listed firms in Bangladesh is 
premised on two key factors. First, family dominance is very common among 
companies in Bangladesh with many of the controlling families having close ties 
with political parties (Imam and Malik, 2007; Haque, Arun and Kirkpatrick, 
2011). Siddiqui (2010), in his recent review of corporate governance within the 
Bangladesh corporate sector is critical of the high ownership concentration, 
family dominance, lack of shareholder activism, and poor enforcement and 
monitoring of regulations. It is contended that due to family dominance in 
companies, important decisions tend to be made in family meetings rather than in 
board meetings, and are then communicated through the formal board meetings 
(Ahmed and Siddiqui, 2011).  Further, most of the family firms tend to appoint 
CEOs from their family members. Such family dominance is seen to have given 
rise to a corporate culture where control mechanisms, such as effective board 
structure, are not regarded as being important and discourages non-family 
members being active (Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim, 2007). The potential 
for these idiosyncratic characteristics to exist in family firms in Bangladesh in 
turn raises the need for a better understanding on how such characteristics affect 
family firm governance structure and performance. 
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The second justification for choosing Bangladeshi firms is the lack of 
clarity on corporate board diversity and its impact on firm performance. For 
instance, recent studies in more developed nations indicate that having a greater 
proportion of females on boards leads to better monitoring (Carter et al., 2003, in 
USA; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003, in USA; Nguyen and Faff, 2007, in 
Australia; Bohren and Strom, 2010, in Norway). Whether female directors in 
developing countries are in a similar position to influence board effectiveness is 
unclear. Indeed, Singh, Vinnicombe and Terjesen (2007) argue that female 
directors on corporate boards are an emergent issue for developing economies. In 
the case of Bangladesh, culturally, it is a nation where the society is seen to be 
largely male-dominated (Jasimuddin, 1995). Therefore, it is likely that females’ 
opinions in decision-making have limited effects. Further, female participation in 
business, particularly at the director level, remains low in Bangladesh, even 
though over the years females’ labour force participation rate has increased from 
23.9 per cent in 1999 to 29.2 per cent in 2005 (LFS3, 2005). Their role in senior 
positions remains unclear. Further, foreign directors are another factor that may 
improve board effectiveness. In Bangladesh, foreign directors are becoming 
increasingly common because of the growth in multinational ventures. Oxelheim 
and Randoy (2003) reveal that having a foreign director on board signals a higher 
commitment to corporate monitoring and transparency which leads to an increase 
in firm performance. However, their impact on firm performance in a developing 
country context such as Bangladesh remains limited. It is, thus, clearly warranted 
that further investigation be conducted on female and foreign directors on 
                                                 
3 Bangladesh Labour Force Surveys conducted in 1999 and 2005 by the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics. 
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governing boards, and their impact on firm performance within a developing 
nation context. 
 
In the next section, a brief discussion is undertaken on the nature and the 
types of governance-related challenges faced by family firms relative to non-
family firms, much of which is premised on an agency theory viewpoint. This is 
followed by a delineation of the motivations for each of the three research studies. 
 
1.1.2 Family firms – nature and challenges to governance 
Family firms can be small or large. Smaller family firms generally 
comprise a large proportion of the small-to-medium sized entity (SME) sector, 
and are often managed by family members. However, there are also family firms 
that have grown to become established as large businesses, and many of these are 
also publicly-listed, such as Microsoft Corporation (USA), Harvey Norman 
(Australia), Hutchison Whampoa (Hong Kong), Kuok Brothers (Malaysia), and 
Aditya Birla Group (India).The controlling shareholders might, for example, be 
the founders of the firm, their heirs, or private investors. Like other (non-family) 
public-listed firms, family firms are also required to establish a board of directors 
as the central governing body. However, it is contended that several factors that 
are idiosyncratic to family firms may influence the manner in which their 
governing boards are structured, which, in turn, may have implications for firm 
performance. Provided below is a brief overview from both agency theory and 
resource dependence theory on how specific family firm factors may influence the 
development of governance structure and related challenges in publicly-listed 
family firms compared to non-family firms. 
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From an agency theory perspective, there are two common types of 
problems a firm may face. First is a ‘type I’ agency problem when there is a 
separation of ownership (principal) from management (agent), where there are 
costs associated with managers potentially making choices that serve their self-
interests which may diverge from the principal’s interests, leading to lower firm 
performance ultimately (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For family firms, this 
traditional agency problem is generally seen as less of an issue. This is because as 
ownership becomes more concentrated (higher family firm ownership), firm 
performance is expected to be maintained or enhanced due to their personal 
interest as shareholders in the firm’s well-being (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Family shareholders who are also often active managers tend to safeguard the 
interests of the firm. However, while much of agency theory focuses on the 
incentives that affect management’s monitoring, the ability to monitor also 
potentially influences the type of governance structure firms choose, and the 
effect on firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
 
Resource dependence theory proposes that family business contacts and 
experience tend to add substantial business resources to firms, as family members 
often have contacts with external constituencies through their social and 
professional network (Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios, 2002). Prior studies by 
Carney (2005) suggest that family firms are likely to choose higher quality 
governance structures, and will be better managed due to families’ long-term 
investors’ commitment to the success of the firm they invest in. As such, family 
firms are likely to select better corporate governance mechanisms and outperform 
non-family firms. 
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The second type of agency problem a firm may face (also referred to as a 
‘type II’ agency problem) relates to the potential conflict between the controlling 
family and its minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). It is argued that 
family owners as dominant shareholders may hold stronger incentives to 
expropriate from the minority shareholders through excessive compensation, 
related-party transactions, and/or special dividends (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2000), ultimately leading to a lowering of firm value. Consequently, the 
controlling family shareholders’ incentive to extract private benefits raises the 
question of how to control type II agency problems. Prior research argues that 
board structure is an effective mechanism to deal with type II problems in family 
firms (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Anderson and Reeb, 2004). That is, the board of 
directors can enhance monitoring and restrict the opportunistic behaviour of 
controlling families to mitigate agency costs (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
However, it can also be argued that family firms are also more likely to choose 
board attributes that will help them into a position where decision-making is in 
their favour. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2004) find that in family firms, 
families usually try to minimise the presence of independent directors in order to 
more easily entrench themselves and extract private benefits from the firm. 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) find that family firms tend to have more 
CEO duality to maintain a close locus of control to ensure that family dominance 
can prevail. In particular, this threat is more imminent in firms in developing 
nations given their poorer legal and regulatory oversight. However, there is a lack 
of a more comprehensive analysis of systemic differences in the governance 
structure between family and non-family firms. 
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Consequently, two key research issues that arise are as follows: “Do 
family firms have different board structure from non-family firms?”, and, “Do 
board characteristics lead to different firm performance between family and non-
family firms?” Further, an additional dimension to consider in relation to 
challenges to family firm governance, particularly in Bangladesh, relates to their 
political connections and their effect on firm performance. Prior research suggests 
that political connections tend to be more common in developing countries where 
firms are controlled by a small number of families, and legal systems tend to be 
weak with high levels of corruption and political demands (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Chen, Li, Su and Sun, 2011; Faccio, 2006). In Bangladesh, family firms are well-
known for their political connections, with many such connections formed post-
colonisation (Kochanek, 1996). Existing studies have found mixed evidence of a 
relationship between political connections and firm performance. Political 
connections can have positive effects on firm performance because political 
connections may facilitate certain firms gaining benefits through easier access to 
debt financing, relaxed regulatory oversight, and preferential tax treatment 
(Hillman, 2005; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Li, 
Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Cooper, Gulen and Ovtchinnikov, 2010). On the 
other hand, political connections can be detrimental to firm performance due to 
rent seeking activities of the politically connected members (Boubakri, Cosset and 
Saffar, 2008; Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007). In fact, there is almost negligible 
empirical evidence on the relationship between family ownership, board political 
connections and firm performance. Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) state that 
a family name and family control can become the source of a reputation in the 
political market. Family members may maintain political relations to more easily 
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secure public transfers. Thus, the connection between family members in family 
firms and politicians deserves closer analysis. This gives rise to the third research 
question for this study. 
 
 In the following section, a more detailed discussion is provided for each 
of the three main research questions in this study. 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The first main research question for this study is as follows: 
RQ1: Does board structure, namely, board independence, board size, 
CEO duality, proportion of female directors and foreign directors, differ 
between family and non –family firms? 
 
Family firms are often built by founders who are strong and passionate 
about their business and subsequently, such firms in turn become closely linked 
with the family’s reputation. Consequently, there is often a strong sense of 
ownership and connection to the business by the family shareholders (Lee, 2006; 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003). This can be expected to increase the family 
shareholders’ need to dominate the governing board, particularly in public-listed 
firms, leading to preferences for selecting certain types of directors to work with 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003). Thus, it is likely that family 
directors in family firms would prefer boards that are not only effective in terms 
of maximising firm performance, but also ones that would be ‘yielding’ to their 
interests. Further, it can also be argued that with a strong family commitment to 
business prosperity, mimicking corporate governance mechanisms designed for 
non-family firms may, in fact, be inefficient for family firms, as they tend to 
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assume a greater divide between owners and management (Barney and Hansen, 
1994; Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007). As such, these factors have the potential to 
drive systematic differences in the board structure of family versus non-family 
firms. 
 
Prior studies based on agency theory suggest that board effectiveness is 
associated with higher independent directors (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996), 
smaller boards (Yermack, 1996), CEO non-duality (Daily and Dalton, 1993), 
female directors (Carter et al., 2003) and foreign directors (Oxelheim and Randoy, 
2003). Such board characteristics are seen to provide better monitoring and lower 
managerial entrenchment. On the other hand, resource dependency theory states 
that more effective boards tend to be comprised of more independent directors 
(Dyer, 1989),  larger boards (Jackling and Johl, 2009) and CEO duality (Boyd, 
1995), as they offer more experience and professional knowledge, which, in turn, 
increase the board’s ability to make better business decisions. Moreover, it can 
also be argued that female and foreign directors bring a variety of abilities, 
experiences, networks, and cultures which might add substantial business 
resources to the firms. Family firms with strong motivation to keep their business 
successful are, therefore, likely to invest in more diverse boards. 
 
On the other hand, a competing argument for how family firms may 
structure their boards is that they are also strongly driven to dominate decision-
making. As a result, their preference for more independent directors may be lower 
than in non-family firms as more independent directors mean less power and more 
external scrutiny. From an agency type II perspective, where family firms are 
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more inclined to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders, boards of 
family firms are likely to include fewer independent directors and more CEO 
duality. There is some empirical evidence to support this. For example, Anderson 
and Reeb (2004) find that families often seek to minimise independent directors 
on boards to exercise their power on the board, and Chen et al. (2005) document 
that CEO duality is much more likely in family firms compared to non-family 
firms. Likewise, Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) 
and Navarro and Anson (2009) find that family firms have fewer independent 
directors, a smaller board, and more CEO duality to retain control of the firm. 
 
However, while the few studies undertaken show that family firms may 
adopt different board structure (board independence, board size and CEO duality) 
from non-family firms, previous studies have not examined such differences in 
terms of female directors and foreign directors in family and non-family firms. 
Both these board attributes are critical for board diversity and performance. In 
Bangladesh, participation of females on boards is a more recent phenomenon. 
Female directors, who are appointed on the basis of family ties, usually increase 
firms’ voting power or dominance. Moreover, from a cultural perspective, in 
Bangladesh the views and opinions provided by a female member of the family 
may not be well taken by board members of family firms (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio, 2000). This implies that female directors can be appointed as a form of 
tokenism in family firms, and to increase board dominance by the family. In other 
words, family firms are likely to have a higher proportion of females on boards 
than non-family firms. However, this remains an empirical issue to date. 
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In the case of foreign directors, they are often seen as enriching board 
diversity; they are seen to bring additional resources through their knowledge, 
expertise and social capital. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) argue that foreign 
directors are also expected to have monitoring effects. Such directors can improve 
the accountability process in the light of their foreign experience and knowledge. 
Their monitoring may obstruct family directors from becoming entrenched and 
protect the interests of general shareholders. In Bangladesh, foreign directors are 
becoming increasingly common because of the growth in multinational ventures. 
If family firms are primarily concerned over firm performance, it is likely that 
they will have more foreign directors to help enrich decision-making. On the other 
hand, it is also likely that the demand for foreign directors is lower in family firms 
since foreign directors can obstruct family control. However, this also remains an 
empirical issue, and, thus, provides the motivation for the first research question 
of this thesis (as stated above) for study. 
 
The second main research question addressed in this thesis is as follows: 
RQ2: Does board structure, namely, board independence, board size, 
CEO duality, proportion of female directors and foreign directors, have 
an effect on the performance of family firms? 
 
The board of directors is considered to be the ‘apex’ of an organisation’s 
internal governance systems, and is responsible for monitoring management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Farooque et al. (2007) argue that, in Bangladesh, most 
of the firms are family controlled and corporate governance is relatively weak. 
Additionally, controlling families tend to fill the positions of executive directors 
and CEO, which increases the possibility of managerial entrenchment. Hence, 
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there is a high risk of expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by families. 
Given that minority shareholders rely on the corporate board to monitor and 
control the family’s opportunism, the board structure of a firm is an important 
internal governance mechanism, especially for family firms in Bangladesh. 
Westphal (1998) notes that a board of directors can have an important role in 
promoting firm performance in family firms when alternative governance 
mechanisms are weak. Farooque et al. (2007) argue that, in Bangladesh, the 
controlling families dominate the board and take important decisions in the 
majority of cases. Also, most family firms tend to appoint CEOs from their family 
members. 
 
Prior studies have also shown that board structure affects the quality of 
monitoring and subsequent firm performance. The board of directors as the 
monitoring mechanism for shareholders, however, may help to reduce the agency 
problem (Fama, 1980). Weisbach (1988) argues that the board of directors is the 
first-line of defence against incumbent managers. For instance, more diverse 
boards which include independent directors, females and foreign directors, are 
generally seen to improve board monitoring and performance (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; Erhardt et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). Yet, in the 
situation of family firms, it is unclear whether the different types of directors are 
able to freely monitor and guide the firm to better performance, as in non-family 
firms. 
 
Although a few studies have been conducted on board structure and 
performance in the context of family firms, none of them is focused on 
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Bangladesh. Further, prior studies also suggest that female directors and foreign 
directors are likely to have positive effects on firm performance. For example, the 
study by Carter et al. (2003) finds that gender diversity improves board 
monitoring, resulting in better performance. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) find 
that foreign board members signal a higher commitment to corporate monitoring 
and transparency which leads to an increase in firm performance. Whilst female 
directors and foreign directors have been found to be related to improve board 
effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003), their impact on 
firm performance in the presence of family dominance remains unclear. 
 
The second research question in this thesis addresses these various gaps in 
the family firm performance literature from the governing board structure 
perspective. 
 
The third and final main research question in this thesis is: 
RQ3: Do political connections influence the association between family 
ownership and firm performance? 
 
The importance of political connections to business entities has long been 
recognised. Prior studies find that political connections have a positive impact on 
performance (Hillman, 2005; Goldman et al., 2009; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Li 
et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010). They argue that politically-connected firms tend 
to obtain preferential benefits through their connections (such as contracts, tax 
benefits, etc.) which help them to enhance performance. Other studies, such as 
Boubakri et al. (2008), Fan et al. (2007) and Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and 
Thesmar (2007), find a negative relationship between political connections and 
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firm performance. They show that political connections induce more managerial 
entrenchment and the costs of rent seeking activities is likely to exceed the 
associated benefits. 
 
In this study, it is argued that the way owners and, in particular, family 
firm owners utilise their political connections will be highly relevant to the link 
between political connections and firm performance. How political connections 
are exploited and utilised in relation to firm activities is potentially related to the 
motivations and incentives of the family firm owners (Chen et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, both political connections and family firms are more prevalent in 
developing countries where legal systems tend to be weak, engendering high 
levels of corruption (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Chen, Li and 
Su, 2005). Family owners in such countries need to seek private protection for 
their property rights since legal protection is insufficient and/or unreliable 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Family owners are assumedly more committed and 
motivated to their businesses, in particular, taking a longer-term view and, relative 
to non-family firms, political connections in family firms can be utilised to 
enhance firm survival and performance (Morck and Yeung, 2004). On the other 
hand, it can be argued that family firms with political connections are more likely 
to exploit minority shareholders through rent seeking activities (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). Haque et al. (2011) argue that controlling shareholders in 
Bangladesh either become a part of the political process, such as a businessmen-
cum-politician, or develop strong personal and/or business relationships with 
political leaders and their families, or financial contributors to major political 
parties. Given that there is poor-quality law enforcement, unlike the common-law 
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economies of wealthy nations (Farooque et al., 2007), Bangladesh represents an 
interesting case for this study, since the entry of businessmen into politics is 
prevalent in the country (Haque et al., 2011). The study addresses this gap in the 
literature by investigating the relationship between political connections and 
performance of family firms. 
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses empirical data on 155 non-financial companies listed with 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009, producing a 
total sample of 775 sample year observations. Missing information, however, 
reduces the final sample to 654 firm-year observations over a five-year period. 
This study utilises data from the annual reports of the sample companies, the 
DataStream database, and the national election database. 
 
The three empirical studies of this thesis have used different regression 
techniques. For example, the first study utilised an OLS regression technique and 
simultaneous equations modelling (the three-stage least squares regression; 
3SLS). Consistent with the previous studies, this study develops a system of 
equations to address the issue of endogeneity (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Mak 
and Li, 2001). In the second study, following Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) OLS 
and instrumental variable regression techniques (2SLS) are used. Furthermore, a 
fixed effect technique is also used to address the unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
The third and final study uses an OLS regression technique. Consistent with 
Boubakri et al. (2008) and Chaney, Faccio and Parsley (2011), this study also 
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addresses the issue of endogeneity by applying an instrumental variables 
technique (2SLS). 
 
1.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The various data analyses lead to several important findings. With regard 
to the first study on the relationship between board structure and family firms, it is 
clear that family firms in Bangladesh adopt a distinctly different board structure 
from non-family firms. In particular, family firms have a lower proportion of 
independent directors than non-family firms. This result is similar to the findings 
of Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), however, 
contradictory to the findings of Navarro and Anson (2009) who fail to find any 
significant difference in terms of board independence between family and non-
family firms in developed countries. Furthermore, consistent with prior studies 
(Navarro and Anson, 2009; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006) this study finds 
that family firms have smaller boards and likely to have more CEO duality than 
their non-family counterparts. In terms of board diversity characteristics, this 
study finds that family firms relative to non-family firms have higher proportion 
of female directors and lower proportion of foreign directors. Overall, the results 
imply that families of Bangladeshi firms appear to maintain a close locus of 
control with little opportunity for external disciplining mechanisms to ensure that 
family dominance prevails. It is arguable that compared to non-family firms, 
boards of family firms are in a stronger position to sway decision-making in 
accordance with the controlling family interests given that there are lower 
independent and foreign directors (who are expected to act as external monitors), 
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and smaller boards with higher CEO duality (where CEO is in a more powerful 
position in decision making with fewer directors to contest decisions).   
 
The second study investigates the relationship between board structure and 
family firm performance. The results show that several board characteristics, 
namely, board independence, board size, female directors and foreign directors, 
have a weaker impact on performance of family firms compared to non-family 
firms, while CEO duality is found to have a stronger impact on firm performance. 
One possible explanation is that in family firms independent directors are not truly 
independent (i.e. individuals selected by family members whom they may have 
outside social connections), and board resources are not fully utilised as a 
consequence of family dominance. Further, the lack of impact of female and 
foreign directors also goes against predictions by resource-based theory as these 
resources do not seem to be used in family firms as found in other studies 
involving non-family firms (Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Hillman, Cannella, and 
Harris, 2002). This raises issues regarding the nature of association between 
female directors and foreign directors and family firms. For instance, female and 
foreign directors may be appointed for the sake of gaining control over the board 
by the few controlling family directors, and not allowed the latitude to question 
and improve organisational processes, and as such have little impact on firm 
performance. However, this remains an issue for future study. No doubt, the 
findings from the second study support previous studies from developed countries 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009 and Mishra et al., 2001), 
which in general suggest that the effects of board structure on firm performance 
are different in family firms compared to non-family firms.  
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With respect to the third study which focuses on the relationship between 
political connections and performance of family firms, the results reveal a 
significant interaction between political connections and family firms affecting 
firm performance. While for family firms, political connections are seen to have a 
positive impact on firm performance, the opposite, that is, a negative impact is 
evident for non-family firms. The findings are similar to the findings of Bertrand 
et al. (2007) and Fan et al. (2007) who reveal that political connections in non-
family firms are not economically efficient since they worsen firm performance. 
Interestingly, additional analysis reveals inter-generational differences within 
family firms, where political connections and firm performance are associated 
positively only when founder members act as CEOs or chairmen. When 
descendants serve as CEOs or chairmen, political connections are associated with 
poorer firm performance. The study thus not only suggests that family ownership 
could be a critical moderating factor on the link between political connections and 
firm performance, but also it depends upon the generation i.e. founder vs 
descendent. 
 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDIES 
The major contributions of the three empirical studies undertaken by this 
thesis are as follows. The first empirical study provides systematic evidence of 
differences in board structure between family and non-family firms in 
Bangladesh, and contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the study 
integrates agency theory and resource dependence theory specifically for family 
firms in Bangladesh. The integration of these two theories can assist in 
overcoming the theoretical weaknesses in choosing one approach at the expense 
24 
 
of the other (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). By considering these two theories 
concurrently in family firms, it brings to the fore the issue of the impact of factors 
such as female directors and foreign directors as critical features of a board to 
enhance monitoring. Second, there is a great deal of research that examines the 
relationship between family firms and corporate governance practices in 
developed countries (Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009; Navarro and Anson, 2009). This study, however, explores the impact of 
family firms on corporate board structure in a developing economy setting, where 
there is high ownership concentration and lack of shareholder activism, and poor 
regulatory oversight. A third contribution of the first study is that it extends 
several earlier studies by Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006), Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2009) and Navarro and Anson (2009), while examining the influence of family 
firms on board structure, by considering two important aspects of corporate 
boards, namely, female and foreign directors, which have received significantly 
less attention in the emerging economy context. 
 
The second empirical study contributes to the literature on the relationship 
between board structure and performance of family firms in Bangladesh in several 
ways. First, this study integrates agency theory and resource dependence theory, 
while examining the relationship between board structure and performance of 
family firms. A second contribution to the extant literature of this study is that it 
provides evidence, using secondary data from a developing country (i.e., 
Bangladesh), where there is a lack of research on the corporate governance 
practices of family firms. This study, therefore, extends the emerging research 
strand of several earlier studies on family firms, board structure and performance 
25 
 
by Ibrahim and Samad (2011), Lam and Lee (2008), Chen et al. (2005), and Ng 
(2005), with its contribution from a developing country’s perspective. In 
particular, although previous studies on corporate board structure by Carter et al. 
(2003), Erhardt et al. (2003) and Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) suggest that 
female and foreign directors improve board monitoring and effectiveness, none of 
the prior studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009; Mishra, Randoy and Jenssen, 2001), while examining the 
differences in the impact of board structure on performance between family and 
non-family firms, considers these two variables. This study, therefore, extends 
prior research by considering these two important aspects of board structure. 
 
The third empirical study examines the relationship between political 
connections and firm performance in family firms. It also makes several 
contributions. First, this study applies evolutionary psychology theory and agency 
theory to explain the relationship between political connection and family firm 
performance. In doing so, this study can better assess the ownership identity as an 
important feature which may influence firm performance. Second, political 
connections have received increasing attention in academic research recently 
(Bliss and Gul, 2012; Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishrs and Saffar, 2012; Bliss, Gul 
and Majid, 2011; Chaney et al., 2011; Faccio, 2006). However, understanding of 
the effect of political connections on family firms remains very limited (Xu, Xu 
and Tuan, 2012; Chen et al., 2005). This study addresses this research gap by 
identifying family ownership as a critical moderating factor on the link between 
political connections and firm performance. Third, prior studies (Molly et al., 
2010; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) investigating the impact 
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of family generations on firm value did not address the issue of political 
connections. This study extends the previous literature of generational impact on 
firm value by examining the link between family generations, political 
connections and firm performance.  Finally, this study adopts a wider approach to 
identify political connections. In particular, consistent with the prior studies by 
Faccio (2006) and Chaney et al. (2011), this study identifies a firm to be 
politically connected firm when a director is a member of parliament or a 
minister, and/or is publicly reported as having close relationships with politicians 
(e.g., in the news media). Further, a third criterion, that is, whether a director is a 
member of a political party who has contested previous elections, and/or is a 
committee member of a political party, has also been used. This broader approach 
of identification of political connections has helped this study to assess the impact 
of different levels of power and influence that are inherent in political connections 
on firm outcomes. 
 
1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This chapter has outlined the background and objectives of the thesis. The 
overall aim of the thesis is to examine the impact of family firms on corporate 
board structure, as well as the relationship between board structure and family 
firms’ performance. This thesis also examines the relationship between political 
connections and performance of family firms. The motivation and research 
questions for the three empirical studies are reported in this chapter. The final 
section outlines the expected contributions of the thesis. The remainder of this 
thesis consists of six chapters.  
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Chapter Two outlines the institutional, socio-economic background and 
legal environment of Bangladesh. The institutional setting provides an overall 
picture of the corporate environment in Bangladesh. This chapter also discusses 
about the main institutions that regulate the corporate governance practices for 
listed companies in Bangladesh. 
 
 Chapter Three reviews two important theories namely, agency theory and 
resource dependence theory that underpin the three empirical chapters in this 
thesis. This chapter also discusses about the importance of integration of agency 
theory and resource dependence theory, since this integration can assist to 
overcome the theoretical weaknesses in choosing one approach at the expense of 
the other. 
 
Chapter Four presents the first empirical study that investigates whether 
there are significant differences in corporate board structure between family and 
non-family firms. More specifically this chapter investigates whether Bangladeshi 
family firms utilise board structure to retain dominance on the board. 
 
Chapter Five presents the second empirical study that investigates whether 
there is a significant difference in the impact of board structure on performance 
between family and non-family firms. This study considers five board structure 
variables namely board independence, board size, CEO duality, female directors 
and foreign directors. 
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Chapter Six presents the third and last empirical study that investigates the 
relationships between political connections and performance of family firms, and 
how family ownership moderates the link between political connections and firm 
performance. This chapter also investigates the generational impact on the 
relationship between political connections and performance in family firms. 
 
The three empirical chapters in the thesis are configured in a consistent 
manner. The first section of each chapter reviews the background and motivation 
of the study. The second section of each chapter sets out the literature review and 
hypotheses development. This is followed by a discussion of the methodology and 
the results. The final section of each of these empirical chapters presents a chapter 
summary. 
 
Finally, Chapter Seven provides an overall summary of the three empirical 
studies undertaken in this thesis. It also discusses the contributions as well as the 
research implications of the findings of the empirical studies. The chapter ends 
with a discussion on limitations of three empirical studies and suggestions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section presents a brief 
outline of the socio-economic background of Bangladesh, followed by a section 
focusing on the institutional setting of Bangladesh. The institutional setting 
provides an overall picture of the corporate governance environment in 
Bangladesh. This chapter also delineates the major institutions that regulate the 
corporate governance practices for listed Bangladeshi companies. 
 
2.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BANGLADESH 
Bangladesh is a developing country in the South-Asia region, with a vast 
segment of the population living below the poverty line. Bangladesh emerged as 
an independent and sovereign state on 16 December 1971. It has a border on the 
west, north, and east with India, on the southeast with Myanmar (Burma), and the 
Bay of Bengal is to the south. The total area of Bangladesh is 147,570 square 
kilometres, and it has a population of approximately 162.22 million as at July 
2009, and a growth rate of 1.39 per cent. More than 75 per cent of the population 
lives in rural areas. 
 
Bangladesh has a common language and culture; Islam is the major 
religion and faith of 85 per cent of the population. However, other religions such 
30 
 
as Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity are also present in Bangladesh. Despite 
the presence of several religions there is a considerable degree of religious 
harmony. The official language is Bengali; English, however, is widely spoken. 
The cultural life of Bangladesh is characterised by the existence of strong family 
values, powerful elite groups and widespread corruption (Belal, 2001). 
Bangladesh is a democratic country with two major political parties, the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL). 
 
The growth performance of Bangladesh has considerably improved over 
the last few years. The GDP growth rate was 6.21 per cent in 2008. However, due 
to the global financial crisis, the growth for 2009 was slightly reduced to 5.9 per 
cent. Domestic and national savings as a percentage of GDP in 1998 were 17.4 
and 21.8, respectively, and rose to 20.1 and 29.2 in 2008, respectively. On the 
other hand, as a percentage of GDP, total public and private sector investment in 
Bangladesh was 14.3 in 1998, and reached 19.2 in 2008 (ADB, 2009). Investment 
in the private sector has been rising and, currently, the private sector accounts for 
about 79 per cent of total investment. Export earnings in 2002 were around US$6 
billion and, in 2009, export earnings reached US$15.56 billion (GOB, 2009). 
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Table 2.1  Bangladesh: Selected Economic Indicators 
Economic Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP per capita (in US$) 440.8 446.5 486.8 558.7 621.1 
Real GDP growth 5.96 6.63 6.43 6.21 5.90 
Inflation rate (average %) 6.5 7.2 7.2 9.9 6.7 
Private sector growth (%) 16.8 18.1 15.0 24.9 14.6 
Private investment as % of GDP 18.3 18.7 19 19.3 19.6 
Export growth (%) 14.0 21.5 15.8 17.4 10.1 
Import growth (%) 20.6 12.1 16.6 25.6 4.2 
Foreign exchange reserves (in 
billions) 
2.9 3.5 5.1 6.1 7.5 
Source: ADB, 2010. Asian Development Outlook 2010. Manila. 
 
Economic development is weak and the quality of life in Bangladesh is 
low due to the population density, low economic growth, lack of institutional 
infrastructure, an incentive dependence on agriculture and agricultural products, 
its geographical setting, and various other factors (UNDP, 2005). Despite 
sustained economic prospects, the country remains a developing country with an 
emerging economy. 
 
Although primarily an agrarian country, the industrial sector now makes a 
significant contribution to the economy of Bangladesh. The industrial sector is 
characterised by the domination of a large public sector, which suffers from huge 
losses each year because of inefficiencies and corruption. However, with the 
adoption of a market form of economy, Bangladesh is moving towards private 
sector-led industrialisation. The country has initiated a privatisation program since 
the 1980s with the aim of privatising the loss-making public sector. At present, 
the Bangladesh corporate sector consists of a few state-owned enterprises and a 
large number of private firms, and joint venture and multinational firms, but only 
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a few firms are listed on the stock exchanges. The capital market in Bangladesh is 
still in an emerging stage with market capitalisation amounting to only 17.06 per 
cent of GDP in 2009 (SEC, 2009). 
 
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF BANGLADESH 
A prior study by Prowse (1999), mentions that the development of corporate 
governance mechanisms depends on the political, cultural, and historical 
characteristics of a country. Bangladesh carries the legacy of almost two hundred 
years of British colonial rule. Farooque et al. (2007) point out that colonisation 
had a two-fold effect on the Bangladeshi corporate governance scenario: on one 
hand, Bangladesh inherited the British institutional and regulatory framework 
incorporating notions of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, an 
independent judiciary, and relevant legislation such as the Companies Act (1913); 
on the other hand, prolonged political and economic exploitation led to the 
development of very few entrepreneurs of Bengali origin. After the partition of 
India in 1947, Bangladesh became an eastern province of the independent 
Pakistan. However, it continued to be politically and economically exploited by 
West Pakistan. Humphrey (1987) reports that at the time of liberation from 
Pakistan in 1971, Bengalis owned only about 33 per cent of the fixed assets in the 
jute industry, and just over half in cotton textiles. However, outside these two 
industries, there were only six Bengali-owned enterprises. Bengalis were more 
interested in small and medium-sized industries, where they owned approximately 
20 per cent of fixed assets (Humphrey, 1987). However, the scenario changed 
completely when Bangladesh became independent in 1971 through a bloody 
liberation war. At that time, the West Pakistani owners and managers who were 
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running most of the private sector businesses fled the country, leaving a huge 
vacuum in the corporate sector. This, coupled with the new Bangladesh 
government’s socialist ideology, led to the nationalisation of most of the 
industries in Bangladesh. Humphrey (1987) reports that just after liberation in 
1971, government control over industrial assets jumped from 34 per cent to 92 per 
cent. However, soon, most of these nationalised firms started making significant 
losses, mainly through lack of management skills and expertise. This, along with 
subsequent changes in government, and pressure exerted by donor agencies (such 
as the World Bank) promoting a free market economy, resulted in the adoption of 
a denationalisation policy in 1975. As is the case for many countries in transition, 
the privatisation process was not transparent, resulting in many of the privatised 
state-owned industries being purchased by individuals, that is, private citizens 
(World Bank, 2009; Uddin and Hopper, 2003). Consequently, the industrial policy 
led to the rapid growth of a new family-based industrial elite, and, subsequently, 
to the present day Bangladesh capital market which is comprised of a large 
proportion of family-owned public-listed companies. While many of the new elite 
are drawn from the old, established business families, there is also a growing 
trend of new groups that have benefited from the patronage of successive 
governments. The leaders of the new industrial elite are active in politics and 
often their successes depend heavily on the political connections they maintain 
(Kochanek, 1996). This pattern of entrepreneurial development has had a major 
influence on the pattern of industrialisation, and the emergence of the business 
community as a force in the political process. In recent years, a large number of 
businessmen in Bangladesh have been connected to the two major political 
parties, the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the Bangladesh National Party 
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(BNP). In the present ninth parliament, 59 per cent of the elected Members of 
Parliament are businessmen, 44 per cent of whom have assets worth at least one 
crore taka (US$10 million) (Chowdhury, 2009). 
 
The Bangladeshi capital market is dominated by controlling families. A 
survey conducted by Sobhan and Werner (2003) finds that an overwhelming 
majority (73 per cent) of the boards of non-bank listed companies are heavily 
dominated by sponsor shareholders ‘who generally belong to a single family-the 
father as the chairman and the son as the managing director is the norm’ (Sobhan 
and Werner, 2003 p. 34). Farooque et al. (2007) find that around 78 per cent of 
CEOs are shareholders of the firm, either as founder shareholders or as 
descendants of founding families. Their study also shows that the five largest 
shareholders hold more than 50 per cent of shares in Bangladeshi companies. 
Farooque et al. (2007) observe that 
‘corporate governance systems in Bangladesh are firmly based on family 
ownership and insider domination. In most firms, majority shareholders 
are family groups and, in a few firms. …controlling families dominate the 
boards in most companies, filling positions of executive directors, and 
CEOs’ (p. 132). 
 
The dominance of family members in firm management leads to a 
tendency for important decisions to be made in family meetings which are then 
regularised in formal board meetings, making such meetings largely symbolic 
(Ahmed and Siddiqui, 2011). 
 
The corporate governance system that currently exists in Bangladesh can 
be described as a weak form of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system. Although Bangladesh has a market-based system similar to Anglo-
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American firms, it lacks an active market for corporate control, and strong 
incentive contracts for management and outside directors (Farooque et al., 2007). 
Also, unlike the Anglo-American countries, the market for takeovers is weak and 
under-developed in Bangladesh. Other important features are the absence of a 
liquid capital market, or an important control mechanism such as share-based 
(options) compensation. Further, corporate boards in Bangladesh have one-tier 
like those in the US and UK. Unlike many continental European countries such as 
Germany and Finland, there is no supervisory board. Both the executive and the 
non-executive directors perform duties together in one organisational layer, which 
is common in Anglo-Saxon countries. Therefore, there is a different institutional 
setting in Bangladesh than in the developed economies, which is unique. 
 
The legal and regulatory framework and its enforcement are relatively 
poor in Bangladesh, which critically hinders the market’s potential growth 
(Farooque et al., 2007). Moreover, the judicial systems in Bangladesh are not well 
organised to oversee corporate affairs. Therefore, the absence of well-defined 
property rights means minority shareholders are poorly protected (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Effective legal protection for investors is indispensable for the 
development and the restoration of public confidence in the developing securities 
market of Bangladesh. 
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During the period 1993 to 2009 eight major developments took place in 
regard to corporate financial reporting and governance which have influenced the 
corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. These events are outlined in the 
following table: 
Year Major events 
1993 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established under the 
SEC Act of 1993. 
1995 The Companies Act 1913 was replaced by the new Companies Act 1994. 
1997 Compliance with International Accounting Standards (IASs) and 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) was made mandatory for listed 
companies. 
1997 The SEC amended the Securities and Exchange Rules (SER) of 1987 to 
require listed companies to prepare half-yearly financial statements within 
one month of the close of the first half-year of its accounting year. 
2000 The SEC amended the Securities Exchange Rules (SER) 1987 to require, 
among other things, that the financial statement of an issuer shall be audited 
within 120 days, or within a period as extended by the SEC. 
2006 The SEC issued an order for complying with a number of governance 
guidelines. 
2008 The SEC issued an order that listed companies should include a statement in 
their yearly and periodical financial statements which explains that the 
financial statements are in compliance with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). 
2009 The SEC issued an order that all listed companies (except life insurance 
companies) are required to submit interim financial reports to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Stock Exchanges within forty-
five days of the end of the first quarter, and thirty days of the end of the 
third quarter of the financial year. These interim financial reports may be 
audited or un-audited and need to be published in at least two widely-
circulated national dailies, one in Bengali and the other in English. 
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The current legal framework surrounding entities in Bangladesh includes: 
the Companies Act 1994, Bangladesh Bank Order 1972, the Bank Companies Act 
1991, the Financial Institutions Act 1993, the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 
1969, the Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993, and the Bankruptcy 
Act 1997 (Sobhan and Werner, 2003). Presently, the following five established 
institutions in Bangladesh are working on corporate governance regulations: the 
accounting professional bodies, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Stock Exchanges, and the 
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) - a government office. The SEC and 
Institute of Chartered Accountants are autonomous bodies which are indirectly 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce, respectively. 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute is a private institution which provides valuable 
recommendations on corporate governance matters to the government, stock 
exchanges and non-government organisations. Finally, the Registrar of Joint 
Stock Companies (RJSC) is directly controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Figure 
2.1). 
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2.3.1 The Companies Act, 1994 
In Bangladesh, companies are registered, and their affairs are governed, 
under the Companies Act, 1994. This Act plays the major role in corporate 
governance and defines the rights of shareholders. It provides certain supervisory 
rights to shareholders, such as rights to attend meetings, elect and remove 
directors, the right to access to financial information and the right to receive 
dividends. In addition, under this Act, the minority shareholders having at least 
ten per cent of the outstanding shares may seek remedies in the court in the case 
of any reservations about the corporate activity. The Companies Act also sets a 
number of rules covering management and administration of a company. This Act 
also provides a list of mandatory items to be disclosed in the balance sheet and 
income statement, and a list of information items that must be disclosed in the 
directors’ report. According to this Act the auditor should present an audit report 
at the annual general meeting of the company. 
 
2.3.2 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established in 1993 
under the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, for the 
protection of the interests of investors, and to regulate and develop the securities 
markets. The SEC in Bangladesh plays a vital role in monitoring and enforcing 
the mandatory disclosure compliance of listed companies (Akhtaruddin, 2005). 
 
In 2001, the SEC undertook various legal and institutional reforms to 
ensure good corporate governance and the accountability of listed companies. 
These reforms, among others, included: the compulsion for listed companies to 
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adopt and apply International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International 
Standards of Auditing (ISA), and the imposition of penalties in the event of non-
payment of declared dividends by listed companies (SEC, 2001). 
 
Recently, the SEC issued a brief corporate governance order only 
applicable to publicly-listed firms in Bangladesh (SEC, 2006). The adoption of 
the SEC order (2006) is not mandatory; rather, it is applicable on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis.4 Therefore, a vast majority of Bangladeshi companies do not have 
any mandatory or ‘best practice’ guidance as far as corporate governance is 
concerned. The SEC order is in line with the western-styled shareholder model of 
corporate governance, and contains provisions such as a single-tiered board, the 
presence of at least 10 per cent independent members5, separation of CEO and the 
chairman, and the presence of an audit committee. Very recently, the SEC (2012) 
has invited comments on proposals for reforming the SEC (2006) order. Major 
proposals include increasing the number of independent directors on boards, 
specifying qualifications for independent directors, and enhancing the role of the 
audit committee. 
 
 
                                                 
4 This mechanism provides both flexibility in the application of the ‘Corporate Governance 
Notification’ and a means by which compliance can be assessed. Any non-compliance or non-
application of the relevant rule can still be said to be consistent with the spirit of the notification. 
Non-compliances/non-applications are to be monitored by shareholders. 
5 SEC (2006) defines an independent director as one ‘who does not hold any share in the company 
or who holds less than 1 per cent of total paid-up shares of the company; who is not connected 
with the company or its promoters or directors on the basis of family relationship; who does not 
have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, with the company or its subsidiary/ 
associated companies; who is not a member, director or officer of any stock exchange; and who is 
not a shareholder, director or officer or member of a stock exchange or an intermediary of the 
capital market.’ 
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2.3.3 The Stock Exchanges 
The stock exchanges are non-government independent regulators who play 
vital roles in the improvement of corporate governance in Bangladesh. The capital 
market facilitates good governance through information production and 
monitoring. The capital market of Bangladesh consists of two stock exchanges: 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). The Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) was formed in 1954 and registered as a limited liability 
company. The Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) was set up in 1995. Both stock 
exchanges are regulated under the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 and the 
Companies Act. The stock exchanges, which are largely private voluntary bodies 
and are examples of self-regulatory regimes, may be considered as regulatory 
bodies in that they maintain official and unofficial working relationships with the 
government and enforce, although softly, corporate governance rules (Securities 
and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Section 34-1). The stock exchanges in Bangladesh 
are trying to enhance the confidence of investors in the capital market through 
close observation of share price behaviour, and have de-listed (or imposed fines 
on) several errant firms (firms which did not hold AGMs, give dividends or 
submit regular audited financial accounts). However, the existing judicial 
structure, together with the Companies Act and other SEC regulations and poor 
enforcement are undermining the stock exchanges’ efforts to enforce better 
governance practices in the capital market (Haque, 2009). The following tables 
show the features of the DSE and CSE from 2003 to 2009. 
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Table 2.2: Key Statistics of Listed Companies in the DSE 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
No. of Listed 
Securities 267 256 286 310 350 412 415 
No. of Listed 
Companies 249 237 247 255 266 276 282 
Issued 
Capital (Mil. 
Tk.) 46,055 49,533 70,313 118,437 214,472 372,156 521,632 
Market 
Capitalization 
(Mil. Tk.) 897,587 224,923 233,075 323,368 753,955 1,059,530 1,887,177 
Annual 
Turnover 
(Mil. Tk.) 19,154 53,181 64,835 65,079 322,867 667,965 1,475,301 
DSE All 
Share Price 
Index 967.88 1,294.81 1321.39 1,267.97 2,535.96 2,795.34 3747.53 
Source: Web site of Dhaka Stock Exchange 
 
Table 2.3: Key Statistics of Listed Companies in the CSE 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
No. of Listed 
Securities 172 182 184 198 204 216 227 
No. of Listed 
Companies 185 195 198 213 219 231 245 
Issued 
Capital (Mil. 
Tk.) 31,907 44,361 49,988 62,591 81,032 102,220. 137,421 
Market 
Capitalization 
(Mil. Tk.) 60,209 125,911 203,044 196,341 398,499 777,743 962,477 
Annual 
Turnover 
(Mil. Tk.) 10,912 8,440 16,787 11,408 34,177 79,254 125,149 
CSE All 
Share Price 
Index 1,841.24 2,329.46 3,347.10 2,879.19 5,194.77 9,050.56 10,477.67 
Source: Web site of Chittagong Stock Exchange 
 
It is evidenced from the above tables that the number of listed securities 
has increased from 267 (2003) to 415 (2009) on the DSE, and 172 (2003) to 227 
(2009) on the CSE, within a span of seven years. The market capitalization of 
companies has grown by 110 per cent on the DSE, and 1,499 per cent on the CSE 
from 2003-2009. The CSE is smaller than the DSE in terms of annual turnover, 
number of listed securities, and market capitalisation. However, the CSE attained 
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a much higher all share price index (10,477.67) than that of the DSE (3,747.53) in 
2009, which indicates stronger investor confidence in listed securities on the CSE 
than on the DSE. 
 
2.3.4 The Accounting Professional Bodies 
The accounting profession can act as a major proponent of better corporate 
governance practice. There are two professional accounting bodies in Bangladesh: 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), and the Institute of 
Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB). The financial audits 
are done by members of ICAB, and the cost audits by members of ICMAB. 
However, both of these bodies are under the control of the Ministry of Commerce, 
Bangladesh. Both institutes are run and managed by council members, who are 
elected internally, and representatives from the government. The ICAB is the 
national professional accounting body in Bangladesh established under the 
Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order 1973 (Presidential Order No. 2 of 
1973). This regulatory body provides the framework for corporate disclosure in 
Bangladesh. The ICAB has adopted a number of the International Accounting 
Standards (IASs) and International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) as Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BASs) and Bangladesh Standards on Auditing (BSAs), 
respectively. The accounting standards issued by the ICAB are recommendatory 
in nature, as the ICAB has no power of its own to enforce compliance with 
accounting standards. However, the SEC has made it mandatory for listed 
companies in Bangladesh to comply with the accounting standards set by the 
ICAB. 
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2.3.5 Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) 
The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) is a non-government, non-profit 
and non-political research centre established in October 2000. The institute is 
registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, Bangladesh, under the 
Societies Registration Act. The Institute promotes issues of importance to the 
private sector and seeks to initiate essential measures and influence policy for the 
development of a market-oriented economy, as well as the sustainable growth of 
trade, commerce and industry. Moreover, the BEI is engaged in advocacy work on 
corporate governance practices in all sectors to lay a solid foundation for the 
growth of capital markets. Therefore, the main aim of the BEI is to establish a 
sound practice of corporate governance in Bangladesh, through its continuous 
research, training, discussions and dialogues. The Institute also provides 
suggestions to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enhance corporate governance practices in 
Bangladesh. 
 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a brief background on Bangladesh and its 
economy. Bangladesh has a different institutional setting than the developed 
economies. The present formal framework for corporate governance practices for 
listed companies in Bangladesh comprises the company law and capital market 
law. Private organisation such as the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute provides 
some suggestions and the Securities and Exchange Commission imposes some 
conditions in their notification to enhance corporate governance practices in 
Bangladesh. 
45 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The major objective of this chapter is to discuss the common theoretical 
frameworks that have been used to explain the selection of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the impact of corporate governance on firm outcomes. More 
specifically, this chapter discusses agency theory and resource dependence theory, 
and their relevance in explaining the impact of firm ownership on board structure, 
political connections and firm performance. Section 3.2 briefly discusses agency 
theory, managing the agency problem, and family firms and agency problems. 
Section 3.3 outlines the resource dependence theory. Section 3.4 discusses the 
integration of agency and resource dependence theory. The final section 
summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 AGENCY THEORY 
It is argued that the divorce of ownership and control has given rise to the 
‘agency problem’. Berle and Means (1932) discuss the extent to which increasing 
the dispersion of shareholdings, leads to the separation of ownership and control 
in the USA. This issue was raised by Adam Smith (1776) more than three 
centuries ago, as mentioned by Cadbury (2002): 
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“The directors of such companies (joint stock) however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company” 
(p. 4). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop the idea of characterising the modern 
corporation as an agency relationship. They identify the managers of the company 
as the ‘agents’ and the shareholders as the ‘principal’. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) explain agency relationship as: 
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf that 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent’’ (p. 
305). 
 
The problem arises because the agents do not necessarily make decisions 
in the best interests of the principal (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lambert, 2001; 
Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang, 2009; Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
 
The most important potential conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders can lead to much greater reductions in shareholders’ wealth and, 
therefore, much greater agency costs. Denis (2001) notes three main causes of 
such conflicts, which include: (a) the managers’ desire to retain their jobs and the 
shareholders’ need to replace them if the management team does not show their 
ability to run the firm well; (b) different levels of risk-bearing between the 
shareholders and managers, such as shareholders preferring to hold a well- 
diversified financial portfolio so that the shareholders’ holdings in any particular 
firm represent a comparatively small proportion of their overall wealth, thereby 
creating a comparatively small negative effect on their wealth if a project fails in 
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any one firm. However, the manager of a firm has the majority of his human 
capital as well as some of his financial capital tied up in the firm. He will, 
therefore, suffer a greater loss than the shareholders if a project fails, and this 
generates conflicts of interest regarding investment policy; (c) different views on 
the use of free cash flow6 which sometimes create serious conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders. For instance, shareholders would prefer that 
free cash flow should be returned to them either through dividends or share 
repurchases. On the other hand, a manager prefers to hold on to the cash flow 
and/or invest it in negative net present value (NPV) projects rather than return it to 
shareholders. A manager may prefer to maximise the value of assets under his 
control. He may like value, power and prestige. Therefore, he can invest in a bad 
project that will increase sales revenue. It will always be more prestigious for him 
to run a firm with greater sales. Moreover, frequently the executive compensation 
package is related to the firm size. 
 
Also, Dey (2008) states the conflict between managers and shareholders as: 
“The relationship between shareholders and corporate managers is 
fraught with conflicting interests that arise due to the separation of 
ownership and control, divergent management and shareholder objectives, 
and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Due to 
these conflicting interests (collectively referred to as agency conflicts), 
managers have the incentives and ability to maximise their own utility at 
the expense of corporate shareholders” (p. 1144). 
 
This conflict of interest amplifies the agency problem because it enables 
the agents to manipulate the information and/or take actions that favour their own 
interest. This provides the principals with reasons for investing in monitoring and 
incentives (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling and Dino, 2005). 
                                                 
6 Free cash flow is generated by the firm in excess of the amount required to fund all available 
positive Net-Present Value (NPV) projects. 
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3.2.1 Agency Costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the principal has to incur some 
costs to ensure that the agent will maximise the principal’s welfare. The costs so 
incurred are generally termed agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also 
argue that agency costs can be defined as the sum of the following three 
components, monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss (Figure 3.1). 
 
Monitoring costs 
Monitoring costs are expenditures paid by the principal to monitor an 
agent’s behaviour. Information asymmetries between shareholders or bondholders 
and corporate executive management create the necessity for monitoring (costs) 
and complicate the structuring of financial contracts. They may include the costs 
of preparing reliable accounting information and audits, executive compensation 
contracts and the cost of replacing managers. 
 
Bonding costs 
To minimise monitoring costs, managers tend to set in place principles or 
structures and try to act in the shareholders’ best interests. The costs related to 
encouraging the agent to behave in such a way that is not harmful to the 
principals’ interests, are known as bonding costs. For example, they may include 
the costs of additional information disclosure to shareholders. 
 
Residual loss 
Despite monitoring and bonding, the interests of managers and 
shareholders are still unlikely to be fully aligned. There is always likely to be a 
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divergence between an agent’s decision and a decision that could maximise the 
principals’ interests. The monetary equivalent of the reduction in principals’ 
interests because of this divergence is regarded as the residual loss. 
 
These agency costs are minimised where the contracting arrangement is 
optimal between the agent and the principal (Hossain and Taylor, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
Figure 3.1:  Types of Agency Costs 
 
3.2.2 Managing the Agency Problem 
Denis (2001) states that there are three general ways to encourage 
management to act in the interests of shareholders: (a) bond the agent 
contractually to do as the principal would like; (b) have managers monitor the 
agent’s actions to ensure that they carry out their activities to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth; and (c) provide management with incentives such that it is 
in their own interest to do so. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that the agency 
problem can be solved in the following ways: (a) with optimal contracts between 
principals (investors) and agents (managers), for example, compensation 
agreements which seek to align the interest of the entrepreneurs/agents with those 
Agency Costs 
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of external shareholders. These contracts frequently require agents to disclose 
relevant information that helps principal (investors) to monitor compliance with 
contractual agreements and to examine, whether agents (managers) have managed 
the firm’s resources in the interests of the principals; (b) the board of directors 
could reduce the agency problem by monitoring and taking disciplinary action on 
behalf of shareholders; and (c) information intermediaries, such as financial 
analysts and rating agencies, may mitigate agency problems between agents and 
principals by producing private information to disclose managerial expropriation. 
 
The pattern of the ownership structure of a corporation is likely to affect 
the nature of agency problems between managers and shareholders. One of the 
most common types of ownership is managerial ownership. The level of 
managerial ownership can mitigate the agency problem since it aligns the interests 
of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Involving the outside 
block holders, such as institutional investors, in monitoring between shareholders 
and managers results in lower agency problems (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Singh 
and Davidson, 2003). Another kind of commonly-observed ownership structure is 
family ownership (La Porta et al., 1999). In a family controlled firm, conflicts of 
interest may arise between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, 
as the controlling shareholders may take actions for their own benefits at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. Related to this, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
point out that controlling shareholders might not have a convergence of interests 
with minority shareholders. A greater degree of control by controlling 
shareholders, therefore, implies a greater ability to expropriate the wealth of 
minority shareholders. In closely held family firms, agency problems are not a 
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result of separation of ownership and control, but of controlling shareholders not 
necessarily acting in the best interests of minority shareholders. Hence, there is 
the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). The agency problem, therefore, shifts from 
the conventional manager–shareholder conflict to a controlling and minority 
shareholders’ conflict. The board of directors may help to reduce this agency 
problem through better monitoring (Fama, 1980). In family firms, however, the 
minority shareholders potentially depend on the board of directors to monitor and 
control the family’s opportunism because of the weak governance system 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
 
3.2.3 Family Firm and Agency Problem 
Fama and Jensen (1983) note that agency problems between managers and 
shareholders could be reduced if the residual claimants and the decision agents are 
the same. In other words, when ownership and control lie with the same 
individual, the need for costly monitoring by outside shareholders is reduced, and, 
consequently, increases firm value. Fama and Jensen (1983) also observe that 
family-controlled firms fall under this characterisation of ownership and control: 
“Family members have many dimensions of exchange with one another 
over a long horizon and, therefore, have advantages in monitoring and 
disciplining related decision agents” (p. 306). 
 
However, family firms are likely to face different types of agency 
problems from those of non-family firms. Agency problems arise from the 
separation of ownership and management (the type I agency problem), and 
conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (the type II agency 
problem). Family firms face less severe type I agency problems compared to type 
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II agency problems (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan, 2007; Jaggi, Leung and Gul, 2009). 
 
Ali et al. (2007) note that family firms face severe type II agency problems 
because of the family’s significant share ownership and control over the board. 
They also note that family firms are likely to be less independent because of being 
dominated by family members. Moreover, family members may seek more private 
benefits7 at the expenses of minority shareholders when they enjoy substantial 
control. In addition, type II agency problems may lead to manipulation of 
accounting earnings and delays in the disclosure of bad news (Ali et al., 2007). 
 
There are several features of family firms that reduce the agency problem 
and maximise firm value. These are discussed below. 
 
Economic incentives to monitor 
A family’s wealth is closely linked to the firm’s welfare, therefore, a 
family may have strong economic incentives to monitor managers, which 
minimises the free-rider problem inherent with small, atomistic shareholders 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This incentive is likely to 
be stronger in the case of founding family ownership, since founding families 
generally invest the majority of their private wealth in the firm and are not well-
diversified. Therefore, economic incentives to monitor diminish agency conflicts 
and maximise firm value. 
 
                                                 
7 Bebchuk and Kahan (1990) define private benefit as “any value captured by those controlling the 
company after the control contest and not shared among shareholders at large” (p. 1090). 
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Probable longer horizons in the firms 
Families have much longer investment horizons than other shareholders. 
Thus, family firms that have shareholders with longer investment horizons suffer 
less managerial myopia which will help not to sacrifice better investment in order 
to boost current or short-term earnings (Stein, 1988). In addition, families 
consider their firms as assets to pass on to succeeding generations, rather than 
wealth to consume during their lifetime. Thus, firm survival is an important 
concern for families (Chami, 1999). Besides, their investment decisions are based 
on long-term value maximization of firms (James, 1999). 
 
Reputation concerns 
The family name itself is a carrier of a reputation in economic and political 
markets, giving “reputational benefits” (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003). 
The long-term time horizon of family ownership creates a solid reputation which 
is likely to affect relationships with customers and external suppliers of capital, 
and also creates longer-lasting economic consequences. Anderson et al. (2003) 
suggest that family firms enjoy a lower cost of debt financing than non-family 
firms. They attribute this finding to the unique interests generated by long-term 
family commitments to the firm, and suggest that bondholders view founding 
family ownership as an organisational structure that reduces the conflicts between 
shareholders and themselves and, therefore, better protects their interests. 
 
Although prior literature suggests that family ownership and control 
results in a number of benefits, family influences can also create several potential 
costs: 
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Different investment decisions by families 
Some managerial actions in family-controlled firms benefit themselves at 
the expenses of firm performance because of their substantial ownership of cash 
flow rights (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Thus, the combination of management 
and control might lead to sub-optimal investment decisions since the interests of 
the family members are not necessarily in line with those of minority shareholders 
(Fama and Jensen, 1985). A family’s entrenchment in the firm may provide 
incentive to the family members to exchange profits for private rents, instead of 
maximizing firm value (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001a). Therefore, a firm may 
allocate its resources to inefficient projects (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
 
Less possibility of bidding by other agents 
Higher family ownership stakes reduce the probability of bidding by other 
external investors and, thereby, leads to a lower market valuation (Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989). This is because family members can obtain more private 
benefits through their voting rights, to the exclusion of other shareholders. 
 
Family influences in selecting CEOs and directors 
A family’s influence in selecting managers and directors may result in 
greater managerial entrenchment, which might lead to poor performance, since 
external parties can hardly capture control over the firm. Moreover, families often 
tend to favour family members when filling executive management positions and, 
hence, restrict the labour pool to a very small group from which to obtain 
qualified and capable talent, potentially leading to a competitive disadvantage for 
family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Yammeesri and Lodh (2004) find that it 
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is a common practice that family firms will hire executives from within the 
family, regardless of the ability of the family members. The entrenchment of 
family executives might also cause founders to remain active in firms even though 
they are no longer capable. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), therefore, argue that this 
is one of the greatest costs that large shareholders can impose. They also find that 
as a firm ages, the performance of a family firm gets worse relative to a non-
family firm, because as firms age, family members have less to contribute to firm 
productivity and efficiency (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth 
Families are capable of expropriating the wealth of the minority 
shareholders through excessive compensation, related-party transactions, or 
special dividends. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) argue that sometimes a 
family’s desire for taking special dividends can hamper a firm’s capital expansion 
plans, which can lead to lower operating and stock market performance. 
 
Negative effect on employee effort and productivity 
If family members act for their own interests, it can adversely affect 
employee effort and productivity (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997). Family 
firms may hire family members out of altruism but fail to retain competent, 
unrelated employees. The effect of such altruism may harm venturing value since 
employees are often unqualified for the position they hold (Lubatkin, et al., 2005). 
Therefore, employee productivity might be decreased. 
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3.3 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
The resource dependence theory concentrates on strategic actions of 
organisations that are inclined to manage and control resource-scarcity within 
organisations through interdependence with other firms in their environment 
(Mustakallio, 2002). The key success of a business depends on its ability to 
control important environmental resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Related 
to this, Pfeffer (1981) argues that firms could raise their power by acquiring 
control over vital environment resources, and by having a dynamic managerial 
approach to administering their external dependencies. As a result, firms could 
reduce the impact of external threats. 
 
The board of a firm is a mechanism that might facilitate access to 
resources which are important to company success. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
argue that board members’ individual experience and occupational background 
are main components of boards’ capital and, hence, of its ability to provide 
resources. The board of directors provides the firm with resources such as advice, 
counsel, know-how, legitimacy and reputation. Moreover, the board can also offer 
channels for communicating information among external organisations and other 
firms. It can further promote preferential access to commitments or support from 
important elements outside of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The board of 
directors provides these resources through their social and professional networks 
(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004a). 
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) propose two main roles for boards of directors, 
namely, strategy and service beyond the monitoring and control roles. Both of 
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these roles clearly fall within resource dependence theory. They depict the 
‘strategy role’ as the directors’ active involvement in the strategic arena through 
advice and counsel to the CEO, and the ‘service role’ as enhancing company 
reputation, establishing contacts with the external environment and giving advice 
and counsel to executives. 
 
Furthermore, boards of directors provide access to the resources needed by 
the firm, for example, a director who is an executive of a financial institution 
could help to get secure lines of credit, or a lawyer could provide legal advice to 
the firm, which might otherwise be more costly for the firm to secure (Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003). 
 
The resource dependence view proposes that a board’s provision of 
resources is related to firm performance. Resources help reduce dependency 
between the organisational and external contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), reduce uncertainty for the firm (Pfeffer, 1972), lower transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1984), and, ultimately, assist in the survival of the firm (Sing, House 
and Tucker, 1986). 
 
In a family firm the experience of family members, their expertise, skills 
and resources may also contribute to the prospects of the firm. Astrachan et al. 
(2002) argue that every succession in a family firm adds significant valuable 
business experience to the firm. Moreover, family business experience might add 
substantial business resources to the family firm through discussions between 
them and contracts with external constituencies through family members’ social 
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and professional networks. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) argue that 
directors who are connected to the firm through family relationships often have 
more incentive to provide advice and counsel, call upon connections to other 
organisations, encourage communication flows, and act to improve the external 
image of the firm. 
 
3.4 INTEGRATION BETWEEN AGENCY AND RESOURCE 
DEPENDENCE THEORIES 
Agency theory asserts that managerial incentives are likely to motivate 
managers to improve performance, regardless of the managerial ability to monitor. 
Conversely, resource dependence theory highlights the resources supplied by the 
board without considering managerial incentives to monitor (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). The board’s ability and incentives are likely to affect monitoring and 
performance. Both theories are similarly constrained to a particular antecedent, 
such as incentives or board resources. Applying each theory separately, however, 
does not contribute to developing a more complete picture of the types of factors 
that influence effective monitoring and provision of resources. 
 
It is argued that integration of these two theories will help to establish, and 
eventually to legitimise, a more parsimonious corporate governance model which 
can explain the relationship between board structure and firm performance in a 
broader fashion. 
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Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hillman and Dalziel (2003: 390) 
Figure 3.2: Integrations of Agency and Resource Dependence Theory 
 
 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter underpins the various theoretical issues that may potentially 
explain how family ownership affects corporate governance mechanisms, and, in 
particular, board structure and its impact on firm performance. Several features of 
family firms, such as families’ economic incentives to monitor, families’ long-
term investment horizons, and the family reputation, reduce the type I agency 
problem and maximise firm value. However, family influences can create agency 
problem type II, such as the families’ entrenchment in the firm, which may 
provide incentives to family members to exchange profits for private rents, and 
influence the selection of managers and directors. Corporate governance 
mechanisms, in particular board structure, can be used to mitigate agency 
Agency theory Resource 
dependence theory 
Incentive to monitor Ability to monitor 
Firm performance 
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problems and minimise agency costs. Agency theory depicts that the board 
structure of a firm reflects the extent to which management dominates the board 
and, thus, there is a direct link between board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. Similarly, political connections enhance managerial entrenchment 
and help to extract private benefits at the expenses of minority shareholders. 
 
On the other hand, the resource dependence theory view is that resources 
provided by the board are directly linked to firm performance. Board structure is 
one of the characteristics of the firm’s environment that helps the firm to acquire 
resources. In family firms, the experience of family members, their expertise, 
skills and resources may also contribute to the long-term prospects of the firm. 
 
Thus, this chapter gives an outline of the theoretical aspects relating to 
family firms, board structure, political connections and firm performance. The 
following chapter, Chapter Four, presents the first empirical study relating to 
whether there are significant differences in corporate board structure between 
family and non-family firms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
IMPACT OF FAMILY FIRM ON CORPORATE 
BOARD STRUCTURE 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the first empirical study of this thesis and 
investigates whether there are significant differences in corporate board structure 
between family and non-family firms. This chapter considers five board structure 
variables, namely, board independence, board size, CEO duality, female directors, 
and foreign directors. 
 
There has been a long strand of research that has focused on firm ownership 
and board structure (Lasfer, 2006; Mak and Li, 2001; Denis and Sarin, 1999; 
Mangel and Singh, 1993; Shivdasani, 1993). Prior studies suggest that family 
firms have different corporate governance from their non-family counterparts 
(Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Navarro and 
Anson, 2009), and that several conventional governance mechanisms for 
controlling type I agency problems (i.e., the takeover market, institutional 
investors and incentive compensation) are less effective in dealing with type II 
agency problems. This implies that other internal governance mechanisms such as 
board structure may be more significant in controlling type II agency problems 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Therefore, the first study of this thesis aims to 
investigate whether the board structure of family firms is different from non-
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family firms, using data from listed non-financial companies in Bangladesh 
during the period 2005 to 2009. 
 
A large body of previous research on family firms has been conducted in 
countries with effective governance mechanisms in place (Anderson and Reeb, 
2004; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). The 
research on family firms should assume more importance for emerging markets 
where corporate management may find expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
interest easy because of the lack of effective governance structures. Furthermore, 
the implications for corporate governance of a number of board characteristics 
which are more distinctive to developing capital markets in the Asian region, such 
as the emerging participation of women on boards and the growing number of 
foreign directors, remain largely unexplored. 
 
Prior research in developed capital markets has found that board 
independence, board size and CEO duality are critical internal governance 
mechanisms (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). However, 
evidence from family firms, particularly in developing economies, remains 
limited. Further, prior studies also suggest that female directors and foreign 
directors are important board characteristics. A more gender-diverse board is 
generally seen to enhance monitoring and improve board independence (Carter et 
al., 2003). Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva (2007) find evidence that there is a link 
between founding family firms and the gender of the directors. They argue that 
females are often selected as board members based on family ties to enhance 
family dominance, and they also act as family delegates in family firms. Further, 
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foreign directors can also improve board effectiveness. Oxelheim and Randoy 
(2003), for example, find that foreign board members signal a higher commitment 
to corporate monitoring and transparency which leads to an increase in firm 
performance. Whilst female directors and foreign directors have been found to be 
related to board effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003) in 
developed countries, the difference in board structure between family and non-
family firms, in terms of these two board variables in a developing market setting, 
remains unexplored. 
 
Bangladesh is an emerging economy characterised by concentrated 
ownership and poor investor protection and a weak legal system.8 Good corporate 
governance practices in Bangladesh are yet to be developed (Siddiqui, 2010), 
which gives Bangladeshi family firms strong impetus to dominate the public-
listed firms. Thus, an investigation into the link between board structure and 
family firms, compared to that in non-family firms, is warranted. 
 
The results of this study, based on recent data from Bangladeshi public-
listed firms, indicate that family firms have a lower proportion of independent 
directors on boards than their non-family counterparts. This implies that families 
usually try to minimise the presence of independent directors (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004) since they often seek to entrench themselves and extract private 
benefits from the firms. The size of boards in family firms is smaller than in non-
family firms because families may be unwilling to increase the board size in order 
to retain control and family dominance. Family firms are more likely to have CEO 
                                                 
8 See Section 2.3 for a more detailed discussion. 
64 
 
duality. It implies that if the CEO and chairman are the same person, the conflicts 
of interests may be less severe, and duality may ease family firm governance. The 
result of this study also suggests that the proportion of female directors is higher 
in family firms than in non-family firms. In Bangladeshi family firms female 
board members are usually appointed based on family ties. In most cases, the 
founder owners or directors appoint their wives and daughters on boards, often 
with the motive of increasing family voting power or dominance (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). This study also finds that family firms have a lower proportion 
of foreign directors than their non-family counterparts. The overall results indicate 
that family firms utilise a different combination of governance mechanisms 
compared to their non-family counterparts. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes research methodology. 
Section 4.4 presents empirical results, followed by further analysis in Section 4.5. 
Section 4.6 concludes the study. 
 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 Board Independence 
It is argued that a higher proportion of independent directors may reduce the 
conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, 
and may make management more effective through better monitoring (Andres, 
Azofra and Lopez, 2005). Prior studies have provided evidence which suggests 
that independent directors add real value to a firm (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009). Recently, several authors have strongly argued for the 
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importance of an active board with independent board members in family firms 
(e.g., Gersick, Davis, Hampton and Lansberg, 1997; Neubauer and Lank, 1998; 
Huse, 2000). However, families usually try to minimise the presence of 
independent directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004) since the families often seek to 
entrench themselves and extract private benefits from the firm. Ward (1991) has 
explained possible reasons for the lack of independent directors on many family 
firm boards. He argues that the main reasons are that owners tend to be afraid of 
losing control, do not believe that the independent directors understand the firm's 
competitive situation, and are afraid of opening up to new, external ideas and 
viewpoints. 
 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) and Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) 
document that family firms have lower levels of board independence compared to 
non-family firms. However, Navarro and Anson (2009) find that the proportion of 
independent directors does not differ between family and non-family firms. 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) argue that minority shareholders in family firms are 
best protected when there is a greater presence of independent directors on the 
board. Furthermore, family firms may have more independent directors on 
resource dependence argument. Independent directors of family firms can provide 
quality advice to the CEO and may also bring valuable experience and expertise 
to the board (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). 
 
Based on the above discussion, the first hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
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H1: The proportion of independent directors is significantly different between 
family and non-family firms. 
 
4.2.2 Board Size 
Previous empirical studies find that smaller boards enhance firm 
performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998). Family 
firms have smaller boards since individual responsibility tends to dissolve in 
larger groups (Ward, 1991). A recent study by Bennedsen, Kongsted and Nielsen 
(2008), shows that family firms achieve a significantly worse performance when 
the board size is increased to six or more. It is argued that smaller boards in 
family firms facilitate communication and decision-making and are also likely to 
reduce the problem of free-riding. Navarro and Anson (2009) also find that family 
firm boards are relatively smaller than non-family firm boards. They suggest that 
families may be unwilling to increase the board size so as to retain control. Lane, 
Austrachan and McMillan (2006) suggest that smaller boards are more desirable 
for family firms, as larger boards inhibit full family participation and individual 
responsibility. Consistent with the resource dependence argument, Setia-Atmaja et 
al. (2009), on the other hand, contend that larger boards are affiliated with the 
controlling family. Larger boards may enhance performance because family 
members can draw on the others who may have valuable business experience, 
expertise, skills and social and professional networks which might add substantial 
business resources to the family firm. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the second hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
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H2: Board size is significantly different between family and non-family firms. 
 
4.2.3 CEO Duality 
Having separate individuals holding the CEO and chairman positions 
enhances the monitoring ability of the board (Jensen, 1993). Chen et al. (2005) 
and Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) find that CEO duality is much more 
likely in family firms compared to non-family firms. Within family firms, if the 
CEO and the chairman are the same person, or the person is a family member, the 
conflicts of interests may be less severe and duality may, in fact, ease family firm 
governance. Hence, CEO duality could be considered a strength for a family firm 
(Navarro and Anson, 2009). On the other hand, in family firms, CEO duality 
provides CEO entrenchment which leads to a decrease in board independence 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004) and increases the possibility of wealth expropriation 
by the families. However, a family CEO’s experience, skills, expertise and 
powerful reputation are likely to provide valuable resources to the firm (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). Therefore, from a resource provision perspective, duality may 
be beneficial. The power exercised by families as large shareholders in family 
firms, means that duality is likely to be present to a larger extent within family 
firms. 
 
Based on the above discussion, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: Family firms have more CEO duality than non-family firms. 
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4.2.4 Female Directors 
A more gender-diverse board is generally seen to enhance monitoring and 
improve board independence (Carter et al., 2003). Ruigrok et al. (2007) find 
evidence that there is a link between family firms and gender of the directors. 
They argue that females are often selected as board members based on family ties, 
and that they act as monitors and family delegates in family firms. Haalien and 
Huse (2005) report that there are more female directors in family firms than in 
non-family firms in Norway, and the number of women directors does not 
increase with board size. Moreover, resource dependence theorists argue that 
female directors facilitate the acquisition of critical resources for the organisation 
(Pfeffer, 1972). 
 
Traditionally, the main role for females in Bangladesh has been engaging in 
domestic activities inside the home, rather than market or business activities 
(Ahmed and Maitra, 2010). Even though over the years the female labour force 
participation rate has increased from 23.9 per cent in 1999 to 29.2 per cent in 
2005 (LFS9, 2005), gender inequalities persist in the labour market in Bangladesh 
where females are paid lower and tend to be in less senior positions. In spite of the 
cultural and social factors, some companies appoint females as directors based on 
family ties. In most cases, the founder owners or directors appoint their wives and 
daughters to the boards, often with the motive of increasing family voting power 
or dominance (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). Therefore, it is predicted that family 
firms are more diverse in terms of gender than non-family firms. 
                                                 
9 See Footnote 3. 
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Based on the above discussion the fourth hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
 
H4:  Family firms have more female directors than non-family firms. 
 
4.2.5 Foreign Directors 
Foreign directors are usually considered to be unaffiliated and independent 
of the firms. They can make the board of a family firm more effective and 
efficient. However, families may seek to appoint fewer foreign directors on the 
board to avoid external monitors. Ruigrok et al. (2007) do not find any significant 
relationship between family affiliation and foreign directors. In Bangladesh, 
foreign directors are becoming increasingly common because of the growth in 
multinational ventures. Haque, Kirkpatrick and Arun (2006) report that almost 14 
per cent of the listed non-financial Bangladeshi firms have foreign directors. 
 
This study proposes that foreign directors can make the monitoring of the 
board more efficient. Their monitoring may obstruct family directors from 
becoming entrenched and protect the interests of general shareholders. Such 
directors can also improve the accountability process in the light of their foreign 
experience and knowledge. Therefore, family firms could be less likely to appoint 
foreign directors to avoid monitoring. It can also be argued that Bangladeshi 
family businesses may appoint them as token members just for a joint venture 
business. Sometimes their appointment might be made by the family firms to give 
signals to the market about the quality of governance. 
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On the basis of above discussion, this study proposes the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H5: The proportion of foreign directors is significantly different between family 
and non-family firms. 
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1 Data and Sample 
The sample selection procedure is reported in Table 1. The sample consists 
of all 155 non-financial companies listed with the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009, producing a total sample of 775 sample year 
observations10. Missing information has meant the study had to exclude 121 firm-
year observations, yielding a final sample of 654 firm-year observations. The data 
for the analysis comes from multiple sources of secondary data. This study 
collects the financial data from the annual reports of the sample companies listed 
on the stock exchange. Stock price data are obtained from the DataStream 
database. The family ownership and other corporate governance data were hand-
collected from the corporate governance disclosures, shareholding information 
and directors’ reports contained in annual reports. 
 
4.3.2 Measuring Family Firms 
This study adopts multiple criteria to identify family firms mainly because 
prior literature provides no single, commonly-accepted measure or criterion for 
identifying a family firm. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that 20 per cent ownership 
                                                 
10 In 2005, there were 282 listed companies in the DSE. Out of this, 127 companies belong to the 
financial sector. These have been excluded since they are controlled by different regulations and 
are likely to have different disclosure requirements and governance structure. 
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is usually enough to reflect effective control of a firm and this cut-off point is 
adopted by a number of past studies to identify family firms (Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). However, a recent study by Cascino 
et al. (2010) is of the adoption of a single indicator for assessing firm control, and 
suggests active management by family members to be a critical criterion as well. 
Thus, following Cascino et al. (2010), this study uses a more refined definition of 
family firms that does not rely uniquely on ownership concentrations as a major 
determining criterion.11 That is, this study identifies family firms12 as being: (1) 
firms in which a 20 per cent share of ownership or voting rights (either direct or 
indirect) is held by family members, and (2) at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position such as board member, CEO or 
chairman. This study uses a dummy variable and is set equal to 1 if the firm is 
considered to be family firm, and 0 otherwise. Family relationships and 
shareholding patterns were collected from the annual reports, the prospectuses of 
the listed companies and company web sites. 
 
From Table 1, it is observed that family firms are present in 64.07 per cent 
of the total sample. The family firms are prevalent in various sectors such as 
cement (17), ceramics (13), engineering (62), food (68), information technology 
                                                 
11 Cascino et al. (2010) argue that choosing a certain percentage threshold would not capture any 
difference in terms of family and non-family firms, because a certain percentage threshold only 
represents high ownership concentration rather than family ownership and management. 
12 For example, according to the 2008 annual report of Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited the 
founder and his brother own 2.75 per cent of shares and their associate companies (two other 
shareholders), Beximco Holdings Limited and Bangladesh Export Import Company Limited own 
11.36 per cent and 6.01 per cent of shares, respectively. Therefore, the total family shareholding of 
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited is 20.12 per cent, and both the founder and his brother are 
board members. Thus, it is classified as a family firm. In contrast, the 2006 annual report of Kay 
and Que Bangladesh Limited reports a total 5.14 per cent shareholding by the founder’s family 
members and the parent/subsidiary/associate company’s shareholding is nil. Kay and Que 
Bangladesh Limited is, therefore, classified as a non-family firm though it is run by a founder 
family member. 
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(11), jute (9), paper and printing (10), miscellaneous (22), pharmaceuticals (62), 
service and real estate (12), tanneries (9) and textiles (124). This study controls 
industry affiliations for the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 4.1: Sample Description 
Panel A  
Number of firms 282 
Less:  
Financial and Utility companies -127 
Companies without necessary information for corporate governance and 
family ownership data 
 
-14 
Total 141 
Panel B 
 
Sector 
 
Family 
 
Non-family 
 
Total 
Per cent of Family 
Firms in Industry 
Cement 17 20 37 45.95 
Ceramics 13 6 19 68.42 
Engineering 62 40 102 60.78 
Food 68 45 113 60.18 
IT 11 17 28 39.29 
Jute 9 5 14 64.29 
Paper & Printing 10 0 10 100.00 
Miscellaneous 22 30 52 42.31 
Pharmaceuticals 62 30 92 67.39 
Service & Real Estate 12 14 26 46.15 
Tanneries 9 16 25 36.00 
Textiles 124 12 136 91.18 
Total 419 235 654  
 
4.3.3 Model Specification 
To test H1 this study uses the following OLS regression equation: 
Board independence = α + β1 Family firm + β2 Board size + β3 CEO Duality+ β4 
Female director + β5 Foreign director + β6 Board ownership + β7 Firm age + β8 
Firm size + β9  Growth + β10  Leverage + β11 Industry dummies + β12 Year 
dummies + ε       ----- (4.1) 
 
 
The key variable family firm has already been defined in Section 4.3.2. This 
study defines board independence as the proportion of independent directors on 
the board, who do not have any material interest in the firm (denoted as board 
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independence) (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), whereas board size is measured based 
on the number of directors on the board (denoted as board size) (Setia-Atmaja et 
al., 2009). It is expected that larger boards will have more independent directors. 
CEO duality refers to the situation where the same person serves in the role of the 
CEO of the firm as well as the chairman of the board (denoted by CEO duality). 
Consistent with the prior study, this study uses the CEO duality variable as a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the CEO and chairman are the same 
person, and 0 otherwise (Boyd, 1995). Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that CEO 
duality in a family firm increases entrenchment, resulting in lower board 
independence. Therefore, CEO duality is expected to be negatively related to 
board independence. Consistent with the prior study (Carter et al., 2003; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009), female directors is measured as the proportion of female 
directors on the board (denoted as female director) and foreign directors is 
measured by the proportion of foreign directors on the board (denoted as foreign 
director) (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). It is argued that female and foreign 
directors improve monitoring and board effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; 
Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). Therefore, female and foreign directors are 
expected to be positively related to board independence. Consistent with prior 
studies, this study uses the board ownership (denoted as board ownership) 
variable as the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family 
directors’ ownership) on the board (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
In the above equation this study also controls for several firm characteristics 
such as: 
Firm size: When firm size grows over time board independence increases 
(Boone et al., 2007). Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) argue that due to greater 
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agency costs of free cash flow (agency problem), larger firms require more 
independent directors. Therefore, there is a relationship between the independence 
of the board and firm size as a means to mitigate the agency problems associated 
with firm size. Firm size is measured as a natural logarithm of total assets 
(Yermack, 1996). 
 
Firm age: Younger firms tend to have a lower proportion of independent 
directors than older firms because the scope and complexity are lower (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998). Age of the firm is calculated by taking the natural log of the 
number of years since the firm’s inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Leverage: Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) argue that leverage as a governance 
mechanism can be used as a substitute for board independence in family firms. 
Leverage is measured by taking the ratio of book value of total debt and book 
value of total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Growth: Myers (1977) argues that agency costs can be relatively high for 
high-growth firms as managers have greater flexibility with regard to future 
investments. Therefore, high-growth firms may have a stronger presence of 
independent directors on their boards. On the other hand, Lehn et al. (2009) argue 
that one can expect an inverse relationship between growth opportunities and the 
proportion of independent directors because of the information asymmetries 
associated with high-growth firms. The growth of a firm is measured as the 
difference between the total assets of the prior year and the current year divided 
by prior year total assets. 
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To test H2, this study uses the following OLS regression equation: 
Board size  = α + β1 Family firm + β2 Board independence + β3 CEO Duality+ β4 
Female director + β5 Foreign director + β6 Lag performance + β7 Firm age + β8 
Firm size + β9  Growth + β10  Leverage + β11 Industry dummies + β12 Year 
dummies + ε       ----- (4.2) 
 
 
The definitions of family firm and all the board structure variables and 
control variables are similar to those in equation (4.1). According to the agency 
argument, greater board independence (denoted as board independence) will lead 
to smaller board size, whereas the resource dependence argument suggests that 
greater board independence will lead to larger board size. CEO duality (denoted 
by CEO duality) enhances CEO power, which influences the appointment of 
directors who are less effective monitors, or assemble larger boards which are less 
effective monitors (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). On the other hand, a powerful CEO 
who is also a chairman of the board might be interested in keeping the board size 
smaller to enhance his/her control or influence over the board. Female and foreign 
directors improve monitoring and board effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; 
Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). On the other hand, the resource dependence 
argument suggests that female and foreign directors are positively related to board 
size. 
 
In the above equation this study controls several firm characteristics such as: 
Lag Performance: Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) reveal that board size 
may be affected by prior year performance. Lag performance is measured by 
ROA lagged one year. 
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Firm size: Larger firms may have a greater demand for advice and expertise 
than smaller firms due to more activities than smaller firms (Lehn et al., 2009). 
Therefore, larger board size is expected for larger firms. Firm size is measured as 
a natural logarithm of total assets (Yermack, 1996). 
 
Firm age: Harmalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that older firms are inclined 
to have larger boards because the scope and complexity of such firms are greater 
compared to younger firms. Age of the firm is calculated by taking the natural log 
of the number of years since the firm’s inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Leverage: Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) argue that lower leveraged firms may 
require a smaller board, which is a better monitor of potential agency problems. 
Leverage is measured by taking the ratio of book value of total debt and book 
value of total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Growth: Boards must be small in high-growth firms so that board members 
have sufficient incentive to monitor managers (Lehn et al., 2009). The growth of a 
firm is measured by the difference between the total assets of the prior year and 
the current year divided by prior year total assets. 
 
To test H3, this study uses the following logit model. 
CEO duality  = α + β1 Family firm + β2 Board independence + β3 Board size + β4 
Female director + β5 Foreign director + β6 CEO tenure + β7 Firm age + β8 Firm 
size + β9  Growth + β10  Leverage + β11 Industry dummies + β12 Year dummies + ε       
----- (4.3) 
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The definitions of family firms and all the board structure variables and 
control variables are similar to those in equations (4.1) and (4.2). Board 
independence (denoted as board independence) diminishes CEO power through 
monitoring. Therefore, board independence is expected to be negatively related to 
CEO duality. Board size is measured based on the number of directors on the 
board (denoted as board size). It is expected that a larger board is negatively 
related to CEO duality. Since female and foreign directors improve monitoring 
and board effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003), they 
are expected to be negatively related to CEO duality. CEO tenure is measured 
based on the number of years served by the current CEO. Since CEO tenure is 
likely to increase CEO power, it is expected that CEO tenure is positively related 
to CEO duality. 
 
In the above equation this study controls for several firm characteristics 
such as: 
Firm size: Large firms may have more opportunities for expansion, which, 
in turn, puts all of the authority in one hand (CEO duality structure) and is more 
likely to increase managers’ power over the firm’s resources (Elsayed, 2010). On 
the other hand, agency problems also seem to be more severe for large firms 
which have more opportunities for misuse of resources. Firm size is measured as a 
natural logarithm of total assets (Yermack, 1996). 
 
Firm age: Organisational complexity stimulates older firms to adopt CEO 
duality (Faleye, 2007). Age of the firm is calculated by taking the natural log of 
the number of years since the firm’s inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
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Leverage: Firms with CEO duality have higher institutional ownership and 
financial leverage, indicating more external monitoring, which also might be 
required to reduce agency problems resulting from the increased power of dual 
CEOs (Chen, Lin and Yi, 2008). Faleye (2007) argue that firms may adopt CEO 
duality to increase the power of the manager in debt contracts. Leverage is 
measured by taking the ratio of book value of total debt and book value of total 
assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Growth: Boyd (1995) asserts that high-growth firms are more likely to 
adopt CEO non–duality to reduce the discretionary power of the CEO, as the 
monitoring cost of a growth firm is high. The growth of a firm is measured as the 
difference between the total assets of the prior year and the current year divided 
by prior year total assets. 
 
To test H4, this study uses the following OLS regression equation: 
Female director  = α + β1 Family firm + β2 Board independence + β3 Board size 
+ β4 CEO duality + β5 Foreign director + β6 Female CEO + β7 Firm age + β8 
Firm size + β9  Growth + β10  Leverage + β11 Industry dummies + β12 Year 
dummies + ε       ----- (4.4) 
 
The definitions of family firms and all the board structure variables and 
control variables are similar to those in previous equations. Because of the 
monitoring argument, board independence (denoted as board independence) is 
positively related to female directors. Board size is measured based on the number 
of directors on the board (denoted as board size). It is expected that a larger board 
will incorporate more female directors. It is expected that a powerful CEO will 
appoint fewer female directors to the board. Therefore, this study expects to find a 
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negative relationship between CEO duality (denoted by CEO duality) and female 
directors. Foreign members on a board signal a higher commitment to corporate 
monitoring and transparency (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). Accordingly, foreign 
directors (denoted as foreign directors) are expected to be positively related to 
female directors. Female CEO is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a 
female, and 0 otherwise. Female directors are tougher monitors (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), therefore, a positive relationship is expected between female 
CEOs and female directors. 
 
In the above equation this study controls several firm characteristics such as: 
Firm size: Larger firms may have more demand for advice and expertise 
than smaller firms due to more activities than smaller firms. Previous research 
suggests that female directors provide more monitoring and expertise. Moreover, 
larger firms are more likely to have larger boards and, hence, are more likely to 
have female directors (Carter et al., 2003). Firm size is measured as a natural 
logarithm of total assets (Yermack, 1996). 
 
Firm age: Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that older firms tend to 
have larger boards because the scope and complexity of the firms are greater than 
in younger firms. Due to family ties, larger boards in family firms incorporate 
more female directors. Age of the firm is calculated by taking the natural log of 
the number of years since the firm’s inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Leverage: Leverage is expected to have a negative relationship with female 
directors. Leverage as a governance mechanism can be used as a substitute for 
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poor governance. Leverage is measured by taking the ratio of book value of total 
debt and book value of total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Growth: High growth potential firms may be reflected by a higher 
proportion of future investment. This study expects female directors with family 
affiliations in high-growth firms. The growth of a firm is measured as the 
difference between the total assets of the prior year and the current year divided 
by prior year total assets. 
 
To test H5, this study uses the following OLS regression equation: 
Foreign director  = α + β1 Family firm + β2 Board independence + β3 Board size 
+ β4 CEO duality + β5 Female director + β6 Foreign ownership + β7 Firm age + 
β8 Firm size + β9  Growth + β10  Leverage + β11 Industry dummies + β12 Year 
dummies + ε       ----- (4.5) 
 
 
The definitions of family firms, all the board structure variables and control 
variables are similar to those in previous equations. Because of the monitoring 
argument, board independence is expected to be positively related to foreign 
directors. Board size is measured based on the number of directors on the board 
(denoted as board size). Larger boards are likely to have more foreign directors. It 
is expected that a powerful CEO (denoted by CEO duality) will appoint fewer 
foreign directors. Female directors (denoted as female directors) are expected to 
be positively related to foreign directors, consistent with the monitoring argument. 
Foreign ownership represents ownership by foreigners. Foreign ownership is 
expected to be positively related to foreign directors. 
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In the above equation this study controls several firm characteristics, such 
as: 
Firm size: Larger firms may have more demand for advice and expertise 
than smaller firms due to more activities than smaller firms. Lehn et al. (2009) 
argue that due to the significant agency problem, larger firms demand more 
foreign directors. Firm size is measured as a natural logarithm of total assets 
(Yermack, 1996). 
 
Firm age: Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) find that there are more foreign 
directors in older firms than in younger firms due to the scope and complexity of 
the firm. Age of the firm is calculated by taking the natural log of the number of 
years since the firm’s inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Leverage: Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) argue that leverage as a governance 
mechanism can be used as a substitute for poor governance. Leverage is measured 
by taking the ratio of book value of total debt and book value of total assets 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Growth: To build confidence in relation to the global investor community, 
high-growth firms may have more foreign directors (Oxelheim and Randoy, 
2003). The growth of a firm is measured as the difference between the total assets 
of the prior year and the current year divided by prior year total assets. 
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4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics (i.e., means, medians, 
standard deviations, maximum and minimum values, skewness and kurtosis) for 
the full sample. The number of directors averages around seven, 6.30 per cent are 
independent directors, 16.90 per cent are female directors and 5.50 per cent are 
foreign directors. With regard to the ownership structure, the board of directors 
(excluding family directors), and family members, hold an average of 8.60 per 
cent and 29 per cent of shares, respectively. The average firm age is nearly 23 
years, and the average firm size is 8.70 (natural logarithm of total assets). 
 
Panel B of Table 4.2 presents difference of means tests for key variables 
between family and non-family firms. Family firms represent 64.07 per cent of the 
sample. Family firms have a significantly lower proportion of independent 
directors (6.10 per cent versus 7.60 per cent), and smaller boards (6.36 versus 7.43 
directors). However, family firms have significantly higher CEO duality (29.7 per 
cent versus 15.20 per cent), and more female directors (24 per cent versus 5.00 
per cent). Family firms have a lower portion of foreign directors than their non-
family counterparts. The univariate analysis also indicates that other variables, 
such as firm age and firm size, are significantly lower in family firms than in non-
family firms. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Observations 
Firm size 8.696 8.684 0.659 654 
Leverage 0.749 0.604 0.789 654 
Firm age 22.989 23.000 10.940 654 
Board ownership 0.086 0.013 0.145 654 
Board size 6.742 6.500 2.073 654 
Growth 0.116 0.048 0.341 654 
Family ownership 0.290 0.319 0.219 654 
CEO duality 0.246 0.000 0.431 654 
Board independence 0.063 0.000 0.082 654 
Foreign director 0.055 0.000 0.157 654 
Female director 0.169 0.143 0.183 654 
 
 
Panel B: Difference of Means Tests 
Variable Family Non-family P Value 
Board size 6.358 7.426 0.000 
Board ownership 0.033 0.182 0.000 
Growth 1.727 0.349 0.100 
Firm age 21.303 25.996 0.000 
Firm size 8.650 8.778 0.279 
Board independence 0.061 0.076 0.015 
CEO duality 0.297 0.152 0.000 
Foreign director 0.030 0.102 0.000 
Female director 0.240 0.050 0.000 
N 419 235 
The above tables report descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as follows: Family firms are 
those where the family members hold at least twenty per cent equity ownership, and at least one 
member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered as 
non-family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board 
independence is calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. 
CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to one when the chairperson is the CEO, and zero 
otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign 
directors on the board, respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total 
shareholdings (excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of 
number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of 
total debt to book value of total assets. Firm size is the natural log of book value of assets. Growth 
of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. Panel A provides summary statistics 
for the full sample. Panel B provides difference of means tests between family and non-family 
firms. 
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Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix for some of the key variables in the 
analysis. The family firm variable has a negative correlation with board size and 
foreign directors. CEO duality and female directors are positively correlated with 
family ownership. In addition, consistent with prior literature, this study also finds 
negative correlations between family firm and firm age, and firm size. 
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4.4.2 Regression Results: Family Firms and Board Structure 
In Table 4.4 this study reports the individual regression results of different 
hypothesised board structure variables. In Model 1 of Table 4.4, this study 
examines whether the proportion of independent directors is different between 
family and non-family firms. The result shows that the coefficient of family firms 
is negative and significant (β =-0.021, p < 0.05). This supports H1. This implies 
that family firms have a lower proportion of independent directors than non-
family firms. This is consistent with the univariate analysis (see Table 4.2, Panel 
B). The boards in family firms are more often dominated by family members, who 
are more likely to minimise the presence of independent directors (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004) since they often seek to entrench themselves and extract private 
benefits from the firms. Among the board structure variables, this study finds that 
CEO duality and foreign directors have negative and positive impacts on 
independent directors, respectively. In other words, CEO duality and independent 
directors are substitute monitoring mechanisms, whereas foreign directors and 
independent directors are complementary monitory mechanisms. Board 
independence is also positively related to firm age. Older firms have higher scope 
and face more complexity than younger firms; therefore, they appoint more 
independent directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Independent directors have 
negative and significant relationships with leverage. In family firms, leverage 
allows controlling families to control more resources without diluting their voting 
rights, and they are unwilling to appoint independent directors (Faccio, Lang and 
Young, 2001b). 
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In Model 2 of Table 4.4 this study examines whether board size is different 
between family and non-family firms. This study finds a negative significant 
coefficient of family firm (β = -0.638, p < 0.01). It suggests that family firms have 
smaller boards than non-family firms. This supports H2. Family firms may 
assemble smaller boards for more effective monitoring and to retain control 
(Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Navarro and Anson, 2009). This study also 
finds that CEO duality has a negative impact on board size which suggests that 
these variables are substitute monitoring mechanisms. Firm size positively 
influences board size. This result suggests that larger firms have a greater volume 
of activities that requires more advice from experts than in smaller firms (Lehn et 
al., 2009). Consistent with prior study, this study also reveals that prior year 
performance (Lag) affects the decision of board size (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003). 
 
In Model 3 this study tests whether family firms have more CEO duality 
than non-family firms. This study documents a positive significant coefficient of 
family firms (β = 0.389, P < 0.05), implying that family firms are more likely to 
have CEO duality than their non-family counterparts. This result supports H3. It 
suggests that families want to retain control over the firms with little chance for 
external monitoring, which is consistent with the expropriation argument. Board 
size is negatively related to CEO duality which, once again, suggests that these 
two variables are substitute monitoring mechanisms. CEO tenure is positively 
related to the likelihood of CEO duality. This study also finds a positive and 
significant relationship between firm age and likelihood of CEO duality. Older 
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firms suffer from organisational complexity which motivates them to adopt CEO 
duality (Faleye, 2007). 
 
In Model 4 this study examines whether family firms have more female 
directors than non-family firms. This study finds a positive significant coefficient 
of family firms (β = 0.152, p < 0.01), implying that family firms have more 
female directors than non-family firms. This also supports H4. In family firms 
female board members are often selected based on family ties, and they also act as 
a family delegate (Ruigrok et al., 2007). Sometimes they are appointed to the 
board to ensure family dominance. The result of this study also supports the 
findings of Uddin and Choudhury (2008). This study also documents that larger 
firms have a higher proportion of female directors. The result also suggests that 
firms appoint female directors when they have female CEOs. 
 
In Model 5 the study investigates whether there is a significant difference 
between the proportion of foreign directors in family firms and non-family firms. 
This study finds the coefficient of family firm variable (β =-0.092, P < 0.01) to be 
negative and significant. This supports H5. The result suggests that family firms 
appoint fewer foreign directors than non-family counterparts because they want to 
avoid external monitoring. This result is also consistent with the expropriation 
argument. This study also finds that foreign ownership is positively related to 
foreign directors. Firm size and growth have significant and positive impacts on 
appointment of foreign directors. Larger firms appoint more foreign directors for 
their expertise. Moreover, to enhance reputation in the financial market, high-
growth firms may appoint more foreign directors (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). 
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Younger firms appoint foreign directors to create an appropriate image by 
signalling quality corporate governance to the market participants. 
Table 4.4: Regression Results: Family firms and board structure 
 
Variable 
Board 
Independence 
(Model 1) 
Board 
Size 
(Model 2) 
CEO duality 
(Logit- 
Model 3) 
Female 
Director 
(Model 4) 
Foreign 
Director 
(Model 5) 
Constant 0.192 
(0.000) 
-0.898 
(0.436) 
-6.263 
(0.000) 
0.459 
(0.000) 
-0.413 
(0.000) 
Family firm 
 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.638 
(0.001) 
0.389 
(0.037) 
0.152 
(0.000) 
-0.092 
(0.000) 
Board 
independence 
------ 0.489 
(0.647) 
-2.794 
(0.078) 
-0.021 
(0.792) 
0.255 
(0.000) 
Board size 0.001 
(0.582) 
----- -0.185 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.356) 
0.003 
(0.245) 
CEO duality -0.017 
(0.089) 
-0.519 
(0.004) 
-- -0.021 
(0.192) 
0.021 
(0.123) 
Female director 0.005 
(0.767) 
0.059 
(0.905) 
0.196 
(0.765) 
---- 0.023 
(0.524) 
Foreign 
director 
0.103 
(0.000) 
-0.374 
(0.486) 
1.515 
(0.125) 
-0.034 
(0.376) 
--- 
Board 
ownership 
-0.051 
(0.032) 
    
Firm age 0.004 
(0.046) 
-0.014 
(0.077) 
0.013 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.906) 
-0.001 
(0.049) 
Firm size -0.009 
(0.141) 
0.943 
(0.000) 
0.487 
(0.238 
0.069 
(0.000) 
0.062 
(0.000) 
Growth 0.002 
(0.823) 
-0.219 
(0.332) 
0.351 
(0.221) 
0.014 
(0.346) 
0.027 
(0.074) 
Leverage -0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.356 
(0.023) 
0.363 
(0.197) 
-0.002 
(0.844) 
0.027 
(0.112) 
Performance 
(Lag) 
----- 0.443 
(0.004) 
------ ------ ------ 
CEO tenure ----- ----- 0.097 
(0.000) 
-----  
Female CEO ----- ----- ----- 0.221 
(0.000) 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
----- ----- ----- ------ 0.212 
(0.000) 
Industry 
dummy 
Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted 
R2/Pseudo R2 
0.293 0.185 0.159 
 
0.443 0.217 
Total 
observation 
654 654 654 654 654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and family firms. Variables are defined as 
follows: Family firms are those where the family members hold at least twenty per cent equity ownership and at 
least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family 
firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as the 
number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the chairperson is the CEO, and zero otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured by the proportion 
of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total 
shareholdings (excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of the number of 
years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total 
assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. Lag performance – previous year’s 
ROA. CEO tenure – number of years served by the current CEO. Female CEO is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership - foreign ownership represents ownership by foreigners. 
The reported results are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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4.4.3 Endogeneity of Board Structure Variables 
The hypothesised board structure variables used in this study are dependent 
on each other, that is, they are endogenous. The variables also depend on other 
variables such as firm size, firm age, and growth. These other variables are treated 
as exogenous variables. Consistent with the previous studies, this study develops a 
system of equations to address the issue of endogeneity (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Mak and Li, 2001). To estimate the system of simultaneous equations 
empirically, this study employs the three-stage least squares (3SLS) procedure. 
 
The endogenous variables in the system of equations are board 
independence, board size, CEO duality13, female directors and foreign directors. 
There are five equations in the system of equations for the five board structure 
variables. In order to satisfy the order condition to ensure that the equations in the 
system are identified, each equation must exclude at least four of the exogenous 
variables since each equation includes four endogenous variables as regressors 
(Kennedy, 1998). The specification of equations (4.1) to (4.5) is partly driven by 
the need to satisfy this order condition. Although, as far as possible, this study 
relies on theory or prior research to determine the exogenous variables to be 
included or excluded in each of the equations, it should be recognised that the 
results obtained may be sensitive to what exogenous variables are included. 
 
                                                 
13 The 3SLS procedure included in standard statistical software packages assumes that all the 
dependent variables are continuous. Therefore this study does not use the logit specification for 
CEO duality because OLS is generally robust to the inclusion of limited dependent variables 
(Greene, 1997). 
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The issue of endogeneity of different board structure variables is addressed 
by using a simultaneous equations framework. Table 4.5 reports the estimations of 
equations (4.1) to (4.5) using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression. 
Table 4.5 (second row) presents coefficients on family firm for each equation. In 
the CEO duality and female director equations, family firm variables have 
positive significant coefficients. It implies that family firms are more likely to 
have CEO duality than non-family firms, and that these firms have a higher 
proportion of female directors than their non-family counterparts. Thus, the results 
provide support to H3 and H4. While both the regression results (with and without 
addressing the issue of endogeneity) are statistically significant, the magnitude of 
the family firm coefficients generated by the 3SLS on CEO duality and female 
directors, is smaller. In the board independence, board size and foreign director 
equations, family firm variables have negative significant coefficients. It implies 
that family firms have fewer independent directors, smaller boards and fewer 
foreign directors than non-family firms. Thus, the results provide support to H1, 
H2 and H5. The magnitude of family firm coefficients generated by 3 SLS is 
greater than the same coefficients generated by OLS regression. 
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Table 4.5: Regression Results: Family firms and board structure (3 SLS) 
 
Variable 
Board 
Independence 
(Model 1) 
Board 
size 
(Model 2) 
CEO duality 
(Logit-Model 
3) 
Female 
Director 
(Model 4) 
Foreign 
Director 
(Model 5) 
Constant 0.059 
(0.236) 
-0.975 
(0.394) 
-0.063 
(0.797) 
0.464 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.703) 
Family firm 
 
-0.013 
(0.044) 
-0.607 
(0.001) 
 
0.041 
(0.035) 
 
0.072 
(0.000) 
-0.062 
(0.064) 
Board 
independence 
------ 0.378 
(0.010) 
-1.441 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.716) 
0.204 
(0.000) 
Board size 0.003 
(0.125) 
----- -0.023 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.317) 
0.001 
(0.579) 
CEO duality -0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.530 
(0.002) 
-- -0.027 
(0.214) 
0.022 
(0.033) 
Female director 0.007 
(0.746) 
0.032 
(0.925) 
-0.025 
(0.812) 
---- 0.028 
(0.326) 
Foreign 
director 
0.098 
(0.000) 
-0.541 
(0.299) 
0.370 
(0.139) 
-0.003 
(0.317) 
--- 
Board 
ownership 
-0.032 
(0.132) 
    
Firm age 0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.059) 
0.001 
(0.875) 
0.001 
(0.889) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
Firm size -0.001 
(0.241) 
0.939 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.180) 
0.049 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.042) 
Growth 0.008 
(0.363) 
-0.221 
(0.317) 
0.070 
(0.040) 
0.019 
(0.230) 
0.031 
(0.013) 
Leverage -0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.329 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.818) 
-0.002 
(0.838) 
0.012 
(0.172) 
Performance 
(Lag) 
----- 0.434 
(0.000) 
------ ------ ------ 
CEO tenure ----- ----- 0.013 
(0.000) 
-----  
Female CEO ----- ----- ----- 0.219 
(0.000) 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
----- ----- ----- ------ 0.621 
(0.000) 
Industry 
dummy 
Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.143 0.117 
 
0.398 0.179 
Total 
observation 
654 654 654 654 654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and family firms. Variables are 
defined as follows: Family firms are those where the family members hold at least twenty per cent 
equity ownership, and at least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, 
otherwise firms are considered as non-family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on 
the board. Board independence is calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by the size 
of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to one when the chairperson is the CEO, and zero 
otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors 
on the board, respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings 
(excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of the number of years 
since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value 
of total assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. Lag performance 
– previous year’s ROA. CEO tenure – number of years served by the current CEO. Female CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership- Foreign 
ownership represents ownership by foreigners. Number of observations is 654. The reported results are 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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4.5 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
4.5.1 Alternative Measure of Firm Performance 
This study uses an alternative definition of family firms. In particular, this 
study defines a family firm as one where family members hold at least 50 per cent 
of a firm’s shares (voting rights) (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000; Van den Berghe and 
Carchon, 2002). Furthermore, this study requires that at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position (i.e., board member, CEO or 
chairman). This study uses a dummy variable to identify the family firms which 
his set equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be a family firm, and 0 otherwise. 
When this study uses this alternative definition, the number of family firms is 
reduced to 171. This study runs all the regressions that report for in Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5 and finds that results are consistent with the main findings. The results 
are presented in Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix A. 
 
4.5.2 Alternative Measure of Board Independence 
This study examines whether the results are sensitive to the fact that the 
proportion of independent directors in family firms is, by sample construction, 
lower than in non-family firms. This study constructs a measure of board 
independence that excludes family board members in the denominator (i.e., board 
size) and estimates equations (4.1) to (4.5) using this measure. The results are not 
different from the earlier analyses. The results are presented in Table A.3 in 
Appendix A. 
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4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This study examines whether the board structures of family and non-family 
firms are significantly different in an emerging economy setting, taking 
Bangladesh as a case. Unlike most western economies, family firms are the most 
dominant form of listed public companies in Bangladesh. Given that minority 
shareholders rely on corporate boards to monitor and control family’s 
opportunism, the research issue addressed in regard to the relationship between 
board structure and family firm is particularly interesting. 
 
The results suggest that family firms adopt distinctly different board 
structures from their non-family counterparts. Family firms have a lower 
proportion of independent directors than non-family firms. This is consistent with 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) who argue that families usually try to minimise the 
presence of independent directors since they often seek to entrench themselves 
and extract private benefits from the firm.  
 
This study finds that board size is smaller in family firms than in non-family 
firms. This result suggests that family members want to maintain control of the 
firms and, therefore, prefer a smaller board. The analysis shows that family firms 
are more likely to have CEO duality, implying that CEO duality in family firms 
provides greater opportunities for managerial entrenchment and expropriation 
from minority shareholders. 
 
This study also finds that family firms have more female directors than non-
family firms. In Bangladeshi family firms, female board members are usually 
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appointed based on family ties. In most of the cases the founders appoint their 
daughters and wives on the boards. Their appointment is also consistent with the 
contention of an increase in family dominance. The results of this study also 
suggest that family firms have fewer foreign directors than non-family firms. 
Family firms want to avoid external monitoring and, therefore, prefer not to have 
foreign members on the board. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FAMILY BOARD STRUCTURE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the second study of this 
thesis. This study investigates whether there is a significant difference in the 
impact of board structure on performance between family and non-family firms. 
Consistent with the first study, this study also considers five board structure 
variables, such as board independence, board size, CEO duality, female directors 
and foreign directors. 
 
It is commonly argued that the board of directors, which is a critical internal 
governance mechanism, through its monitoring activities minimises agency costs 
associated with the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Lower agency costs, in turn, have implications for 
better firm performance. For instance, prior studies (Yermack, 1996; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) suggest that board characteristics 
such as independence, size and CEO duality are directly related to firm 
performance. This study aims to add to this research strand by investigating the 
relationship between board structure and performance of family firms using data 
from listed non-financial companies in Bangladesh during the period 2005-2009. 
A key motivation for this study is that prior research has failed to consider the 
implications of family ownership on the effects of board characteristics such as 
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female directors and foreign directors on firm outcomes. Given that board 
characteristics are themselves a function of ownership structure, the type of 
ownership structure and its impact on the link between board characteristics and 
firm performance becomes a vital research issue. In particular, the family 
ownership structure has been found to be significantly related to board structure 
and firm performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; 
Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011). 
 
Agency theory argues that the board of directors plays a significant role in 
protecting the interests of firms’ stakeholders by monitoring and disciplining 
senior management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). Additionally, 
resource dependence theory suggests that the board is an instrument for sourcing 
critical resources to create a sustainable competitive advantage (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Using the integrated agency and resource dependence theory 
approach14 suggested by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), this study argues that the 
characteristics of boards are likely to be the governance factors of particular 
importance to family firms. 
 
Much of the prior research on family firms has been conducted in developed 
economy settings15 where there are strong capital market regulations, and non-
family firms predominate among publicly-listed companies (Young et al., 2008). 
Given the high rate of family ownership and poor corporate regulatory oversight 
                                                 
14 See Section 3.4 for a more detailed discussion. 
15 For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the impact of 
family ownership and control on performance in the USA. Maury (2006) examines the 
performance of family controlled firms and non-family firms in Western Europe. Setia-Atmaja et 
al. (2009) investigate the impact of family ownership and control on the firm’s dividend, debt, and 
board structure decisions in the Australian listed firms. 
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in developing countries, the generalisability of the past research findings remains 
limited. Furthermore, the implications on firm performance of a number of board 
characteristics which are idiosyncratic to developing capital markets in the Asian 
region, such as the emerging participation of women on boards and the growing 
number of foreign directors, remain largely unexplored as well. 
 
Prior research in developed capital markets has found board independence, 
board size and CEO duality to be critical for firm performance (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). However, evidence from family firms, 
particularly in developing economies, remains limited. Further, prior studies also 
suggest that female directors and foreign directors are likely to have positive 
effects on firm performance. For example, the study by Carter et al. (2003) using 
a sample of Fortune 1000 firms, finds that gender diversity improves board 
monitoring thus resulting in better performance. In Bangladesh, participation of 
females on boards is a more recent phenomenon. Female workers are still heavily 
concentrated in rural areas (employed in low productivity daily work for poor 
wages and often concentrated in public food for work programs) and in unpaid 
work for family businesses (Ahmed and Maitra, 2010). The literacy rates are 
approximately 48 per cent for females, compared with 59 per cent for men in 
2009 (UNESCO, 2009). Whether females on family firm boards have a significant 
impact on performance remains an empirical issue. Further, foreign directors are 
another factor that may improve board effectiveness. In Bangladesh, foreign 
directors are becoming increasingly common because of the growth in 
multinational ventures. Haque et al. (2006) report that almost 14 per cent of the 
listed non-financial Bangladeshi firms have foreign directors. Oxelheim and 
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Randoy (2003) find that foreign board members signal a higher commitment to 
corporate monitoring and transparency which leads to an increase in firm 
performance. Whilst female directors and foreign directors have been found to be 
related to board effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003), 
their impact on firm performance in the presence of family dominance remains 
unclear. This study addresses these various gaps in the family firm performance 
literature from the perspective of a family firm dominated economy. 
 
Bangladesh provides an interesting and appropriate context for this study 
because it has an unusually high level of family ownership and management 
(Imam and Malik, 2007). Family dominance in Bangladesh has given rise to a 
corporate culture where internal governance mechanisms, such as board 
independence and CEO duality, are at risk of being regarded as ‘not important’. In 
more recent times, however, there have been efforts to improve corporate 
governance in Bangladesh.16 Nevertheless, corporate governance regulatory 
oversight in Bangladesh is still viewed as nascent (Siddiqui, 2010), and, given the 
strong family dominance in Bangladeshi public-listed firms, further investigation 
into the link between board structure and family firm performance compared to 
that in non-family firms is both critical and warranted. 
 
The results of this study, based on recent data from Bangladeshi public-
listed firms, indicate that board independence and board size have significantly 
weaker effects on performance of family firms compared to that of non-family 
firms. The findings further reveal that CEO duality in family firms has a relatively 
                                                 
16 See Section 2.3.2 for the detail. 
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stronger impact on performance. Additionally, this study documents that both 
female and foreign directors have relatively weaker impacts on the performance 
of family firms. Collectively, these findings suggest that family dominance is very 
strong in Bangladeshi family firms, which is reflected in the relationships between 
several board characteristics and performance, where the results are contrary to 
those found by prior studies in both non-family firm situations as well as those 
conducted in most developed countries (Yermack, 1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003; Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 5.3 describes research methodology. 
Section 5.4 presents empirical results, followed by robustness tests in Section 5.5. 
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
5.2.1 Board Independence and Firm Performance 
Over the past two decades there has been a great deal of research on the 
relationship between board independence and performance. However, the findings 
of previous research are mixed. Although most of these studies are based on 
developed countries (Weisbach, 1988; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and Hickmen, 1992; Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; 
Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner, 1997; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barnhart and 
Rosenstein, 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Bhagat and Black, 2002, in the US; Bozec, 2005; Erickson, Park, Reising and 
Shin, 2005; Peter, Daniel and Jeffery, 2004, in Canada; Luan and Tang, 2007, in 
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Taiwan; Ng, 2005; Chen et al., 2005, in Hong Kong; Lawrence and Stapledon, 
1999; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Christensen, Kent and Stewart, 2010, in 
Australia; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010, in Ireland), a few studies focus on 
developing countries (Liang and Li, 1999, in China; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011, in 
Malaysia; Kula, 2005, in Turkey; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010, in Thailand; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009, in India) as well. 
 
Previous research on board composition focuses on board independence, as 
an independent board influences better monitoring (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
Agency theory has been the most dominant approach for investigating the 
relationship between board independence and performance (Gani and Jermias, 
2006). The articulation in agency theory suggests that a higher proportion of 
independent directors should lead to better firm performance, since it reduces the 
conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
and makes management more effective through better monitoring (Andres et al., 
2005). Related to this, Dahya and McConnell (2005) find that having more 
independent directors on the board provides better monitoring than on boards 
dominated by insiders. Similarly, Fernandes (2008) provides evidence that firms 
with independent directors have fewer agency problems and have a better 
alignment of shareholder and managerial interest. Therefore, effective boards 
have a higher proportion of independent directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). From 
a resource dependency point of view, independent directors are likely to bring 
professional knowledge and values that may contribute to the effective 
management of family firms (Dyer, 1989). They may also be in a position to 
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extract important resources from the environment that might be otherwise 
unavailable (Daily and Dalton, 1993). 
 
A number of studies have investigated the impact of board independence on 
firm performance and suggest that certain board configurations (e.g., independent 
boards) may lead to better performance. For example, in a US study, Weisbach 
(1988) notes that board independence is positively related to performance. He 
argues that the independent directors perform monitoring roles in the firms. 
Moreover, boards with more independent directors are more likely to force the 
resignation of poorly performing CEOs. The findings of the study by Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) also support this contention. 
 
Using a sample of top Indian companies listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) for the year 2006, Jackling and Johl (2009) find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board and 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. They argue that having more outside 
directors on the board implies better monitoring. The findings of the studies by 
O’Connell and Cramer (2010) and Luan and Tang (2007) also support this 
argument. Additionally, although Liang and Li (1999) find that most of the private 
firms in China adopt an insider-dominated board structure, the presence of outside 
directors on the board is positively associated with higher performance as 
measured by return on investment (ROI). 
 
Previous research has also examined the impact of board independence on 
performance, using an event study approach. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt 
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(1990) examine the wealth effects accompanying the appointment of outside 
directors of 1,251 firms in the US during the period 1981 to 1985. They find that 
the appointment of further outside directors would raise stock prices by 0.2 per 
cent. They contend that the appointment of additional outside board members 
delivers a strong signal to the investors that companies will deal with their 
business problems, even though prior board composition had not necessarily 
obstructed the company’s ability to address problems. In a different study, Byrd 
and Hickman (1992) examine the effect of a takeover bid announcement on the 
stock price of the bidding firms, and demonstrate that firms with a high proportion 
of independent directors realise higher abnormal returns following the 
announcement of tender offers than bidder firms with fewer independent 
directors. Similarly, Brickley et al. (1994) examine the relationship between 
outside directors and the adoption of poison pills in 247 US firms between 1984 
and 1986. They document a significant positive stock price response to the 
adoption of poison pills when boards are dominated by outside directors, and a 
negative one when outside directors are in the minority. Finally, Cotter et al. 
(1997) investigate the role of independent outside directors during takeover 
attempts by tender offers. They find that target shareholder gains over the entire 
contest period are higher when the target board is independent. Therefore, the 
study concludes that the independent directors play a vital role during tender 
offers, and that the majority of the independent board members are more likely to 
utilise resistance strategies to increase shareholder wealth. They also point out a 
non-linear relationship between the fraction of independent directors on the board 
and the bidding firm’s abnormal stock returns. Although this relationship is 
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positive over most of its range, it is negative when the proportion of independent 
directors is very high (over 60 per cent). 
 
Although it is argued that the presence of independent directors on the board 
increases monitoring which, in turn, improves firm performance, some prior 
studies also find a negative impact of board independence on performance. For 
example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, using a sample of 
383 large US firms for the year 1987. They document a negative relationship 
between board independence and firm performance. They argue that outside 
directors are sometimes added to boards for political reasons, and those directors 
can lack monitoring expertise which, in turn, affects firm performance negatively. 
A similar pattern has been documented in a Canadian study. In a different study, 
Erickson et al. (2005) investigate the same relationship using a sample of 236 
publicly-traded Canadian firms between 1991 and 1997. They also find that an 
increase in board independence does not have a positive influence on firm 
performance. They note that poorly-performing firms increase the fraction of 
outside directors in subsequent periods to please unhappy investors. However, this 
addition of directors also has a negative impact on performance. The findings of 
some other studies also suggest a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm performance (see, for example, Christensen et al., 2010; 
Peter et al., 2004; Bozec, 2005; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998). 
 
There is also a group of studies which find that board independence does not 
have any effect on firm performance. For example, using a sample of 142 US 
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firms, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no relationship between the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board and performance. In the same vein, 
Bhagat and Black (2002) find no evidence that greater board independence 
improves firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, return on assets, or stock 
return. They also note that firms suffering from poor performance respond by 
increasing the independence of their boards. In a recent study, Yammeesri and 
Herath (2010) also reveal that the presence of independent directors does not 
improve performance in Thai firms. They argue that Thai firms appoint 
independent directors to the board in order to comply with the regulatory 
requirements of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). They also note that 
sometimes the independent directors so appointed do not have adequate 
knowledge and devote limited time to the firms to improve performance. 
Similarly, Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) in Australia, Dalton et al. (1998) in 
US, Kula (2005) in Turkey, and Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) in Japan, 
document insignificant relationships between the proportion of outside directors 
and firm performance. 
 
There have been several studies that examine the relationship between board 
independence and performance of family firms. From an agency theory 
perspective, independent directors are likely to reduce conflicts of interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders, leading to more effective 
monitoring by management (Andres et al., 2005). Consequently, a positive 
relationship can be envisaged between the proportion of independent directors17 
and firm performance. 
                                                 
17 See Footnote 5 for a definition of independent directors. 
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Empirical evidence based on previous studies, however, indicates mixed 
findings with respect to the relationship between board independence and 
performance in family firms. For example, while examining the impact of 
founding family ownership on performance of S&P 500 firms, Anderson and 
Reeb (2004) document a significant positive relationship between board 
independence and performance. They contend that independent directors are able 
to mitigate conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, by enforcing 
structural constraints on the family through restraining their involvement in board 
sub-committees, and by preventing family members from expropriating the wealth 
of firms through excessive compensation, special dividends, or unwarranted 
perquisites. 
 
Some non-US studies, on the other hand, suggest that board independence 
does not have a significant impact on performance of family firms, which is in 
contrast to the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2004). For example, Chen et al. 
(2005) and Ng (2005) in Hong Kong, and Ibrahim and Samad (2011) in Malaysia 
find that board independence does not have a significant impact on performance 
in family firms. They contend that independent directors in family firms tend not 
to be truly independent but are closely connected, socially or otherwise, with 
family members, and thus may not monitor activities as expected. Moreover, the 
number of independent directors in family firms may not be sufficient to monitor 
the board. The ratio of family directors to independent directors18 may be an 
important factor in determining the board’s ability to monitor and protect minority 
shareholders from opportunism by family members. In an Australian study, Setia-
                                                 
18 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Notification 2006, independent 
directors should comprise at least one tenth (1/10) of the total number of a company’s board of 
directors. 
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Atmaja et al. (2009) find that board independence has a weaker effect on the 
performance of family firms than non-family firms. They argue that the strong 
presence of family dominance in family firms influences the appointment and 
replacement of independent directors, which may reduce the effectiveness of their 
monitoring and result in a negative impact on firm performance. 
 
Based on the previous discussion, the first hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
 
H1: There is a significant difference in the effect of different proportions of 
independent directors on performance between family and non-family firms. 
 
5.2.2 Board Size and Firm Performance 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between board size and firm 
performance is incompatible. A number of studies have been carried out on 
developed countries (Yermack, 1996; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Dalton et al., 
1999; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008, in the US; Bozec, 2005, in Canada; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Hansson, Liljeblom and Martikainen, 2011, in Finland; 
Mishra, Randoy and Jenssen, 2001, in Norway; Bennedsen et al., 2008, in 
Denmark; Ng, 2005, in Hong Kong; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Setia-Atmaja et 
al., 2009; Henry, 2008, in Australia; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010, in Ireland). A 
few studies focus on developing countries (Liang and Li, 1999, in China; Ibrahim 
and Samad, 2011, in Malaysia; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010, in Thailand and 
Jackling and Johl, 2009, in India). In addition, there are some comparative studies 
focusing on multi countries (Andres and Vallelado, 2008, in six OECD countries; 
108 
 
Mak and Kusnadi, 2005, in Singapore; and Malaysia and Bonn et al., 2004, in 
Japan and Australia). 
 
Dalton et al. (1999) contend that board size is a significant determinant of 
effective governance oversight. In general, there is a trade-off between the 
benefits each member brings and the costs of reaching consensus and board 
functioning. In other words, while inclusion of more directors may initially 
increase the board monitoring capacity, the incremental cost of poor 
communication and decision-making associated with larger groups may outweigh 
the benefits. Previous research argues that board size may potentially affect the 
quality of corporate governance and firm performance. For example, an early 
empirical contribution from Yermack (1996) finds evidence that firms with 
smaller boards usually have higher market valuations than firms with larger 
boards. Using Tobin’s Q to approximate a firm’s market valuation, he reveals an 
inverse relationship between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large 
US industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. He finds that firms have 
positive abnormal stock returns around the announcement dates of reduction in 
their board size. He also documents that firms with smaller boards, consisting of 
eight or fewer members, exhibit higher profitability ratios and operating 
efficiency ratios measured by return on assets, return on sales, and total asset 
turnover, than firms with larger boards consisting of more than 14 members. The 
results of Yermack’s study show that the largest losses in firm value occur when a 
firm moves from a small to medium-sized board. This is supported by prior 
theoretical literature (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
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Consistent with the findings of Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
document an inverse relationship between board size and performance of 879 
Finnish firms for the period 1992 to 1994. They argue that larger boards face 
communication and co-ordination problems. Moreover, agency problems become 
more severe as a board grows larger. They conclude that the agency problems 
occur from dysfunctional norms of behaviour in boardrooms. Similarly, Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) report a statistically significant and negative relationship between 
board size and performance measured by Tobin’s Q in Singaporean and 
Malaysian firms. They argue that the inverse relationship between board size and 
firm value transcends different corporate governance systems. 
 
In a similar fashion, Bennedsen et al. (2008) examine the causal effect of 
board size on performance of 7,496 firms in Denmark in 1999. They find a 
negative relationship between board size and performance measured by return on 
assets. However, such findings hold only for the companies with at least six 
directors. They conclude, “Finding the right number of directors is a trade-off 
between the benefits of having sufficient competencies represented and the cost 
arising from increased free-riding among directors” (Bennedsen et al., 2008, p. 
1108). In a recent study, O’Connell and Cramer (2010) also find similar results. In 
a comparative study of Japan and Australia, Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) 
find that board size is negatively related to the performance of Japanese firms. 
They argue that directors in Japan are usually selected on the basis of their 
business relationship with the firm rather than their potential contribution to firm 
performance. However, they find that boards size in Australian firms have no 
significant effect on firm performance. Finally, they note that board members’ 
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skills and knowledge are more important for firm performance than the board 
size. 
 
There is a group of studies that document a positive relationship between 
board size and performance which is supported by the resource dependence 
argument (Coles et al., 2008; Henry, 2008; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Jackling 
and Johl, 2009; Dalton et al., 1999; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010). Consistent 
with the resource dependence theory, these studies argue that larger boards offer 
more experience and knowledge, which, in turn, increase managerial ability to 
make better business decisions and improve firm performance. Moreover, a larger 
board also offers greater access to the firms’ external environment, which reduces 
uncertainties. 
 
In a US study, using a sample of 35 listed banking firms from 1959 to 1995, 
Adams and Mehran (2005) report a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between board size and performance measured by Tobin’s Q. On the 
other hand, using a sample of 96 commercial banks from six OECD countries, 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) find an inverse U-shaped relationship between board 
size and bank performance. They argue that bank board size is related to the 
director’s ability to monitor and advise management and, thereby, improve the 
firm’s performance. However, there is a limit beyond which the co-ordination, 
control, and free-riding problems outweigh the benefits and result in a negative 
effect on performance. 
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There is another stream of empirical literature which suggests that board 
size has no impact on firm performance. For example, using a sample of 228 
small privately-held firms in China in 1998, Liang and Li (1999) find that board 
size does not have any effect on firm performance measured by return on 
investment. They argue that most existing corporate boards in China are still in 
their infancy and, because of the emergent nature of boards, they have no impact 
on performance. Similarly, Bozec (2005) also finds no significant link between 
board size and return on assets of 459 Canadian firms over the period 1976 to 
2000. 
 
There are a few studies that examine the impact of board size on 
performance in family firms. For example, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) investigate 
the relationship between board size and firms’ performance in family and non-
family public companies in Malaysia from 1999 to 2005. They measure firm 
performance by Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. They find a significantly positive 
relationship between small boards and firm value. Similarly, Mishra et al. (2001) 
examine the causal effect of board size on the performance of 120 Norwegian 
family firms, and find a significantly positive relationship between small boards 
and performance in family firms. They conclude that smaller board size19 might 
be a superior corporate governance mechanism for family firms. In a different 
study, Ng (2005) examines the same relationship and finds that board size does 
not have any significant impact on performance of family firms in Hong Kong. He 
argues that boards in Hong Kong are dominated by family members and the 
quality of those boards is not high enough for better governance. Additionally, in 
                                                 
19 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Notification 2006, the number of 
board members in a company should not be less than 5 or more than 20. 
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a recent study, Hansson et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between board 
size and firm performance in family firms in Finland. 
 
Astrachan et al. (2002) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), on the other hand, 
argue that a larger board affiliated with the controlling family may enhance 
performance. Family members can draw on the others who may have valuable 
business experience, expertise, skills, and social and professional networks which 
might add substantial business resources to family firms. Based on the above 
discussion, the second hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
 
H2: There is a significant difference in the effect of board size on performance 
between family and non-family firms. 
 
5.2.3 CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
Prior empirical evidence regarding the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance is mixed. Most studies have focused on developed countries 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Braun and 
Sharma, 2007; Baliga, Moyer and Roa, 1996; Pearce and Zahra, 1991, in the US; 
Bozec, 2005, in Canada; Lin, 2005, in Taiwan; Chen et al., 2005; Lam and Lee, 
2008, in Hong Kong). A few studies also examine this relationship in the context 
of developing countries (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, in Malaysia; Elsayed, 2007, 
in Egypt; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010, in Thailand; Tian and Lau, 2001, in 
China; Jackling and Johl, 2009, in India). 
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Agency theory argues that the positions of CEO and board chair should be 
separated. CEO duality is a sign of a CEO dominated board which could render 
the board ineffective in monitoring managerial opportunism (Daily and Dalton, 
1993). Therefore, CEO duality promotes CEO entrenchment and reduces board 
independence. A substantial number of empirical studies examine the impact of 
CEO duality on firm performance and document a negative relationship between 
these two variables. For example, Rechner and Dalton (1991) examine the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (proxies by return on 
equity, return on investment and profit margin) of 141 large US corporations from 
1978 to 1983. They document the negative effect on firm performance of CEO 
duality. They observe that CEO duality creates managerial entrenchment, and 
separating the positions may reduce agency costs and improve performance. 
Similarly, using a sample of 661 US firms, Brickley et al. (1997) find a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. Previous studies by 
Bozec (2005), Jackling and Johl (2009), and Yammeesri and Herath (2010) also 
report similar findings. All these studies argue that CEO duality may have a 
greater influence on the decision-making of the firm, which, in turn, can 
negatively affect performance. 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), on the other hand, contend that CEO duality 
would be able to improve strategic decision-making, and is more likely to 
overcome organisational inertia, as senior managers have considerable discretion 
to act on their vision. CEO duality is also seen to increase CEO discretion by 
providing a broader power base and control authority, and to weaken the relative 
power of other interest groups (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Consistent with 
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this contention, a number of recent studies provide empirical support indicating 
that CEO duality improves firm performance. For example, Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) examine the effects of CEO duality on shareholder returns in a sample of 
321 US firms from 1985 to 1987, and report that companies with CEO duality 
have better financial performance than those who have different individuals for 
CEO and chairman positions. Similarly, Boyd (1995) investigates the relationship 
between CEO duality and financial performance, proxies by five-year average 
returns on investment (ROI) and reports that firms with CEO duality consistently 
outperform their counterparts with independent board leadership structure. In 
support of their findings they argue that CEO duality enhances decision-making 
by permitting a sharp focus on company objectives. Previous studies by Tian and 
Lau (2001), Pearce and Zahra (1991), and Lin (2005), also document similar 
findings. 
 
There are some empirical papers which suggest that CEO duality has no 
effects on performance. For example, using a small sample of 98 US firms in 
1990, Baliga et al. (1996) find that CEO duality has no significant impact on firm 
performance. They argue that a focus on a single element such as CEO duality in 
the corporate governance-firm performance nexus is unlikely to lead to 
measurable improvements in corporate performance. Elsayed (2007) also 
investigates the impact of CEO duality on performance in Egyptian public limited 
firms, and fails to find any relationship between these two variables. However, 
additional analysis shows that the impact of CEO duality varies with industry type 
and firm performance. He argues that there is no optimal leadership structure and 
CEO duality will benefit some firms while separation will be more advantageous 
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for others. Using a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) also report an insignificant relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. 
 
In family firms, family members tend to dominate the board and may hold 
top management positions, such as CEO and/or Chairperson (La Porta et al., 
1999). Therefore, CEO duality is likely to be more common in family firms than 
in non–family firms (Lam and Lee, 2008). Using a sample of 128 publicly-listed 
companies in Hong Kong, Lam and Lee (2008) argue that CEO duality in family 
firms provides greater opportunities for managerial entrenchment and 
expropriation of minority shareholders, and find that CEO duality has a negative 
impact on performance in family firms. Similarly, using a sample of 412 publicly-
listed firms in Hong Kong for the period 1996 to 1998, Chen et al. (2005) also 
find similar results. Braun and Sharma (2007), on the other hand, find that CEO 
duality in family firms had a relatively stronger impact on the performance of 84 
family-controlled public firms (FCPFs) in the US, implying that it might improve 
strategic decisions because of a greater degree of CEO discretion. 
 
Based on the above discussion, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a significant difference in the impact of CEO duality on performance 
between family and non-family firms. 
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5.2.4 Female Directors and Firm Performance 
The monitoring role carried out by the board of directors is an essential 
element of effective corporate governance mechanisms (John and Senbet, 1998). 
The quality of the monitoring role can be influenced by the gender composition of 
the board. Better corporate governance can be achieved by having a female on the 
board of directors (Bernardi, Bean and Weippert, 2002). Dallas (2002) finds that 
female board members are more inclined to work in those companies which put 
an emphasis on family life and flexible work arrangements. Gul, Srinidhi and Ng 
(2011) note that: 
‘gender diversity could affect stock price informativeness through two 
improvements in board governance: by increasing the oversight over the 
managers which makes them more transparent, and by changing the 
nature and dynamics of board deliberations that makes board members 
pay greater attention to the consequences of their decisions’ (p. 315). 
 
Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui (2011) show that a board with more female 
directors exhibits higher-quality earnings because a gender-diverse board 
improves the oversight functions of the board. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find 
that gender composition of the board is definitely related to measures of board 
efficiency because a gender-diverse board deploys more effort in monitoring. The 
female directors may have experience which is closely aligned with the 
company’s needs and could help a board to execute its strategic function. In the 
case of implementing strategic planning, a female may have a slight edge over a 
man (Fondas, 2000). For example, Welbourne (1999) finds that in the USA IPOs 
are significantly more successful when the companies have females in top 
management which leads to higher earnings and greater shareholder wealth. 
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O’Higgins (2002) suggests two benefits of having females on boards. 
First, females are not part of the ‘old boys’ network which allows them to be more 
independent. Second, they understand consumer behaviour better, and the main 
needs of customers, and opportunities for companies in meeting those needs. 
Moreover, female directors sometimes help corporations to gain competitive 
advantage by dealing with diversity in their products and labour markets more 
effectively. Sometimes they may be able to ask questions more freely than male 
directors, so that more productive dialogue is generated. In addition, having a 
female in the boardroom improves functioning of the board because they may 
influence the perceptions of external agents and can also bring important skills, 
knowledge and competencies to the board (Brammer, Millington and Pavelin, 
2009). Increasing the presence of females in the boardroom may be considered a 
business imperative. Daily and Dalton (2003) argue that female directors may add 
unique perspectives, experiences and working styles compared with their male 
counterparts. Ingley and Van der Walt (2001) note that gender diversity also 
brings variety in abilities, experiences and cultures which may be more productive 
and lead to innovation and creativity. Similarly, Letendre (2004) argues that 
female directors sometimes incite lively boardroom discussions, which leads to 
better decision-making. Kramer, Konrad and Erkut (2006) find that female 
directors are more prepared than male directors to push “tough issues” on the 
board that others were reluctant to tackle. This is particularly relevant because 
corporate boards are often compliant or silent on critical issues. Additionally, 
female directors provide access to important constituencies and resources in the 
external environment. Sometimes, female directors with family ties have valuable 
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business experience and professional networks which may help to improve the 
performance of family firms. 
 
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance is conflicting. Gender diversity on boards is now 
an emergent issue for developed economies such as the USA, Canada, Australia, 
and EU countries (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins and Simpson, 2010; Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao, 2011; 
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles, 1997; Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Siciliano, 1996, in 
the US; Francoeur, Labelle, Sinclair-Desgagne, 2008, in Canada; Vafaei, Mather 
and Ahmed, 2012; Wang and Clift, 2009; Nguyen and Faff, 2007; Bonn, 2004, in 
Australia; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008, in Spain; Smith, Smith and Verner, 
2006; Rose, 2007, in Denmark; Bohren and Strom, 2007, 2010, in Norway, and a 
comparative study by Randoy, Thomsen and Oxelheim, 2006, in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden). However, emergent economies are also starting to 
recognise the importance of developing their female talent up to board level 
(Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000). 
 
Previous research suggests that gender diversity improves monitoring and 
firm performance. For example, using a sample of the 500 largest listed 
companies on the Australian Stock Exchange for 2000 and 2001, Nguyen and Faff 
(2007) investigate the impact of size and gender diversity on the board of 
directors on firm value ( proxy by Tobin’s Q). They show that gender diversity on 
the board is positively related to the greater market value. They argue that having 
more female directors is rewarded with a market value premium since they play a 
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vital role in maintaining the efficiency of a board of directors. In the same vein, 
Bonn (2004) finds that among Australian listed firms, the proportion of female 
directors on the board, despite its low percentage, has a significant positive effect 
on firm performance measured by market-to-book ratio. 
 
In a recent study, using a sample of the top 500 ASX listed firms from 
2005 to 2010, Vafaei et al. (2012) find that gender diversity on boards has a 
significant positive impact on both the accounting and market measure of 
performance. Erhardt et al. (2003) examine the association between demographic 
(ethnic and gender) diversity on the board of directors with the firm performance, 
using the 112 largest US public companies from 1993 and 1998. They find that 
greater board diversity leads to better financial performance measured as return on 
assets and return on investment. They point out that effectiveness in the oversight 
function of the board of directors may be related to diversity. Similarly, using a 
sample of 638 publicly-traded Fortune 1000 firms, Carter et al. (2003) investigate 
the relationship between board diversity and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Their findings suggest that US firms with a higher proportion of women and 
ethnic minorities on their boards show better financial performance. They argue 
that diversity increases monitoring, which leads to board independence. They also 
document that the fraction of female and minorities on the board increase with 
firm size, but decline as the number of insiders increases. Similarly, Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2008) also find that the diversity of the board (measured by the 
percentage of females) has a significant positive impact on firm value in Spain. 
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Consistent with prior evidence, Francoeur et al. (2008) examine whether 
females on a board and in senior management enhances financial performance in a 
sample of 230 of the 500 largest Canadian listed firms from 2001 to 2004. They 
find that firms generate positive significant abnormal returns when they have a 
high proportion of females in top management. Similarly, using the largest 2,500 
Danish firms over the period 1993 to 2001, Smith et al. (2006) report that the 
proportion of women in top management and on the board of directors has a 
positive impact on firm performance. Their results also show that the positive 
effects of women in top management strongly depend on their qualifications. 
 
In a recent study, Anderson et al. (2011) examine the effect of board 
heterogeneity on firm performance by taking six directors’ characteristics such as 
education, experience, profession, gender, ethnicity, and race. They find 
significant positive effects of their diversity index on Tobin’s Q in a sample of 
Russell 1,000 firms over the period 2003 to 2005. They argue that board diversity 
may be advantageous for firms because directors from differing backgrounds can 
bring varied perspectives, talents, and problem-solving skills to corporate 
deliberations which might impact on firm performance. Their findings further 
suggest that the impact of board diversity on performance varies with firm 
characteristics. In particular, board diversity has a beneficial effect in more 
complex firms than in less complex firms. Moreover, board diversity is beneficial 
in firms with higher levels of CEO power. 
 
A strand of literature, on the other hand, has demonstrated a significant 
negative relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. For 
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example, in a recent study, Adams and Ferreira (2009) use data from S&P 500 
firms collected by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) for the 
period 1996 to 2003. They find that the usual effect of gender diversity on both 
market valuation and operating performance is negative. This effect is driven by 
firms with greater shareholder rights. The author suggests that diverse boards are 
tougher monitors. They also find that in firms with weaker shareholder rights, 
gender diversity has positive effects. However, in firms with strong governance, 
mandating gender quotas in the boardroom may reduce shareholder value because 
greater diversity can lead to additional monitoring. 
 
Shrader et al. (1997) investigate the impact of the proportion of female 
directors on two performance measures (ROA and ROE) for a sample of 200 
Fortune 500 firms in 1992. Their results suggest a statistically significant and 
negative relationship between the proportion of females on the board and firm 
value. They argue that the appointment of female board members may be 
tokenism, and their contributions to board activities may be marginalised. In 
addition, Bohren and Strom (2007, 2010) find a negative relationship between 
female board membership and firm value for Norwegian firms. 
 
Previous research also finds that gender diversity does not have any 
significant impact on firm performance. For example, Wang and Clift (2009) 
examine board diversity and its impact on the performance of top 500 Australian 
companies, and show that gender diversity, such as a lack of female directors, 
does not have a significant impact on performance. Carter et al. (2010) investigate 
the relationship between the number of female directors on the board and financial 
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performance. Their results suggest that gender diversity does not have an effect on 
a firm’s financial performance. In a study of 100 Fortune 500 companies Zahra 
and Stanton (1988) find no significant relationship between the proportion of 
females and ethnic minorities on the board and financial performance measured 
by return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS). Similarly, using a 
sample of Danish listed firms during the period 1998 to 2001, Rose (2007) 
examines whether female board representation influences firm performance. 
Consistent with the evidence of Zahra and Stanton (1988), the author fail to find a 
significant link between female representation on Danish boards and the firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The author argues that board members 
with a non-traditional background who are in the socialisation process 
instinctively adopt the ideas of the majority of conventional board members. This 
results in non-materialisation of potential performance. Thus, female directors are 
likely to follow the conventions set by their fellow male board members. 
 
In a different study, using a dataset of 240 YMCA organisations, Siciliano 
(1996) finds that higher occupational diversity of board members leads to a higher 
level of social performance. However, the author finds no relationship between 
gender diversity and organisational operating efficiency. Finally, Randoy et al. 
(2006) examine board diversity and its impact on corporate performance of 500 of 
the largest companies from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The authors also find 
no significant relationship between diversity effects of gender and performance 
measured by return on assets (ROA). 
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No literature was found on gender diversity and its impact on performance 
in the context of family firms. Based on a study of Swiss family firms, Ruigrok et 
al. (2007) argue that female directors are more likely to be affiliated to the firm 
management through family ties. Likewise, in Bangladeshi family firms female 
board members are usually appointed based on family ties. In most cases, the 
founder owners or directors appoint their wives and daughters on the boards, often 
with the motive of increasing family voting power or dominance (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). As family members, they do not need to bring in-depth 
business perceptive, skill or educational qualifications (Uddin and Choudhury, 
2008). Therefore, it can be argued that there is a high likelihood that female 
directors in Bangladeshi family firms may be appointed as a form of tokenism. 
 
Further, from a cultural perspective, the influence of female board members 
on family firm performance becomes questionable. Bangladesh is a country where 
society is dominated by a patrilineal and patrilocal kinship system. Hence, it is 
likely that views and opinions held by a female member of the family may be 
viewed as not being important or even as unacceptable (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio, 2000). Furthermore, traditionally, the main role for females in 
Bangladesh has been engaging in domestic activities inside the home rather than 
market or business activities (Ahmed and Maitra, 2010). Even though over the 
years the female labour force participation rate has increased from 23.9 per cent in 
1999 to 29.2 per cent in 2005 (LFS20, 2005), gender inequalities persist in the 
labour market in Bangladesh where females are paid less and tend to be in less 
senior positions. 
                                                 
20 See Footnote 3. 
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Based on the above discussion, the fourth hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
 
H4: There is a significant difference in the impact of the proportion of female 
directors on performance between family and non-family firms. 
 
5.2.5 Foreign Directors and Firm Performance 
Prior empirical literature documents mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between national diversity and firm performance. Most of the 
previous studies have been conducted in the context of developed countries 
(Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003, in Norway and Sweden; Randoy et al., 2006, in 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; Rose, 2007, in Denmark). Recently, studies have 
also been conducted in the context of developing countries (Darmadi, 2011, in 
Indonesia; Ararat, Aksu and Cetin, 2010, in Turkey; Choi, Park and Yoo, 2007; 
Choi, Sul and Min, 2012, in Korea). 
 
Foreign directors are likely to bring valuable knowledge related to 
contextual issues in foreign markets and are able to increase the quality of 
strategic decision-making (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Moreover, foreign 
directors are less likely to be affiliated to the firm and its management and, hence, 
they are more likely to be independent (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). 
Therefore, from an agency theory perspective, foreign directorships on the board 
may improve monitoring and result in better firm performance. Moreover, 
according to resource dependence theory, foreign directors bring valuable 
knowledge related to contextual issues in foreign markets and are able to increase 
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the quality of strategic decision-making (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Oxelheim 
and Randoy (2003) examine the impact of foreign (Anglo-American) board 
membership on firm value measured by Tobin’s Q, using a sample of 225 traded 
companies in Norway and Sweden for the period 1996 to 1998. The authors find a 
positive significant relationship between outsider Anglo-American board 
member(s) and a firm’s value. They argue that having a foreign member on the 
board signals a higher commitment to corporate monitoring and transparency, and 
enhances the firm’s reputation in the financial market which leads to an increase 
in firm value. Similarly, Choi et al. (2007), Choi et al. (2012) and Ararat et al. 
(2010) provide evidence that having foreign directors on boards leads to higher 
firm performance. They argue that a foreign board member provides expertise and 
independent monitoring over management. However, Rose (2007) and Darmadi 
(2011) fail to find any significant link between the proportion of foreign directors 
and firm performance. Randoy et al. (2006) also find that foreign board members 
do not have any significant impact on firm performance as measured by ROA. 
 
This study proposes that the inclusion of a foreign board member on 
Bangladeshi firms is a step forward in a firm’s globalization process. It can be 
argued that the inclusion of foreign board members will promote the exchange of 
information through their international networks, bringing valuable knowledge 
and expertise to family firms. Their presence will also signal a commitment to 
shareholder rights, something which appeals to investors. Foreign directors can 
make the board more efficient in terms of monitoring. Their monitoring may 
obstruct family directors from becoming entrenched and protect the interests of 
general shareholders. Such directors can also improve the accountability process 
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in light of their foreign experience and knowledge. Thus, it can be argued that 
foreign directors can make the board of a family firm more effective and efficient 
resulting in better performance. However, it can also be argued that the 
dominance of family members may impede the monitoring activities of foreign 
directors. They may not be as active as they are in non-family firms. 
 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H5: There is a significant difference in the impact of the proportion of foreign 
directors on performance between family and non-family firms. 
 
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.3.1 Data and Sample 
The sample selection procedure is reported in Table 5.1. The sample 
consists of all 155 non-financial companies listed with Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009, producing a total sample of 775 sample 
year observations21. Missing information meant that 121 firm year observations 
were excluded, yielding a final sample of 654 firm year observations. The data for 
the analysis come from multiple sources of secondary data. This study collects 
financial data from the annual reports of the sample companies listed on the stock 
exchange. Stock price data are obtained from the DataStream database. The 
family ownership and other corporate governance data were hand-collected from 
                                                 
21 In 2005, there were 282 listed companies on the DSE, of which 127 companies belonged to the 
financial sector. They have been excluded since they are controlled by different regulations and are 
likely to have different disclosure requirements and governance structure. 
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the corporate governance disclosures, shareholding information and directors’ 
reports contained in annual reports. 
 
5.3.2 Measuring Family Firms 
This study adopts multiple criteria to identify family firms. This is mainly 
because prior literature provides no commonly-accepted measure or criterion for 
identifying a family firm. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that 20 per cent ownership 
is usually enough to reflect effective control of a firm and this cut-off point is 
adopted by a number of past studies to identify family firms (Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). However, a recent study by Cascino 
et al. (2010) has been critical of the adoption of only a single indicator for 
assessing firm control and suggests active management by family members to be a 
critical criterion as well. Thus, following Cascino et al. (2010), this study uses a 
more refined definition of family firms that does not rely solely on ownership 
concentrations as the major determining criterion.22 This study, therefore, 
identifies family firms23 as being: (1) firms in which 20 per cent of share 
ownership or voting rights (either direct or indirect) are held by family members; 
and (2) at least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position 
such as board member, CEO or chairman. This study uses a dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be family firm, and 0 otherwise. Family 
relationships and shareholding patterns were collected from the annual reports, the 
prospectus of the listed companies and company web sites. 
 
                                                 
22 See Footnote 11 for details. 
23 See Footnote 12 for details. 
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From Table 5.1, it is observed that family firms are present in 64.07 per cent 
of the total sample. The family firms are prevalent in various sectors such as 
cement (17), ceramics (13), engineering (62), food (68), information technology 
(11), jute (9), paper and printing (10), miscellaneous (22), pharmaceuticals (62), 
service and real estate (12), tanneries (9) and textiles (124). This study controls 
industry affiliations for empirical analysis. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
Number of firms 282 
Less:  
Financial and Utility companies 127 
Companies without necessary information for corporate governance and 
family ownership data 
  14 
Total 141 
Panel B: Sample by Family and Non-family Firms in Sectors 
 
Sector 
 
Family 
(Firm-year) 
 
Non-family 
(Firm-year) 
 
Total 
(Firm-year) 
Per cent Family 
firms in Industry 
(Firm-year) 
Cement 17 20 37 45.95 
Ceramics 13 6 19 68.42 
Engineering 62 40 102 60.78 
Food 68 45 113 60.18 
IT 11 17 28 39.29 
Jute 9 5 14 64.29 
Paper & Printing 10 0 10 100.00 
Miscellaneous 22 30 52 42.31 
Pharmaceuticals 62 30 92 67.39 
Service & Real 
Estate 
12 14 26 46.15 
Tanneries 9 16 25 36.00 
Textiles 124 12 136 91.18 
Total 419 235 654  
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5.3.3 Model specification 
The following regression model is used to test Hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 
and H5. 
 
Performance (Tobin’s Q) = α + β1 Family firm + β2 Board independence + β3 
Board size+ β4CEO duality + β5 Female director + β6 foreign director + β7 Board 
independence * family firm + β8 Board size * family firm + β9 CEO duality * 
family firm + β10 Female director * family firm + β11 Foreign director * family 
firm + β12 Firm size + β13Firm age + β14 Leverage + β15 Risk + β16 Board 
ownership + β17 Growth + β18 Industry dummies + β19 Year dummies + ε ---(5.1) 
 
 
One concern in the above model, if an OLS regression analysis is used, is 
the potential endogenity problem, as pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988). This is consistent, for example, with better-performing firms having a 
superior board structure platform, or poor performance by firms resulting in 
initiatives aimed at improving board structure and the accountability of managers 
and directors. To address endogeneity problems, this study uses a two-stage least 
squares regression analysis and instrumental variables. To test for endogeneity in 
the model, the generalised instrumental variable estimation method is used. First, 
each of the potentially endogenous variables is individually regressed on a set of 
available instruments and the truly exogenous variables in the model. These 
represent a series of single reduced form or artificial equations, where the 
instruments are second lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables24. 
The first-stage regression results are reported in Table B.2 of Appendix B. 
 
The dependent variable measuring firm performance is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt 
divided by book value of total assets (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Tobin’s Q is 
                                                 
24 Consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), this study uses lagged values of board structure 
variables. 
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popularly adopted as a measure of firm performance because it reflects the market 
expectations of future earnings. Family firm variable has already been defined in 
Section 5.3.2. In relation to the independent variables, this study defines board 
independence as the proportion of independent directors on the board who do not 
have any material interest in the firm (denoted as board independence) (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2004), whereas board size is measured based on the number of 
directors on the board (denoted as board size) (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). CEO 
duality refers to the situation where the same person serves in the role of CEO of 
the firm as well as chairman of the board (denoted by CEO duality). Consistent 
with the prior study, this study uses the CEO duality variable as a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the CEO and chairman are the same person, and 0 
otherwise (Boyd, 1995). Consistent with prior study (Carter et al., 2003; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009), the female director variable is measured as the proportion of 
female directors on the board (denoted as female director), and foreign directors 
is measured by the proportion of foreign directors on the board (denoted as 
foreign director) (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). 
 
This study uses five interaction variables to examine the difference in the 
impact of board structure (board independence, board size, CEO duality, female 
directors and foreign directors) on Tobin’s Q between family and non-family 
firms. This study controls for a number of standard variables that may affect firm 
performance, such as firm size, firm age, risk, leverage, board ownership, growth. 
 
Firm size: Larger firms may have fewer growth opportunities (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988) and more co-ordination problems (Williamson, 1967) 
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which may negatively influence their performance. On the other hand, larger 
firms tend to make hefty investments and often receive preferential treatment 
which may enhance firm performance (Boeker, 1997). Firm size is measured as a 
natural logarithm of total assets (Yermack, 1996). 
 
Firm age: Boone et al. (2007) argue that complexity increases with the 
firm’s age. Therefore, an uncertain relationship of firm age on board 
characteristics as well as firm performance is expected. Age of the firm is 
calculated by taking the natural log of the number of years since the firm’s 
inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Risk: Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the greater the level of risk in the 
business environment, the greater the impact of board structure on firm value. 
Therefore, this study expects a negative sign for the coefficient of risk. Consistent 
with previous literature, this study measures firm’s risk as the standard deviation 
of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period (Boone et al., 
2007). 
 
Leverage: The leverage of a firm could lead to external corporate control 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Debt holders should actively monitor the firm’s capital 
structure to protect their own interest (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Therefore, 
leverage influences firm performance through monitoring activities by debt 
holders. On the other hand, a negative relationship could be expected between 
leverage and performance, according to the pecking order theory whereby a firm 
prefers to fund operations through retained earnings rather than debt and equity 
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(Myers, 1984). Leverage is measured by taking the ratio of book value of total 
debt to book value of total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Board ownership: Consistent with prior studies, we use the board ownership 
variable as the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family 
directors’ ownership) on the board to capture the incentive effects of other 
insiders’ ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Growth: Faster growth is more likely to be positively correlated with 
financial performance. The growth of a firm is measured by taking a firm’s assets 
growth ratio. This study is expected to find a positive sign for the growth variable. 
 
Finally, this study uses year dummies and industry dummies for 
manufacturing and processing, services, information technology (IT) and other 
sectors. 
 
5.4 RESULTS 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 presents three panels of descriptive statistics for the full sample. 
Panel A provides means, medians and standard deviations for the main variables 
in the full sample. Panel B shows the results of difference of means tests for key 
variables between family and non-family firms. 
 
Panel A of Table 5.2 shows that the average number of directors is around 
seven, 6.30 per cent are independent directors, 16.90 per cent are female directors 
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and 5.50 per cent are foreign directors. The average Tobin’s Q of the sample firms 
is 1.508. With regard to ownership structure, board of directors (excluding family 
directors) and family members hold an average of 8.60 per cent and 29 per cent of 
shares, respectively. The average firm age is nearly 23 years, and the average firm 
size is 8.70 (natural logarithm of total assets). 
 
Panel B of Table 5.2 presents difference of means tests for key variables 
between family and non-family firms. Family firms represent 64.07 per cent of the 
sample. Family firms have smaller boards (6.4 versus 7.4 directors) than non-
family firms, and have a significantly lower proportion of independent directors 
(6.1 per cent versus 7.6 per cent). On average, family firms exhibit better 
performance than non-family firms (Tobin’s Q: 1.769 versus 1.362). The average 
share ownership of the board of directors (excluding family members) also 
significantly differs between family (3.3 per cent) and non-family firms (18.2 per 
cent). The univariate analysis also shows that several variables differ significantly 
between family and non-family firms, such as age, CEO duality, proportion of 
female directors and proportion of foreign directors. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Observations 
Firm size 8.696 8.684 0.659 654 
Tobin’s Q 1.508 1.118 1.200 654 
Leverage 0.749 0.604 0.789 654 
Firm age 22.989 23.000 10.940 654 
Board ownership 0.086 0.013 0.145 654 
Board size 6.742 6.500 2.073 654 
Growth 0.116 0.048 0.341 654 
Risk 0.028 0.027 0.024 654 
Family ownership 0.290 0.319 0.219 654 
CEO duality 0.246 0.000 0.431 654 
Board independence 0.063 0.000 0.082 654 
Foreign directors 0.055 0.000 0.157 654 
Female directors 0.169 0.143 0.183 654 
 
Panel B: Difference of Means Test 
Variable Family Non-family P Value 
Board size 6.358 7.426 0.000 
Board ownership 0.033 0.182 0.000 
Risk 0.026 0.032 0.126 
Tobin’s Q 1.769 1.362 0.000 
ROA 0.077 0.066 0.147 
Growth 1.727 0.349 0.100 
Firm age 21.303 25.996 0.000 
Firm size 8.650 8.778 0.279 
Board independence 0.061 0.076 0.015 
CEO duality 0.297 0.152 0.000 
Foreign directors 0.030 0.102 0.000 
Female directors 0.240 0.050 0.000 
N 
 
419 
 
235 
The above table reports descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as follows: Family firms are those 
where family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
assets. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated 
as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign directors are 
measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board ownership 
is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. 
Firm age is the natural log of number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the 
ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of assets. 
Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. 
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Table 5.3 provides a simple correlation matrix for the key variables in the 
analysis. Family firm has a positive correlation with both accounting and market 
measures of firm performance. In addition, consistent with previous studies, this 
study finds that family firm is negatively correlated with firm size, firm age and 
risk (see Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The correlation matrix also shows that board 
size and foreign directors are positive and significantly correlated with firm 
performance. However, the proportion of independent directors is positive and 
insignificantly correlated with Tobin’s Q, and positive and significantly correlated 
with ROA. The proportion of female directors has an insignificant positive 
correlation with Tobin’s Q but, however, a significant positive correlation with 
ROA. 
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5.4.2 Regression Results: Board Structure and Family Firm Performance 
The main focus of the analysis of this study is to examine the effect of board 
structure on performance in family firms. The results are reported in Table 5.4. 
First, an OLS regression is run. As previously discussed, this study also uses an 
instrumental variable (IV) regression to address the issue of endogeneity. It can 
also be argued that board structure variables may be endogenously determined by 
the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Therefore, this study tests the model using a 
fixed effect (FE) regression as well. This study finds that the family firm variable 
is positive and significant in both IV (β = 0.029, p < 0.05) and fixed effect 
regressions (β = 0.196, p < 0.10). This is consistent with the findings of Anderson 
and Reeb (2004), and suggests that family firms in Bangladesh perform better 
than non-family firms. 
 
In relation to board independence, this study finds that board independence, 
in general, improves firm performance. The board independence variable is 
positive and significant in both IV (β = 2.288, p < 0.01) and fixed effect 
regressions (β = 2.749, p < 0.01). However, when this study interacts board 
independence with family firm it finds negative and significant coefficients in all 
regressions (OLS: β = -2.108, p<0.05; IV: β = -1.786, p<0.10; FE: β = -1.634, 
p<0.05). This implies that the impact of board independence on performance is 
significantly weaker for family than for non-family firms, thus supporting H1. 
This is consistent with the findings of Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009). They argue that 
families who have the power to appoint and replace independent directors may, in 
fact, appoint directors who are not truly independent, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of monitoring by independent directors. 
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The coefficient of board size is positive and significant in all three 
regressions (OLS: β = 0.075, p < 0.01; IV: β = 0.065, p < 0.05; FE: β = 0.060, p < 
0.10). This indicates that larger boards improve the performance of Bangladeshi 
firms. However, the coefficient on the interaction term between family firm and 
board size is negative and significant (OLS: β = -0.061, p < 0.10; IV: β = -0.025, p 
< 0.10; FE: β = -0.016, p < 0.10), which implies that board size has a significantly 
weaker impact on family than on non-family firms, thus supporting H2. This 
result is consistent with Ibrahim and Samad (2011). They argue that smaller board 
size might be a superior corporate governance mechanism for family firms. These 
results are also aligned with the argument by Anderson and Reeb (2004) that 
larger boards affiliated with the controlling family are likely to face poor 
governance, and achieve lower firm performance in family firms because of the 
effects of entrenchment. 
 
In regard to CEO duality, this study finds that CEO duality has a negative 
and significant impact on performance (OLS: β = -0.311, p < 0.10; IV: β = -0.552, 
p < 0.01; FE: β = -0.255, p < 0.05). This indicates that firms where the same 
person undertakes the dual role of CEO and chairperson their performance is 
poorer. This is consistent with the argument provided by Kang and Zardkoohi 
(2005) that CEO duality reduces firm performance due to the effect of 
entrenchment. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between family 
firm and CEO duality is positive and significant (OLS: β = 0.315, p < 0.05; IV: β 
= 0.632, p < 0.01; FE: β = 0.339, p < 0.05), which suggests H3 is supported. This 
result suggests that CEO duality is seen to have a significantly stronger effect on 
the performance of family than non-family firms, implying that it might improve 
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strategic decisions because of the greater degree of CEO discretion (Braun and 
Sharma, 2007). Moreover, CEOs who have a dual role in Bangladeshi family 
firms are concerned about reputation, are more committed to their businesses, and 
run the business accordingly to improve firm performance. 
 
The coefficient of female directors is positive and significant in the OLS 
regression only (β = 0.927, p > 0.10). However, none of the coefficients of the 
interaction variable between family firm and female director is significant in the 
three regressions. This implies that a gender-diversified board does not influence 
performance in family firms, thus H4 is not supported when we measure 
performance by Tobin’s Q.25 A possible explanation for this finding is that in 
Bangladesh, female directors could be appointed as a form of tokenism in family 
firms (Shrader et al., 1997), and that they may not have sufficient knowledge nor 
skills to oversee the activities and improve firm performance. 
 
This study finds the coefficient of the foreign director variable (OLS: β = 
2.698, p < 0.01; IV: β = 2.762, p < 0.01; FE: β = 1.592, p < 0.05) to be positive 
and significant in all three regressions. This indicates that foreign directors tend to 
improve the performance of Bangladeshi firms through their monitoring. 
However, the interaction term between family firms and foreign directors is 
negative, suggesting a weaker effect by such directors on the performance of 
family firms, relative to their impact on non-family firms (OLS: β = -2.459, p < 
0.01; IV: β = -2.662, p < 0.01; FE: β = -1.388, p < 0.10). H5 is thus supported. 
                                                 
25 However, when this study measures performance by ROA, this study gets negative and 
significant coefficients of the interaction term between family firms and female directors. Thus H4 
is supported when this study measures performance by ROA. The results are reported in Table 5.5. 
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This is consistent with the argument that family dominance may obstruct 
monitoring by foreign directors in Bangladeshi family firms. 
 
With respect to the control variables, this study finds that firm age, firm size 
and board ownership (excluding family directors’ ownership) are all negatively 
related to firm performance. This study also notes a positive relationship between 
performance and leverage26 and risk. The results of the analysis with respect to the 
control variables are consistent with previous studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, 
2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Since leverage and Tobin’s Q are highly correlated, this study reruns the model after excluding 
leverage. This study finds that results which are reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B are 
consistent with the results reported in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: Regression Results: Firm performance (Tobin’s Q), board 
structure and family firms 
OLS IV FE 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 3.378 0.000 2.178 0.000 -0.084 0.921 
Family firm 0.443 0.103 0.029 0.032 0.196 0.059 
Board ownership -0.663 0.020 -0.68 0.002 -0.304 0.621 
Board independence 2.412 0.255 2.288 0.005 2.749 0.000 
Board size 0.075 0.002 0.065 0.022 0.060 0.098 
CEO duality -0.311 0.079 -0.552 0.003 -0.255 0.006 
Female directors 0.927 0.077 0.832 0.145 0.551 0.202 
Foreign directors 2.698 0.000 2.762 0.000 1.592 0.029 
Firm age -0.002 0.606 -0.005 0.268 -0.012 0.134 
Leverage 0.882 0.000 0.902 0.000 0.807 0.000 
Risk 2.149 0.123 1.028 0.493 3.233 0.132 
Firm size -0.240 0.000 -0.207 0.001 -0.181 0.195 
Growth 0.049 0.619 0.001 0.877 0.165 0.505 
Family firm *board 
independence -2.108 0.013 -1.786 0.079 -1.634 0.028 
Family firm*board size -0.061 0.072 -0.025 0.050 -0.016 0.071 
Family firm*CEO duality 0.315 0.041 0.632 0.003 0.339 0.014 
Family firm* female 
director -0.972 0.187 -0.745 0.227 -0.757 0.137 
Family firm*foreign 
director -2.459 0.000 -2.622 0.000 -1.388 0.058 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.529 0.435 0.775 
F-statistic 36.03 30.09 16.59 
N 654 654 654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Family firms are those where the 
family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership, and at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. 
Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as 
the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign 
directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, 
respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family 
directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of number of years since the firm’s 
inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total 
assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month 
period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking 
the firm’s assets growth ratio. The reported results are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent. 
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5.5 FURTHER ANALYSES 
5.5.1 Alternative Measure of Firm Performance 
An alternative measure of firm performance is also adopted, where Return 
on Assets (ROA) is used as the proxy. ROA is measured as earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) to book value of total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009), and it represents how profitable a company is relative to 
its total assets. In general, ROA is directly related to management’s ability to 
efficiently utilize corporate assets, which ultimately belong to shareholders. This 
study runs all the models using ROA as the measure of performance. The results 
are reported in Table 5.5. Overall, the results are consistent with the main findings 
reported in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.5: Regression Results: Firm performance (ROA), board structure 
and family firms 
  OLS IV Fixed effect 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 0.047 0.370 0.027 0.611 0.037 0.638 
Family firm 0.044 0.084 0.055 0.036 0.060 0.098 
Board ownership -0.048 0.073 -0.022 0.253 -0.032 0.551 
Board independence 0.131 0.043 0.114 0.014 0.070 0.052 
Board size 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.032 
CEO duality -0.005 0.158 -0.009 0.070 -0.010 0.053 
Female directors 0.175 0.000 0.168 0.001 0.113 0.003 
Foreign directors 0.178 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.153 0.059 
Firm age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.094 0.001 0.012 
Leverage -0.048 0.000 -0.042 0.000 -0.047 0.006 
Risk -0.387 0.003 -0.375 0.005 -0.139 0.031 
Firm size -0.004 0.413 -0.001 0.797 -0.003 0.764 
Growth 0.019 0.045 0.000 0.475 0.002 0.808 
Family firm*board 
independence -0.110 0.072 -0.062 0.048 -0.110 0.020 
Family firm*board size -0.001 0.098 -0.002 0.023 -0.002 0.035 
Family firm*CEO duality 0.006 0.073 0.016 0.079 0.007 0.059 
Family firm*female 
director -0.180 0.001 -0.157 0.004 -0.157 0.002 
Family firm*foreign 
director -0.197 0.000 -0.200 0.000 -0.143 0.106 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.293 0.254 0.725 
F-statistic 13.893 13.881 15.697 
N 654 654 654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. ROA is the ratio of profit after tax and book value of total assets. Family firms are 
those where the family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership, and at least one 
member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-
family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is 
calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign 
director are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. 
Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family directors’ 
ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of number of years since the firm’s inception. 
Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is 
the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is 
the natural log of book value of assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets 
growth ratio. The reported results are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. 
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5.5.2 Impact of Family Directors, Family CEO Duality and Female Family 
Directors 
Given that family dominance is very common in Bangladesh, family 
directors, family CEO duality and female family directors are important 
characteristics of the board structure of family firms. This study, therefore, runs a 
separate model to test their impacts on performance. This study includes three 
variables, namely, family directors, family CEO duality and female family 
directors in the model. Family director is measured based on the proportion of 
family directors on the board (denoted as family director). Family CEO duality is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person from a family serves in the role of 
CEO as well as chairman, and 0 otherwise (denoted as family CEO duality). 
Female family director is measured based on the proportion of female family 
directors on the board (denoted as female family director). 
 
This study reports the results in Panel A of Table 5.6.27 First, the results 
suggest a negative significant relationship between family director and 
performance (OLS: β = -0.035, p < 0.05; IV:  β = -0.031, p < 0.05; FE: β = -0.037, 
p < 0.05). This implies that an increase in the proportion of family members on 
boards is likely to increase family dominance as well as possible expropriation, 
resulting in a negative impact on performance. Second, this study finds a positive 
significant relationship between family CEO duality and performance (OLS: β = 
0.074, p < 0.05; IV:  β = 0.073, p < 0.10; FE: β = 0.060, p < 0.10).28 This is 
                                                 
27 The first-stage regression (for IV) results are reported in Table B.2 of Appendix B. 
28 85 per cent of the sample with family CEO duality have founder CEOs. This study also runs 
separate regressions for founder CEO duality and descendant CEO duality. This study finds a 
positive and significant impact of founder CEO duality on performance. However, this study finds 
a positive and insignificant impact of descendant CEO duality on performance. The results are 
presented in Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
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consistent with the notion that family CEOs playing dual roles are normally 
concerned about transferring wealth to future generations. Moreover, because of 
the family reputation effect, they can create networks with customers, suppliers 
and bankers which can help them to improve firm performance. Third, this study 
documents a negative and significant relationship between female family directors 
and performance (OLS: β = -0.039, p < 0.10; IV:  β = -0.043, p < 0.10; FE: β = -
0.077, p < 0.10). This result suggests that an increase in the proportion of female 
family board members increases the family dominance which may have a 
negative impact on performance because of the potential for expropriation. The 
educational background and professional experience of such directors may also 
have an impact on performance. However, this study is not able to test either the 
moderating effects of the qualifications or expertise of female directors because of 
the lack of availability of data. This study also uses ROA as an alternative 
measure performance, and the results presented in Panel B are consistent with the 
findings reported in Panel A. 
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5.5.3 Other Analyses 
First, this study uses an alternative definition of family firms. In particular, 
this study defines a family firm as one where family members hold at least 50 per 
cent of a firm’s shares (voting rights) (Ang et al., 2000; Van den Berghe and 
Carchon, 2002). Further, this study requires that at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position (i.e., board member, CEO or 
chairman). This study uses a dummy variable to identify family firms which is set 
equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be a family firm, and 0 otherwise. When the 
study uses this alternative definition, the number of family firms is reduced to 
171. This study runs all the regressions that are reported in Table 5.4 and finds 
results that are consistent with the main findings. The results are presented in 
Table B.4 and Table B.5 in Appendix B. 
 
Second, since the study includes the period of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) which has implications for firm performance in 2008 in particular, this 
study controls for its impact in the model. This study introduces a dummy variable 
which is set equal to 1 for the GFC year (2008), and 0 otherwise. The findings 
suggest that the GFC had a negative and significant impact on the performance of 
Bangladeshi firms. The analysis also indicates that the main findings in regard to 
the board structure variables remain unchanged. The results are reported in Table 
B.6 in Appendix B. 
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5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This study provides empirical evidence based on Bangladeshi family firms 
that indicate significant relationships between board structure and performance. 
This study argues that ownership in Bangladesh is largely concentrated in the 
hands of a few people, and that the major shareholders belong mostly to 
controlling families. Since prior studies suggest that minority shareholders rely on 
corporate boards to monitor and control family opportunism, this study explores 
the impact of board structure on the performance of family firms. While the 
results, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance, indicate that family firms 
perform better than non-family firms, the impact of board structure on firm 
performance differs between the two types of firms. More specifically, the 
analysis indicates that the impact of board independence on performance is 
weaker for family firms than for non-family firms, implying that independent 
directors do not necessarily add value to family firms in Bangladesh. It is possible 
that families have a significant influence on the selection and appointment of 
independent directors and, therefore, the so called ‘independent’ directors are not 
truly independent. This is also consistent with the opinion expressed by one of the 
experienced General Managers of a listed company in Uddin and Choudhury’s 
(2008) study in regard to independent directors: 
‘In most of the local companies, independent directors are being 
appointed by name only. They are choosing person who are either a friend 
or someone who will always act as per the directive of the sponsors. They 
are independent in name only’ (p. 1035). 
 
In relation to board size, this study reveals larger boards to have a weaker 
impact on the performance of family firms than on non-family firms, which 
implies that a smaller board is preferable for Bangladeshi family firms. The 
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results also indicate that CEO duality has a stronger impact on the performance of 
family firms than on their non-family counterparts. This is consistent with the 
notion that CEOs who have a dual role in Bangladeshi family firms are likely to 
exercise their decision-making more effectively, and run the business accordingly 
to improve performance. This study finds that gender-diversified boards in 
Bangladeshi family firms have a relatively weaker impact on performance than in 
non-family firms. As female directors are frequently appointed on the basis of 
family ties, they usually do not need any qualifications or expertise. This implies 
that female directors may have been appointed as a form of tokenism in family 
firms. Finally, this study documents that foreign directors have a significantly 
weaker impact on the performance of family firms than on their non-family 
counterparts. This result implies that foreign directors in family firms may not be 
sufficiently active as monitors because of the dominance of the family members. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FAMILY FIRMS, POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the third empirical study that examines the 
relationship between family ownership, board political connections and firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. This chapter also investigates 
the generational impact on the relationship between political connections and firm 
performance in family firms. 
 
Besides high rates of family ownership among Bangladeshi firms, another 
key attribute that characterises these firms are the strong political connections 
they have. Political connections have been found to be critical for understanding 
family firm performance, and it is not surprising that there is a growing body of 
literature on the impact of political connections on business (Bliss and Gul, 2012; 
Boubakri et al., 2012; Bliss et al., 2011; Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain and James, 
2011; Gul, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Chen et al., 2005). Firms are normally identified 
as being politically-connected when at least one of its controlling shareholders, or 
a member of its board or the CEO, is or was a member of parliament or a minister, 
or is closely associated with a political party or a politician (Faccio, 2006; Chaney 
et al., 2011). Political connections are viewed as desirable as they may lead to 
competitive advantages such as relaxed regulatory oversight, easier access to debt 
financing, preferential tax treatment, bailouts from the government, higher IPO 
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offer prices, lower cost of debt among many others.29 These competitive 
advantages, in turn, are contended to have a positive impact on firm performance 
and value (Hillman, 2005; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Li et al., 2008). 
 
There is also evidence to the contrary, however, where political connections 
and firm performance are found to be negatively related (Faccio et al., 2006; 
Bertrand et al., 2007; Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008). Such a relationship 
may be because the costs of maintaining political connections outweigh the 
benefits, including, for instance, when politicians are able to extract rents from the 
firms that they own and/or manage at the expense of the wealth maximisation of 
the other shareholders (De Soto, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
 
A factor that has not been fully addressed in this growing body of literature, 
and one which may explain the mixed results on the association between political 
connections and firm performance, relates to ownership structure. How political 
connections are exploited and utilised in relation to firm activities is potentially 
related to the motivations and incentives of the owners (Chen et al., 2011). The 
type of ownership that forms the focal interest for this study is family ownership 
or control30, and the justification for the choice of this study is premised on the 
following reasons. First, family owners have long been seen to be more motivated 
and committed to their businesses and, in particular, to take a longer term view 
(Nicholson, 2008). Second, family firms globally form an important part of the 
                                                 
29 Evidence of relaxed regulatory oversight of connected firms is provided by Stigler (1971); easier 
access to debt financing is empirically documented by Khwaja and Mian (2005); preferential tax 
treatment to connected firms was argued by De Soto (1989); government sponsored bailouts are 
documented by Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006); a higher IPO offering price of connected 
firms is documented by Francis, Hasan and Sun (2009); lower cost of debt enjoyed by connected 
firms is reported by Boubakri et al. (2012). 
30 Family firms are generally identified based on the ultimate ownership and voting rights of an 
individual or a group of members from the same family. 
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world’s economy31. Third, both political connections and family firms are more 
prevalent in developing countries with high levels of corruption where legal 
systems tend to be weak (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Chen et al., 2005). Yet, there is almost negligible empirical evidence 
on the association between family ownership, political connections and firm 
performance. 
 
This study addresses this gap in the literature by investigating the 
relationship between political connections and firm performance of both family 
and non-family firms in Bangladesh, using data from listed non-financial 
companies during the period 2005 to 2009. Bangladesh is an emerging economy 
and it has different institutional, regulatory and legal environments32 than 
developed economies (Farooque et al., 2007). Like many other South-East Asian 
countries, most of the controlling families in Bangladesh hold shares 
independently in a particular company or group of companies. This ownership 
structure is, however, very different from the pyramidal structure found in Japan 
and some other East Asian economies (Farooque et al., 2007). Family and kinship 
ties are deeply-rooted in Bangladesh’s political and economic history. Since its 
independence in 1971, the development of Bangladeshi capitalism has been 
shaped by colonialism, interventions by global authorities (e.g., the World Bank) 
and families that were wealthy and socially influential. It is, thus, no surprise that 
family-owned firms have dominated the Bangladeshi capital market over several 
decades. Haque et al. (2011) argue that controlling shareholders from families in 
Bangladesh either become part of the political process or develop strong personal 
                                                 
31 See Section 1.1 for details. 
32 See Section 2.3 for a more detailed discussion. 
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and/or business relationships with political leaders, their families and with the 
financial contributors to the major political parties. Subsequently, such 
‘businessmen-cum-politicians’ and their families are seen to hold substantial 
influence over major industries and businesses. Thus, Bangladesh provides a 
suitable context for this study. 
 
The key research question for this study is, ‘Does family firm ownership 
moderate the relationship between political connections and firm performance?’ 
In general, this study proposes that relative to non-family firms, political 
connections in family firms will be utilised to enhance firm survival and 
performance (Morck and Yeung, 2004). This study uses both agency (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001) and evolutionary psychology theories 
(Nicholson, 2008; O’Boyle, Pollack and Rutherford, 2012) to develop hypotheses. 
From an agency theory perspective, the type I agency problem (i.e., costs 
associated with the owner-management separation) is less of an issue in family 
firms than the type II agency problem, where controlling shareholders are able to 
extract private benefits to the detriment of other shareholders as well as the firm’s 
value ultimately33. Villalonga and Amit (2006) contend that controlling families 
have strong incentives for better monitoring as well as for wealth expropriation. 
Their empirical evidence suggests, however, that when founder family members 
act as a CEO, or as a chairperson with a hired CEO, firm value is higher 
indicating better monitoring and firm value-addition by such family members. 
Further, from an evolutionary psychology theory perspective (see Nicholson, 
2008), factors such as ownership identity and intergenerational transmission are 
                                                 
33 See Footnote 7. 
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seen to affect various positive or negative behaviours in family firms, leading to 
poorer or better firm outcomes. For instance, ownership identity in family firms 
may work to enhance firm reputation and survival through greater job 
involvement and commitment (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Likewise, it can also 
be expected that political connections in family firms will be utilised for the long-
term benefit of the firm. Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000) argue that 
controlling families have the motivation to lobby the government in order to 
protect their wealth and to enhance their private benefits. Similarly, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) find that controlling families prefer to keep sensitive information 
about rent-seeking activities secret, and they also have incentives to legitimise 
whatever information they disclose through political connections. 
 
An alternate view is that family firms with political connections are more 
likely to exploit minority shareholders, as they will be in a stronger position to 
avoid any litigation or repercussions. It is argued that directors’ political 
affiliations in family firms tend to entrench their management (Morck et al., 2000) 
leading to the extraction of private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders and resulting in poorer firm performance (Fan et al., 2007). As noted 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) when the ownership is concentrated, the primary 
agency problem is no longer the conflict between managers and shareholders, but 
that between the largest and other shareholders. Furthermore, evolutionary 
psychology theory also identifies several disadvantages inherent in family firms, 
such as conservatism, complacency and conflict (Nicholson, 2008; O’Boyle et al., 
2012) which, in turn, increase the risk of political connections being used for 
private benefits. In particular, second-generation family members who often 
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inherit the business (rather than earn their place in management) may not have the 
same level of family identity or pride nor the skills to manage the firm, leading to 
a lower commitment to enhancing or even protecting firm value (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006). Founder family owners, by contrast, who are normally innovative 
and were instrumental in starting the business are more likely to have both the 
business nouse and commitment to seeing the business prosper. Thus, the way 
political connections are managed and utilised may also differ between founder 
and second-generation owners and managers. Nevertheless, how family 
ownership and inherent intergenerational differences affect the association 
between political connections and firm performance remains largely an empirical 
issue. 
 
The results of this study, based on data from 155 Bangladeshi public-listed 
firms for the period 2005 to 2009, indicate that family ownership moderates the 
association between political connections and firm performance. More 
specifically, while political connections, in general, are seen to have a direct and 
negative impact on firm performance for the full sample, the opposite is found for 
the family firm sub-sample, that is, the association between political connections 
and firm performance is positive. This is consistent with the argument that family 
firms tend to utilise their political connections to improve firm performance so 
that they can create wealth for future generations. This study also finds a negative 
association between political connections and firm performance for the non-
family sub-sample. One probable explanation is that political connections in non-
family firms tend to foster entrenchment by management and they may exploit 
political connections for their personal gain rather than for the firm’s economic 
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success. Further, the results suggest that the impact politically connections have 
on family firm performance is positive for firms with a first generation or founder 
CEO or chairperson. By contrast, such connections are negative in family firms 
with descendant members as CEO or chairperson. These results suggest that 
founders, who tend to be more interested in the longevity of the firms, are likely 
to utilise political connections to the benefit of the firm, while descendant 
members may use political links for rent seeking activities, which is reflected in 
poorer firm performance. Finally, this study also undertakes an additional analysis 
on the impact of two types of political connections: (1) a sitting member of 
parliament (MP) or a minister; and (2) other political connections such as a 
member of a political party (but not an MP or minister), or having close 
associations with politicians. In doing so, the aim of this study is to capture the 
impact of different levels of power and influence that are inherent in political 
connections, where being a minister or an MP is seen to entail a greater level of 
political benefits and clout, while other connections potentially entail lower level 
benefits. The results suggest that the effect of political connections on firm 
performance is significantly stronger when the board member is either a minister 
or an MP, compared to other types of political connections, for both family and 
non-family firms. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a 
review of related literature, and develops two hypotheses. Section 6.3 describes 
the research methodology, followed by presentation of the hypotheses testing in 
Section 6.4, and the results of several robustness tests in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 
provides the conclusions of the study. 
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6. 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
6.2.1 Political Connections, Family Ownership and Firm Performance 
It is well-known that political connections are often costly to maintain 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Svensson, 2003), thus, there must be economic 
justifications for firms to be politically connected. The political benefits may 
either accrue to the entity and/or to the controlling shareholders as individuals, in 
the form of preferential treatment in government contracts or access to funds and 
government services. Researchers such as Shleifer and Vishny (1994) examining 
the relationship between politics and business contend that politicians try to 
influence firms through subsidies, and firms try to influence politicians through 
bribes. It is also common for businessmen to run for political office in order to be 
in a position to utilise the weaknesses of the institutional environment and to 
extract private benefits from the business (Bartels and Brady, 2003). The firms, on 
the other hand, are interested in appointing politicians to their board of directors 
since they know that the politicians have friends in key positions in the 
government who could be valuable to them, as well as be in a position to better 
influence government regulation or take advantage of impending regulatory 
changes (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). For instance, Adhikari, Derashid and 
Zhang (2006), using data from a group of Malaysian firms over a 10-year period, 
find that firms with political connections pay tax at significantly lower effective 
rates than other firms. 
 
A review of the empirical evidence on the link between political 
connections and the economic performance of firms, however, is mixed. Most of 
these studies are from developed countries (see, for example, Goldman et al., 
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2009; Hillman, 2005; Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Niessen and Ruenzi, 
2010; Cooper et al., 2010), while few studies focus on developing countries 
(Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007). A few 
multi-country studies focus on both developed and developing countries (Faccio, 
2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008). 
 
Previous studies provide evidence that political connections have a positive 
impact on firm performance. For example, Hillman (2005) indicates a significant 
positive relationship between political connections and market-based performance 
in the US. Using the resource dependence theory, the author argues that a board of 
directors with political ties can reduce the uncertainty created by the external 
environment through various means, including additional advice and information, 
preferential access to resources, and legitimacy, and, therefore, improves the 
likelihood of survival and performance of the firm (Hillman, 2005). Similarly, 
Faccio (2006) using a large sample of 20,202 publicly-traded companies from 47 
countries, and Goldman et al. (2009) working on a sample of major US companies 
in the period 1996 to 2000, document that firm value increases when a director is 
nominated or elected to a top political position. They suggest that the specific 
expertise that a politically-connected board member gains through his or her 
political position generates additional value. They also note that firms might 
receive various benefits from political connection such as subsidised credit, 
government contracts or favourable legislation. Using a sample of 605 German 
public companies in 2006, Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) find that politically-
connected firms provide better accounting as well as stock market performance. 
They conclude that political connections are valuable assets for firms. In a similar 
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fashion, Li et al. (2008) find that political connections have a positive effect on 
firm performance in China. They argue that political affiliation helps private 
entrepreneurs to gain access to the credit market, avoid red tape, obtain a 
reduction in taxes and gain better access to the legal system. Claessens et al. 
(2008) find that contributions to winning candidates have a positive impact on 
firm performance and access to debt finance. This implies that political 
connection to a ruling party is related to more favourable treatment than 
connection to the opposition party. In a recent study, Cooper et al. (2010) find a 
positive and significant relationship between corporate political contributions and 
future firm performance in US firms. 
 
In a different study by Fisman (2001), it is documented that the share price 
of certain Indonesian companies was connected with former President Suharto. 
The author finds that there was a share price decline in the companies that were 
connected to the Suharto family after announcements regarding the worsening 
health of President Suharto. Finally, he suggests that a large percentage of well-
connected firm value may be derived from political connections. Similarly, 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) find that Malaysian firms, whose officers or major 
shareholders were affiliated to top government officials, benefited from capital 
control implemented during the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Faccio (2010) noted that better performing firms may want to become 
politically connected so as to maintain their performance through such 
connections. By contrast, Faccio (2010) suggests two reasons why poorly 
performing firms may become or remain politically connected. First, political 
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connections may provide relief from some of their problems, and second, firms 
owned and managed by politicians may not have the business skills and acumen 
to run a successful company. Empirical evidence indicating a negative 
relationship between political connections and firm performance, is provided by 
various studies. For example, Boubakri et al. (2008) in an international sample of 
245 firms in 41 countries over the period 1980 to 2002, and Fan et al. (2007) 
working on a sample of 790 IPO companies over the period 1993 to 2001 in 
China, find that newly-privatised, politically-connected firms under-perform their 
non-connected counterparts. They argue that political ties with the board of 
directors help to extract private benefits at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. Moreover, they conclude that political affiliation is associated with 
weak corporate governance and low board professionalism. Bertrand et al. (2007) 
document that French firms with politically-connected CEOs exhibit poor 
accounting performance compared to non-connected CEOs.  Faccio et al. (2006) 
find that bailed-out politically connected firms show a poorer accounting 
performance than non-connected bailed-out ones due to less efficient allocation of 
funds. 
 
This study argues that the nature of firm ownership, namely, the extent of 
family ownership, is a critical moderating factor that affects the link between 
political connections and firm performance. Controlling families have strong 
motivations to undertake a long-term view and see their firm succeed. Drawing 
from evolutionary psychology theory (Nicholson, 2008), ownership identity is an 
important feature of family firms where the reputation of the family and the 
shared sense of pride in the family’s business may lead to greater involvement and 
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increased attention to quality and service, resulting in better firm performance. As 
noted by Nicholson (2008), ‘the “family effect”, “familiness”, or “family capital” 
are evident in the processes that people are able to engender from the intimacy, 
trust, intuition, and invention that come from shared identity, plus the 
motivational focus that shared goals engender’ (p. 113). Further, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) who found family firms within the S&P 500 perform better 
economically than their non-family counterparts, conclude that ‘founding families 
view their firms as an asset to pass on to their descendants rather than wealth to 
consume during their lifetimes’ (p. 1305). Thus, family firms tend to have a 
longer-term orientation. 
 
In line with such reasoning, this study argues that family firms are likely to 
utilise political connections for the economic benefits of the firm. Morck et al. 
(2000) argue that influential families tend to lobby the government in order to 
protect their wealth and to enhance their firm’s reputation and private benefits. 
This is also evidenced in China where Chen et al. (2005) find that family firms 
tend to get politically connected to concentrate their shareholding and dominate 
the board, so that they can make deals with politicians in secrecy and enjoy the 
benefits from government. Further, Olson (1982) finds that family members with 
homogenous interests are more effective in lobbying the government. Given that 
Bangladesh has a weak legal system, politically-connected family members may 
provide unique information about the public policy process, which is often 
difficult or costly for a firm to obtain otherwise. There are also opportunities to 
affect political decision-making that may result in influence over economic policy 
(Pfeffer, 1972) and legitimacy. Subsequently, a politician-owner would be better 
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able to utilise his/her power to the advantage of the family business with the 
economic benefits that they receive through political connections to improve the 
performance of family firms. 
 
In the case of non-family firms, however, ownership tends to be more 
diverse and the risk of agency problems related to the separation of owners and 
management (agency problem 1) tends to be higher. Consequently, relative to 
family firms, the personal connections and motivations to safeguard the firm 
among non-family firm management would be low, with a stronger focus on 
shorter-term goals and a higher risk of managerial entrenchment. This study 
argues that, in such circumstances, non-family owners and managers are more 
likely to value political connections for potential short-term gains and as a means 
to procure personal benefits. An added argument is that those with political 
connections themselves may behave differently in non-family firms in the absence 
of family owners to defend the firm’s interests. In fact, in developing countries 
where there is greater corruption and weak regulatory and legal systems, non-
family firms may find themselves more vulnerable to politicians’ demands. Given 
that family links with political connections tend to be based on long-standing 
relationships (often developed by influential family patriarchs), the lack of such 
figures in non-family firms may disadvantage them in their ability to resist or 
better negotiate with politicians’ demands (Haque et al., 2011). The cost, 
therefore, of political connections may exceed the benefits in non-family firms 
which, in turn, are likely to be reflected ultimately in poorer firm performance. 
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Based on the above discussion, this study proposes the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: There is a significant interaction between political connections and family 
firm ownership affecting firm performance. 
H1a: The association between political connections and firm performance is 
likely to be positive and significantly stronger in family firms than in non-family 
firms. 
 
6.2.2 Family Firm Generations 
As noted in Perez-Gonzalez (2006), ‘the promotion of one’s kin to a key 
corporate or governmental position is often tainted with controversy’ (2006, p. 
1559). Family succession does not guarantee firm success. Empirical evidence, as 
provided by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Perez-Gonzalez (2006), 
suggests that family succession can have negative impacts on firm performance. 
In general, founders as pioneers in the business bring innovation and 
entrepreneurial skills to their firms (Morck et al., 1988). Not surprisingly, 
founders also tend to have a greater emotional investment in the business, 
resulting in long-term vision and investment horizons for the firm. Founders, 
therefore, have many incentives to increase their wealth by improving firm 
performance, and political connections are more likely to be utilised by founder 
family owners to this end. 
 
By contrast, it is contended that descendants are often appointed on the 
board just to continue inheritances, but may lack the requisite skills and 
164 
 
motivations to adequately manage the firm (Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and 
Wolfenzon, 2007). Another argument is that descendant managers may lack the 
same values and aspirations as the founder managers’, thus, managerial 
succession risks poorer firm performance with an increase in work routine 
disruptions, unclear command protocols and employee insecurity (Haveman and 
Khaire, 2004; Molly, Laveren and Deloof, 2010). Molly et al. (2010) using a 
sample of small to medium-sized US firms did not find family firm succession to 
affect firm profitability. However, Perez-Gonzalez (2006) investigated the impact 
of inherited CEO positions on the performance of publicly-traded US firms and 
found that firms that appoint family CEOs who did not attend ‘selective’ 
undergraduate institutions (e.g., those institutions which considered applicants 
who ranked in the top fifty per cent of their graduating class) showed poorer 
performance compared to succeeding family CEOs with such qualifications. They 
further assert that an unrivalled family heir in the management tends to use the 
firm’s resources to serve his/her own needs. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H2: Compared to second generation family firms, the association between 
political connections and performance will be positive and stronger in first 
generation family firms. 
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6.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
6.3.1 Data and Sample 
The sample selection procedure is reported in Panel A of Table 6.1. The 
sample consists of all 155 non-financial companies listed with Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009, producing a total sample of 
775 sample year observations.34 Missing information meant the study had to 
exclude 121 firm year observations, yielding a final sample of 654 firm year 
observations. The data for this study analysis come from multiple sources of 
secondary data. Financial data are collected from the annual reports of the sample 
companies listed on the stock exchange. Stock price data are obtained from the 
DataStream database. The family ownership data were hand-collected from the 
corporate governance disclosures, shareholding information and directors’ reports 
contained in annual reports. 
 
6.3.2 Measuring Family Firms 
This study adopts multiple criteria to identify family firms mainly because 
prior literature provides no commonly-accepted measure or criterion for 
identifying a family firm. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that a 20 per cent cut-off 
point is usually enough to have effective control of a firm, and this cut-off was 
adopted by a number of past studies to identify family firms (Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Following Cascino et al. (2010), this 
study uses a more refined definition of family firms that does not rely solely on 
                                                 
34 In 2005, there were 282 listed companies in the DSE. Of these, 127 companies belong to the 
financial sector. Consistent with the previous research (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bliss et al., 
2011) these companies have been excluded since they are controlled by different regulations and 
are likely to have different disclosure requirements and governance structure. 
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ownership concentrations as the major determining criteria.35 That is, this study 
identifies family firms as being: (i) firms in which 20 per cent of a firm’s share of 
voting rights (either direct or indirect) is held by family block holders; and (2) at 
least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position such as 
board member, CEO or chairman. The study uses a dummy variable which is set 
equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be a family firm, and 0 otherwise. Family 
relationships and shareholding patterns were collected from the prospectuses of 
the listed companies, annual reports and company web sites. Under the 
Bangladesh SEC notification, the listed companies are required to disclose their 
pattern of shareholdings. This includes the number of shares held by 
parent/subsidiary/associate companies, the directors, Chief Executive Officer, 
Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, Head of Internal Audit and their 
spouse and minor children. Thus, in the present study, if a firm has at least one 
such shareholder, or family members, controlling 20 per cent or more of the 
shareholdings, it is considered to be a family firm36. 
 
From Panel B of Table 6.1, it is observed that family firms are present in 64 
per cent of the total sample. The family firm-years are prevalent in various sectors 
such as cement (17), ceramics (13), engineering (62), food (68), information 
technology (11), jute (9), paper and printing (10), miscellaneous (22), 
pharmaceuticals (62), service and real estate (12), tanneries (9), and textiles (124). 
 
                                                 
35 See Footnote 11 for details. 
36 See Footnote 12 for details. 
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6.3.3 Identification of Political Connections 
The data this study uses to identify political connections come from a 
variety of sources. The boards of directors of all firms were investigated for 
political affiliations. This study uses national election data from the Bangladesh 
Election Commission to identify who was elected or contested from any party in 
the previous elections. This study also checks the names of committee members 
and advisory councils from political parties’ web sites and local newspapers (The 
Daily Star, The Bangladesh Observer, The New Nation, The Financial Express) to 
identify the board of directors’ political affiliations. This identification of political 
connection is consistent with other studies (see Faccio, 2006; Chaney et al., 2011). 
 
This study considers a firm to be politically connected if: (i) any of the 
board of directors is a sitting member of parliament 37 or a minister or member of 
a political party;38 and/or (ii) is closely related to a political party39 as described in 
the press (Faccio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008; Chaney et al., 2011). Consistent 
with previous literature, this study uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is 
politically connected, and 0 otherwise. 
 
From Panel C of Table 6.1, it is observed that political connections are 
present in 57 per cent of the total sample. Politically-connected firm-years are 
                                                 
37 For example, Zahid Maleque, the managing director of BD Thai Aluminium Limited, and 
Nazmul Hassan the managing director of Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd and Shinepukur Ceramics 
Ltd. are members of the present 9th parliament. Md. Mozammel Haque is the managing director of 
Tallu Group and Quzi Saleemul Huq, Chairman and managing directors of GQ Ball Pen industries 
Limited were the members of 8th parliament of Bangladesh. 
38 Member of the political parties other than MPs and ministers have been identified as those who 
contested the previous national elections and/or who are members of the various committees of the 
political parties. 
39 Companies whose boards of directors have been described in the press as having a friendship 
with head of state, government minister, or member of parliament (Faccio, 2006; Chaney et al., 
2011). 
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prevalent in various sectors such as textiles (85), engineering (69), 
pharmaceuticals (47), food (40), cement (30), services (19), information 
technology (13), ceramics (12), tanneries (11), paper and printing (10), jute (9), 
and miscellaneous (28). Further, Panel D indicates that around 63 per cent of 
family firms and 46 per cent of non-family firms are politically-connected. 
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Table 6.1: Sample Description 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Number of firms 282 
Less:  
Financial and Utility companies 127 
Companies without necessary information  14 
Total 141 
Panel B: Sample by family and non-family firms in sectors 
 
Sector 
 
Family 
(Firm-year) 
 
Non-family 
(Firm-year) 
 
Total 
(Firm-year) 
Per cent Family 
Firms in Industry 
(Firm-year) 
Cement 17 20 37 45.95 
Ceramics 13 6 19 68.42 
Engineering 62 40 102 60.78 
Food 68 45 113 60.18 
IT 11 17 28 39.29 
Jute 9 5 14 64.29 
Paper & Printing 10 0 10 100.00 
Miscellaneous 22 30 52 42.31 
Pharmaceuticals 62 30 92 67.39 
Service & Real 
Estate 
12 14 26 46.15 
Tanneries 9 16 25 36.00 
Textiles 124 12 136 91.18 
Total 419 235 654  
 
 
Panel C: Sample by Political Connections and Non-political Connections 
 
Sector 
 
Political connection 
(Firm-year) 
Non-political 
connection 
(Firm-year) 
 
Total 
(Firm-year) 
Per cent of political 
connection in 
Industry 
(Firm-year) 
Cement 30 07 37 81.00 
Ceramics 12 07 19 63.00 
Engineering 69 33 102 68.00 
Food 40 73 113 35.00 
IT 13 15 28 43.00 
Jute 09 05 14 64.00 
Paper & Printing 10 00 10 100.00 
Miscellaneous 28 24 52 54.00 
Pharmaceuticals 47 45 92 51.00 
Service & Real 
Estate 
19 07 26 73.00 
Tanneries 11 14 25 44.00 
Textiles 85 51 136 63.00 
Total 373 281 654 57.00 
 
Panel D: Sample of Political Connections and Non-political Connections by Family and Non-
family Firms 
 Politically connected Non-political connection Total 
Family firms 260 159 419 
Non-family firms 113 122 235 
Total 373 281 654 
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6.3.4 Model Specification 
The following OLS regression model is used to test the hypotheses of this 
study: 
Performance = α + β1 Family firms+ β2 Political connections + β3 Political 
connections * Family firms + β4 Board independence + β5 Board size+ β6 CEO 
duality + β7 Female directors + β8  foreign directors + β9 Firm size + β10 Growth 
+ β11 Leverage + β12 Risk + β13 Firm age + β14 Industry dummies + β15 Year 
dummies + ε  ---- (6.1) 
 
 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) are the primary performance 
measures. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value 
of total debt divided by book value of total assets (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
ROA is measured as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to book value of 
total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Jackling and Johl, 2009).40 Family firms 
and political connections have already been defined in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
 
This study controls for a number of variables that may affect firm 
performance such as board independence, board size, CEO duality, female 
directors, foreign directors, firm size, firm age, risk, leverage and growth.41 
 
Firm size: Larger firms may have fewer growth opportunities (Morck et al., 
1988) and more co-ordination problems (Williamson, 1967) which may 
negatively influence their performance. On the other hand, larger firms tend to 
make large investments and often receive preferential treatment which may 
enhance firm performance (Boeker, 1997). Firm size is measured as a natural 
logarithm of total assets (Mathur and Singh, 2010). 
                                                 
40 Family firms and political connections have already been defined in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
41 Control variables such as board independence, board size, CEO duality, female directors and 
foreign directors are defined in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3. 
171 
 
Growth: Faster growth is more likely to be positively correlated with 
financial performance (Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006). The growth of a firm 
is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. 
 
Leverage: The leverage of a firm could lead to external corporate control 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Debt holders should actively monitor the firm’s capital 
structure to protect their own interests (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Therefore, 
leverage influences firm performance through monitoring activities by debt 
holders. On the other hand, a negative relationship could be expected between 
leverage and performance, according to the pecking order theory, whereby a firm 
prefers to fund operations through retained earnings rather than debt and equity 
(Myers, 1984). Leverage is measured by taking the ratio of book value of total 
debt to book value of total assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Risk: Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the greater the level of risk in the 
business environment, the greater the impact of board structure on firm value. 
Therefore, this study expects a negative sign for the coefficient of risk. Consistent 
with previous literature, this study measures a firm’s risk as the standard deviation 
of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period (Boone, Field, 
Karpoff and Raheja, 2007). 
 
Firm age: Boone et al. (2007) argue that complexity increases with the 
firm’s age. Therefore, an uncertain relationship of firm age on board 
characteristics as well as firm performance is expected. Age of the firm is 
172 
 
calculated by taking the natural log of the number of years since the firm’s 
inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Finally, this study uses year dummies and industry dummies for 
manufacturing and processing, services, information technology (IT) and other 
sectors.42 
 
6.4 RESULTS 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the full 
sample. Panel A of Table 6.2 provides means, medians and standard deviations 
for the key variables. In terms of performance (Tobin’s Q), the sample firms have 
a mean value of 1.508. The average firm age in the sample is nearly 23 years and 
the average firm size is 8.70 (natural logarithm of total assets). The average 
family ownership is around 29 per cent and the average growth rate is 0.116. The 
average number of directors is around seven, 6.30 per cent are independent 
directors, 16.90 per cent are female directors and 5.50 per cent are foreign 
directors. 
 
Panel B of Table 6.2 presents the difference of means tests for key variables 
between family and non-family firms. Family firms represent 64 per cent of the 
sample with a greater proportion of family firms politically-connected43 than non-
                                                 
42 This study applies White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for all regression 
analyses performed in this study. Furthermore, this study applies the firm clustering technique for 
all the analyses because multiple observations from the same firm (but from different years) are 
included in the data set. 
43 All of the family firm observations with political connections are connected through direct or 
indirect links of family board members. 
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family firms. On average, family firms exhibit better performance than non-family 
firms based on Tobin’s Q (1.769 versus 1.362) and, to a lesser degree, in terms of 
ROA (0.077 vs. 0.066). The univariate analysis also shows that several variables 
differ significantly between family and non-family firms, such as age, CEO 
duality, proportion of female directors and proportion of foreign directors. 
 
Panel C of Table 6.2 presents the difference of means tests of four groups of 
firms (family firms with political connections, family firms without political 
connections, non-family firms with political connections, non-family firms 
without political connections). Significant differences in terms of mean 
performance were found between the four groups, with family firms that were 
also politically-connected displaying the highest mean performance (Tobin’s Q 
=1.79; ROA =0.086), and non-family firms that are politically connected the 
lowest performance. 
 
Panel D of Table 6.2 provides the correlation matrix for the key variables in 
the analysis. Political connections do not appear to be significantly and directly 
related to either performance measure, but family ownership has a positive 
correlation with both accounting and market measures of firm performance. The 
correlation matrix also shows that family firms are positively correlated with 
political connections. Political connections have a positive and significant 
correlation with board size and CEO duality. In addition, consistent with previous 
studies, this study finds that family ownership is negatively correlated with firm 
size, firm age and risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Observations 
Firm Size 8.696 8.684 0.659 654 
ROA 0.073 0.070 0.093 654 
Tobin’s Q 1.508 1.118 1.200 654 
Board independence 0.063 0.000 0.082 654 
Board size 6.742 6.500 2.073 654 
CEO duality 0.246 0.000 0.431 654 
Female directors 0.169 0.143 0.183 654 
Foreign directors 0.055 0.000 0.157 654 
Leverage 0.749 0.604 0.789 654 
Age 22.989 23.000 10.940 654 
Growth 0.116 0.048 0.341 654 
Risk 0.028 0.027 0.024 654 
Family ownership 0.290 0.319 0.219 654 
Political connections 0.570 1.000 0.496 654 
Panel B: 
Variable Family Nonfamily P Value 
Size 8.650 8.778 0.279 
ROA 0.077 0.066 0.147 
Tobin’s Q 1.769 1.362 0.000 
Board independence 0.061 0.076 0.015 
Board size 6.358 7.426 0.000 
CEO duality 0.297 0.152 0.000 
Female directors 0.240 0.050 0.000 
Foreign directors 0.030 0.102 0.000 
Leverage 0.711 0.818 0.097 
Age 21.303 25.996 0.000 
Growth 1.727 0.349 0.100 
Risk 0.026 0.032 0.126 
Political connections 0.633 0.460 0.000 
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Panel C: 
 
 
 
 
 
Political connections 
(PC) 
Non-political 
connections (NPC) Differences (P values) 
Family firm 
(F) 
Tobin’s Q = 1.79;  
ROA = 0.086 
Tobin’s Q = 1.39; 
ROA = 0.067 
Between Family PC and 
Family NPC 
(Q = 0.172 ) (ROA = 0.032) 
Non-family 
firm (NF) 
Tobin’s Q = 1.31; 
ROA = 0.056 
Tobin’s Q = 1.58; 
ROA = 0.064 
 
Between Non-family PC and 
Non-family NPC 
(Tobin’s Q = 0.084) (ROA 
=0.209) 
 
 
Differences 
(P values) 
Between Politically 
connected F and NF 
(Tobin’s Q = 0.054) 
(ROA = 0.006) 
 
 
Between Non-
politically connected 
F and NF 
(Tobin’s Q = 0.000) 
(ROA = 0.477) 
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6.4.2 Regression Results: Political connections and firm performance in 
family firms and non-family firms 
First, this study runs equation (6.1) to examine whether there is a significant 
interaction between political connections and family ownership affecting firm 
performance, using the full sample, that is, both family and non-family firm data. 
This study reports the results in Table 6.3. In Model 1, this study measures 
performance by Tobin’s Q, and finds the coefficient of the interaction between 
family ownership and political connections to be positive and significant (β = 
0.325, p<0.05), thus supporting H1. Likewise, in Model 2, measuring firm 
performance based on ROA, this study finds the interaction term to be positive 
and significant (β = 0.030, p<0.10), providing further support for H1. 
Interestingly, this study also finds that political connections have a direct and 
negative impact (Tobin’s Q: β = -0.165, p<0.05; ROA: β = -0.008, p<0.10) on 
performance, based on both measures, suggesting political connections to be 
detrimental to firm performance in general. Among the control variables this 
study finds that foreign directors and leverage have a positive impact on 
performance, while risk has a negative impact. 
 
Given that the overall results indicate family ownership moderates the link 
between political connections and performance, this study then splits the sample 
into two groups – family and non-family - and reruns the model to examine the 
association between political connections and firm performance for both groups. 
The results are presented in Table 6.3 as well. Models 3 and 4 relate to family 
firms and the results of this study indicate that political connections have a 
positive and significant impact on the performance of family firms for both 
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measures, that is, Tobin’s Q (β = 0.126, p<0.05) and ROA (β = 0.015 p<0.10). 
These results support H1a and are consistent with the argument that political 
connections in family firms are utilised to benefit the firm. Given that controlling 
families have strong motivations to undertake a long-term view and to see their 
firm succeed, a politician family firm owner would be better able to utilise his/her 
power to advantage the family business with the economic benefits that they 
receive through political connections to improve the performance of family firms. 
Other control variables, such as risk and age, have negative impacts on 
performance. However, leverage has a positive impact on performance. 
 
For non-family firms, as shown in Table 6.3, the results indicate that 
political connections have a negative and significant (Tobin’s Q: β = -0.107, 
p<0.10; ROA: β = -0.002, p<0.10) impact on both measures of performance. 
These results imply that political connections in non-family firms may entrench 
the management (Morck et al., 2000), and also help them to extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Fan et al., 2007). In other words, 
political connections in Bangladeshi non-family firms are not economically 
efficient since they worsen performance. 
. 
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6.4.3 Regression Results: Family firm generations, political connections and 
performance 
Previous studies (Morck et al., 1988; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006) suggest that 
different generations of family firms may have different impacts on firm 
performance. Therefore, this study investigates the generational impact of 
politically-connected family firms on firm performance. This study reports the 
results in Table 6.4. In Models 1 and 2 performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and 
ROA, respectively, and this study carried out and analysis for all the family firms. 
This study introduces a dummy variable, named family generation, which equals 
1 if the family firm is a first generation family firm, and 0 otherwise, to capture 
the effect of family generations. A firm is considered to be a first-generation firm 
when a founder occupies the position of CEO or chairman of the board, and a 
second-generation firm when a descendant occupies the position of CEO or 
chairman of the board. This study also introduces an interaction variable of 
political connection and family generation to examine the generational impact of 
politically-connected family firms. Consistent with the main findings, this study 
documents positive and significant coefficients of political connections in Models 
1 and 2. This study also documents positive impacts of family generations on firm 
performance. This implies that first-generation family firms perform better than 
second-generation family firms. The interaction variables for both of these two 
models show positive and significant coefficients. This supports H2. This suggests 
that political connection has a stronger impact on the firm performance of first-
generation family firms than their second-generation counterparts. This is 
consistent with the argument that founders bring more skills and knowledge to the 
businesses (Morck et al., 1988) which help to improve performance. When 
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founders act as chairmen or CEOs in politically-connected family firms, they 
utilise political linkages to increase the firm’s wealth by improving firm 
performance. It also implies a complementary effect of political connections on 
first-generation family firm performance. 
 
This study then splits the family firm sub-sample into two groups – first-
generation family firms, and second-generation family firms. After this division, 
the study finds 305 first-generation and 114 second-generation family firm 
observations. This study then reruns the performance regression for these two sub-
samples. In Model 3 performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. This study finds a 
positive significant coefficient (β = 0.349, p < 0.01) of political connections. It 
implies that in first-generation family firms political connections improve firm 
performance. In Model 4 this study uses ROA as a performance measure, and 
documents results consistent with the findings in Model 3. 
 
In Models 5 and 6 the analysis has been done for second generation family 
firms. In Model 5 when performance is measured by Tobin’s Q this study 
documents a negative insignificant coefficient of political connections. However, 
this study finds a negative and significant coefficient (β = -0.065, p < 0.05) of 
political connections when performance is measured by ROA in Model 6. This 
suggests that political links of second-generation family firms deteriorate firm 
performance. In family firms most of the time management and control is 
transferred to the descendants to continue family inheritances, regardless of skill, 
expertise and education of family members. Descendants may use political 
connections to serve their own needs which could destroy the value.
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6.5 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
6.5.1 Different Types of Political Connections 
This study classifies political connections into two groups, that is, a sitting 
Member of Parliament (MP) or a minister, and secondly members of a political 
party but not a minister or MP, or someone with close relationships with 
politicians44. It can be argued that the first group would have greater political 
influence and power as they are in a very strong position to affect legislation and 
gain resources, while the second group, having associations with politicians and 
political parties, would have more limited political clout. This study then 
investigates their differential impacts on firm performance for the full sample. The 
results presented in Table 6.5 for the full sample suggest that MPs or ministers 
have significant and negative relationships with firm performance, when 
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q (Model 1) as well as by ROA (Model 2). 
However, when this study combines family firms with two different types of 
political connections, it finds significant and positive relationships between the 
performance of family firms (as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA) and MPs or 
ministers. The results, however, suggest a positive and significant relationship 
between ROA and the other type of connections (member of a political party other 
than an MP or minister, or someone with close relationships with politicians). 
 
This study splits the sample into two groups – family and non-family firms - 
and re-runs the model. For family firms, this study finds that MPs or ministers 
with related political connections have positive and significant coefficients when 
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q (as shown in Table 6.5, Model 3). For the 
                                                 
44 In the family firm (non-family) sample 13% (7%) of firm-year observations have Ministers or 
sitting Members of Parliament. 
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other type of political connections, this study documents an insignificant impact. 
In Model 4, when performance is based on ROA, positive effects are found for 
both types of political connections, which supports the main findings that political 
connections have a positive and significant impact on family firm performance. 
 
For the non-family firms, this study finds that political connections through 
MPs or ministers have negative and significant coefficients when performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Model 5). These results are consistent with the notion 
that political connections in non-family firms may increase managerial 
entrenchment and expropriation, resulting in poor performance. The findings in 
Model 6 are consistent with the findings in Model 5 when performance is 
measured by ROA. Interestingly, in all cases, the size of the coefficient of the first 
type of political connections (having a minister or MP on the board) has a stronger 
impact on performance than for the other type of political connections. This 
suggests that, in family firms, political connections with ministers and MPs result 
in much better performance, but likewise for non-family firms, firms are also 
much worse-off when political connections are based on having ministers and 
MPs as directors. 
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6.5.2 Endogeneity of Political Connections 
One of the potential concerns for the OLS regression is that the dummy 
variable political connection may not be exogenous. In particular, some 
unobserved determinants of firms’ performance may also explain political 
connections, causing the OLS estimates to be biased and inconsistent. This study 
addresses this issue by applying instrumental variables estimations. Previous 
research shows that firm’s location is a potential predictor of political connection 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008; Chaney 
et al., 2011). Thus, in the first-stage regression, this study predicts political 
connections (with a logit regression) using the firm’s location (dummy variable is 
equal to 1 if the firm is located in the capital city of the country, and 0 otherwise), 
as well as other independent variables such as risk, leverage, firm age and size. 
Consistent with previous studies, this study finds that a firm’s location 
significantly influences political connection.45 The first-stage fitted values for 
political connections are then used in the second-stage OLS regression, and results 
of this regression are presented in Table 6.6, and the findings remain the same. 
 
 
                                                 
45 The first-stage regression results along with the diagnostics in regard to the validity of the 
instruments are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
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6.5.3 Other Analysis 
This study undertook a number of analyses to check the robustness of the 
results. First, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that as family firms continue to 
age family members have less to contribute to firm productivity and efficiency. 
This study investigates this relationship by classifying family firms as young and 
old based on the median age (22 years) of the family firm sub-sample. 
Accordingly, this study created an age dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
family firm is an old firm, and 0 otherwise, as well as an interaction dummy 
between political connections and age. Thereafter this study reran the model for 
the family firm sub-sample. The interaction dummy variable, however, was not 
significant, suggesting there was no differential impact of political connections on 
firm performance. The result is presented in Table C.2 in Appendix C. Second, 
the ninth national parliamentary elections of Bangladesh were held in 2008, which 
is a sample year of this study. Since an election year may affect the findings 
because politicians will anticipate support from corporations which are willing to 
contribute in return for firm benefits, this study controlled for election year 2008 
by creating a dummy variable in the original model. The results remained 
consistent with the main findings, and the dummy variable was non-significant. 
The result is reported in Table C.3 in Appendix C.  
 
Third, this study also controlled for potential survivorship bias by using the 
112-firm sub-set of firms that are available for the entire sample period. This 
study, once again, finds a positive significant interaction between family 
ownership and political connections affecting firm performance. This study also 
finds a negative significant coefficient of political connections. These results are 
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consistent with the earlier findings. The results are presented in Table C.4 in 
Appendix C.  
 
Finally, this study uses a fixed effect model to address the possibility of a 
spurious relationship between dependent and independent variables due to 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. The coefficient of the interaction variable suggests 
a moderating effect of family ownership on the relationship between political 
connections and firm performance. This study also documents a positive 
(negative) significant coefficient of political connections for the family (non-
family) firm sub-sample. The results, which are presented in Table C.5 in 
Appendix C, are consistent with the main findings. 
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6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This study developed several hypotheses between political connections, 
family firms and firm performance using agency and evolutionary psychology 
theories. Empirical data for this study are derived from 155 Bangladeshi public-
listed firms for the period 2005 to 2009. The results for the full sample of family 
and non-family firms show that political connections have an adverse impact on 
the overall performance of Bangladeshi businesses. This result is aligned with the 
argument that in developing countries, where there is weak regulatory and legal 
oversight, the business elite is likely to utilise their political linkages to influence 
the system to accumulate their wealth at the expense of general shareholders (Li et 
al., 2008). Thus, politically-connected firms appear to bear the costs of creating 
connections with politicians and those affiliated with political parties. However, 
this study finds that an exception to this rule is when family-owned firms have 
political connections. More specifically, firm performance is enhanced when 
family firms have political linkages with ministers or MPs and, in particular, 
where ministers or MPs occupy positions as board members. 
 
The results of this study also support the arguments advanced by the 
evolutionary psychology theory (Nicholson, 2008) in that founder firms, when 
compared with descendant family generations, may have different ideologies 
about the family business, and thus vary in their impact on the relationship 
between political connections and firm performance (Morck et al., 1988; Perez-
Gonzalez, 2006). Overall, family firm ownership leads to better performance 
when a founder acts as a CEO or chairman. The results support the arguments put 
forward by Villalonga and Amit (2006), but are in contrast to the findings of 
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Molly et al. (2010) who did not find family profitability affected by firm 
succession. In terms of the direct association between family firm succession and 
firm performance, this study finds new insights in terms of first-generation, or 
founder family, firms that are politically-connected performing better than 
second-generation firms. This result suggests that founder director/s utilise 
political connections to create wealth for future generations by improving 
performance, while second generations with political connections appear to 
destroy such wealth. 
 
Interestingly, the analysis relating to political connections and family firm 
succession indicates firm performance is enhanced by political connections when 
a director is either a minister or an MP, but only for founder family firms. It 
appears that such directors, who have considerable and direct influence in policy-
making and access to other resources, for example, preferential access to 
government subsidies, contracts and financing opportunities, are willing to utilise 
such opportunities for the benefit of the family firm. However, for non-family 
firms, performance deteriorates when a director is a minister or MP and has other 
political associations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis presents empirical evidence based on three studies of the 
associations between family ownership, corporate governance, political 
connections and firm performance. Data from listed non-financial companies in 
Bangladesh during the period 2005 to 2009 has been used for hypotheses testing. 
Bangladesh is seen as an appropriate context for this thesis as Bangladeshi firm 
ownership is dominated by families, many with strong political connections. 
Furthermore, with law enforcement and the regulatory environment still 
underdeveloped, the impact of family ownership is likely to be more evident 
within the Bangladesh capital market. Farooque et al. (2007) argue that in the 
absence of market-based monitoring and control measures, ownership-based 
monitoring and control is expected to function as a core governance mechanism. 
Thus, this institutional setting has the potential to reveal how family ownership 
affects board structure, and whether board structure affects firm performance, as 
well as whether family ownership moderates the relationship between political 
connections and firm performance.  
 
This final chapter provides an overview of the findings of the three 
empirical studies carried out in this thesis, and the conclusions reached. 
Summarises of the overall contributions, research implications and the limitations 
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of the thesis are also provided with a discussion on the directions for further 
research. 
 
7.2 OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION 
7.2.1 Board Structure and Family Firms 
The first empirical study, as presented, in Chapter Four investigates 
whether there are significant differences in corporate board structure between 
family and non-family firms. This study uses 654 firm-year observations of listed 
non-financial firms for the period 2005 to 2009. Prior studies suggest that family 
firms have different board structures from non-family firms (Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Navarro and Anson, 2009). However, 
the prior findings are deficient in two ways. First, prior studies did not assess two 
important board characteristics, namely, female directors and foreign directors 
which are increasingly seen as being critical for improving board monitoring. 
Secondly, prior studies also show mixed results in terms of the proportion of 
independent directors and board size between family and non-family firms.   
 
The data analysis for this study involved three regression techniques: an 
OLS regression, a logit regression and a simultaneous equations system (3 SLS). 
Consistent with the previous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Mak and Li, 
2001), the simultaneous equation system was used to address the endogeneity of 
board structure variables, such as board independence, board size, CEO duality, 
female directors and foreign directors. Five equations were introduced into the 
system of equations for the five board structure variables.  
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The results of this study suggest that family firms in Bangladesh adopt a 
distinctly different board structure from non-family firms. In particular, this study 
finds that: 
x Family firms have a lower proportion of independent directors and foreign 
directors than non-family firms. 
x Family firms have smaller boards than non-family firms. 
x Family firms are more likely to have CEO duality than their non-family 
counterparts. 
x Family firms have more female directors than non-family firms. 
 
These findings in sum suggest that the controlling family shareholders on 
family boards may have greater control over board decision making as they tend 
to have smaller sized boards with lower proportion of independent directors and 
higher CEO duality. These results are consistent with the prior studies (Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009, Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006 and Navarro and Anson, 
2009) from developed nations.  
 
The present study is also unique in that it reveals significant differences in 
terms of female and foreign directors between family and non-family firms which 
were not addressed by prior studies. Some possible explanations relate to family 
firm preference to appoint more female based on family ties with the intention of 
increasing board dominance by the family, and that family firms may want to 
avoid external monitoring and, therefore, prefer not to have foreign members on 
the board. Alternatively, the need for resources brought in by foreign directors 
may be greater in non-family as family firms may already have built strong 
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relationships with foreign firms and associates through more informal 
associations.  
 
Overall, the results imply that families of Bangladeshi firms have a different 
board structure compared to non-family firms, and the structure appears to 
promote a close locus of control for families that facilitates family dominance to 
prevail. 
 
7.2.2 Family Firms, Board Structure and Performance 
The second empirical study presented in Chapter Five examines the 
relationship between board structure and the performance of family firms. This 
study also uses 654 firm-year observations of listed non-financial firms during the 
period 2005 to 2009. The focal research issue was whether there was a significant 
relationship between board structure and the performance of family firms. The 
analysis involved two regression techniques: an OLS regression, and an IV 
regression. To address endogeneity problems, an IV regression with a two-stage 
least squares analysis (2 SLS) was conducted. 
 
The results of this study reveal that: 
x A number of board characteristics, namely, board independence, board 
size, female directors and foreign directors, have weaker impacts on the 
performance of family firms compared to non-family firms.  
x CEO duality has a stronger impact on the performance of family firms than 
in their non-family counterparts. 
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Consistent with the findings of Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) this study 
revealed that the impact of board independence on performance is significantly 
weaker for family than for non-family firms. The possible reason of such finding 
could be that in family firms independent directors are not truly independent, and 
board resources are not fully utilised as a consequence of family dominance. 
Consistent with Braun and Sharma (2007) this study found that CEOs in family 
firms who are also the chairmen of the boards are likely to exercise their decision-
making more effectively, and run the business accordingly to improve 
performance.  
 
This study finds a weaker effect of female and foreign board members on 
family firm performance.  One possible explanation of these findings is that 
females in family firms might be appointed on the board just as a sign of tokenism 
and to increase family voting power.  Furthermore, monitoring by foreign 
directors is possibly obstructed in family firms due to family dominance resulting 
in a weaker impact on firm performance.  
 
Overall, the findings of the second study suggest that family dominance is 
very strong in Bangladeshi family firms, and is reflected in the relationships 
between several board characteristics and performance. 
 
7.2.3 Family Firms, Political Connections and Performance 
The final empirical study presented in Chapter Six investigates the 
relationship between political connections and firm performance, and the 
moderating effect of family ownership thereon, using data from Bangladeshi 
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listed non-financial firms in the period from 2005 to 2009. The analysis involved 
two regression techniques: an OLS regression, and an IV regression to address the 
endogeneity problem. 
 
The results of the study indicate that: 
x A significant interaction exists between political connections and family 
ownership which affects firm performance. While for family firms, 
political connections are seen to have a positive impact on firm 
performance, the opposite, that is, a negative impact is evident for non-
family firms. 
x Inter-generational differences within family firms with political 
connections are associated positively with firm performance only when 
founder members act as CEOs or chairmen. When descendants serve as 
CEOs or chairmen, political connections are associated with poorer firm 
performance. 
x For the family firm sub-samples, firm performance is enhanced when a 
board member is a minister or a sitting Member of Parliament (MP). 
However, for non-family firms, performance deteriorates when a board 
member is a minister or MP and has other connections. 
 
Though prior studies (Hillman, 2005; Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 
2010) in the context of developed countries found that political connection 
improves performance, these studies failed to address the family ownership effect. 
Family firms tend to utilise their political connections to improve firm 
performance so that they can create wealth for future generations. In particular 
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given that family members, especially the founder members, undertake a long 
term view it is likely that family owners are more motivated to leverage their 
political connections for the benefit of the firms, leading to better firm 
performance than the non-family firms. 
 
The results also indicate that political connections in non-family firms tend 
to foster entrenchment by management and that they may exploit political 
connections for their personal gain rather than for the firm’s economic success 
resulting in a negative impact on firm performance. Overall, these findings 
suggest that family ownership could be a critical moderating factor on the link 
between political connections and firm performance. 
 
7.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
7.3.1 Board Structure and Family Firms 
The first empirical study contributes to the extant evidence on corporate 
board structure between family and non-family firms such as that conducted by 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) and Navarro and 
Anson (2009). Several prior studies have found that family firms have less board 
independence than non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Bartholomeusz 
and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009), However, the findings of Navarro 
and Anson (2009) fails to find any significant difference in terms of board 
independence between family and non-family firms. Furthermore, Bartholomeusz 
and Tanewski (2006) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) find no variation in board 
size between family and non-family firms, whereas Navarro and Anson (2009) 
show that boards in family firms are smaller than those in non-family firms. 
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However, this study differs from Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006), Setia-
Atmaja et al. (2009) and Navarro and Anson (2009) in two important respects. 
First, prior studies applied agency theory to examine the significant differences in 
corporate board structure between family and non-family firms. In contrast, this 
study has integrated agency and resource dependence theories. The integration of 
these two theories can assist to overcome theoretical weaknesses in choosing one 
approach at the expense of the other (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
 
Second, previous studies have identified significant differences to exist in 
corporate board structure between family and non-family firms in developed 
countries which have strong legal protection. In contrast, this study has been 
carried out in a developing country setting where there is high ownership 
concentration and weak legal protection. It is arguable that due to such 
institutional differences, family firms in developing nations are more likely to be 
in a stronger position than those in developed nations to influence governance 
structures and decision-making to optimise their benefits, and this study 
contributes to this proposition by providing empirical evidence based on 
Bangladeshi capital market.   
 
7.3.2 Family Firms, Board Structure and Performance 
The second empirical study in this thesis focused on the relationship 
between board structure and the performance of family firms in Bangladesh. This 
study contributes to the literature by extending the findings of prior studies 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; 
Mishra et al., 2001) in at least two ways. First, both agency theory and resource 
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dependence theory are brought together to develop a more comprehensive set of 
board variables that may affect firm performance of family and non-family firms. 
Integration of these two theories will help to establish, and eventually to 
legitimise, a more parsimonious corporate governance model which can explain 
the relationship between board structure and firm performance. In doing so, unlike 
prior studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Setia-Atmaja 
et al., 2009; Mishra et al., 2001) that have largely focused on board structure 
variables such as board size, board independence and CEO duality, this study has 
considered two additional aspects of board composition, namely, the presence of 
female directors and foreign directors. Prior studies in developed nations indicate 
that female and foreign directors are found to be related to board effectiveness 
(Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2006; Oxelheim and 
Randoy, 2003). Whether female directors in developing countries are in a similar 
position to influence board effectiveness is unclear. Moreover, their impact on 
firm performance in the presence of family dominance remains unexplored. As 
such a key contribution of the second study is in exploring the role of female and 
foreign directors on firm performance from a developing nation context. 
 
7.3.3 Family Firms, Political Connections and Performance 
The third and final empirical study examines the relationship between 
political connections and performance in family firms, and contributes to the 
literature in several ways. First, this study informs the literature on family firm 
management by identifying family ownership as a critical moderating factor on 
the link between political connections and performance. Further, Fisman (2001) 
and Johnson and Mitton (2003) focus on political connections in developing 
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economy settings. This study complements these studies by examining the 
relationships between family firms, political connections and performance. While 
prior studies contend that political connections in countries with developing 
market institutions and weak legal frameworks can be abused for rent-seeking 
activities, this present study adds to that literature by providing empirical evidence 
of the moderating influence of family ownership. In particular, given 
Bangladesh’s historical background where the presence of ‘businessmen-cum-
politicians’ is common, the present study provides interesting insights into the 
willingness of family members who are either a minister or MP to utilise their 
political connections for the benefits of the firms.  
 
Second, this study also contributes to the literature on the effect of family 
generational management (founder versus descendants) on firm activities and 
outcomes. Prior studies (Molly et al., 2010; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006) investigating the impact of family generations on firm value, have 
failed to link between family generations, political connections and firm 
performance. It is the first study which indicates that founder director/s utilise 
political connections to create wealth for future generations by improving 
performance while second generations with political connections appear to 
destroy firm value.  
 
Finally, this study adopts a broader but more refined approach to 
identifying political connections. In particular, this study first utilised the two 
criteria described in Faccio (2006) and Chaney et al. (2011), in which political 
connection is seen to be present when a director is a Member of Parliament or a 
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minister, and/or is publicly reported as having close relationships with politicians 
(e.g., as mentioned in the news media). Additionally, a third criterion, that is, 
whether a director is a member of a political party who has contested previous 
elections and/or is a committee member of a political party, was also used. This 
wider approach of identification of political connections has helped this study to 
assess the impact of the different levels of power and influence that are inherent in 
political connections.  
 
7.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis presents a number of policy implications. The study on corporate 
board practices in Bangladeshi family firms lessens the dearth of literature on 
corporate governance in an emerging economy, and contributes significant 
insights into the differences between family and non-family firms’ board structure 
and performance. Firm performance is significantly influenced by board 
independence in non-family firms; however, this is not the case for family firms. 
The regulators should take initiative so that all firms appoint true independent 
directors on their boards and ensure majority independence of the boards. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends the regulatory reform and enforcement to 
improve the corporate governance practices of family firms to achieve good 
governance.  
 
Moreover, this thesis signals the need for minority shareholders in non-
family firms to more actively lobby the politicians for greater protection. Further, 
given the substantial interest and influence that external authorities have in 
promoting greater transparency and better governance in developing nations (e.g., 
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World bank and the like), regulators will also need to pay heed to these findings 
and act to improve regulatory oversight. Furthermore, non-family firms in general 
will need to better assess their strategies and the value in associating with strong 
political figures. Finally, family firms will need to address the issue of the impact 
of succession and its impact on political connections and firm performance. Better 
relationships will need to be fostered to maintain and enhance relationships with 
politicians as founders hand over their business to descendents so as to protect 
firm value. Potential successors could be trained to take up the role as business 
leaders and in the art of political negotiations with the support of founder leaders. 
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS 
Despite the contributions of the study, a number of limitations are to be 
noted. Many of these limitations represent opportunities for further research. 
Nevertheless some of the key limitations that overarch all three studies are 
highlighted in this section.  
 
 Panel data are used for all the empirical studies. One of the major 
limitations of panel data with respect to the relationship between family firm, 
board structure, political connections and firm performance, is that this type of 
data considers differences within a firm and does not consider the differences 
between observations (Zhou, 2001).  Hence, such a limitation is applicable to the 
findings of the family firm, board structure, political connections and family firm 
performance in Chapters Five and Six.  
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Family firms are very difficult to identify and define. Previous studies have 
adopted multiple research approaches to identify and define family firms, which 
may also affect the comparability and validity of findings of prior research 
(Mroczkowski and Tanewski, 2007). For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
refer to family firms as those firms with family ownership or a family presence on 
the board of directors. Mroczkowski and Tanewski (2007) categorise a firm as a 
family firm if the founding member is involved in the management such as the 
CEO and/or the chairman, and has an interest of more than 20 per cent of the 
voting shares. Maury (2006) identifies a firm as a family firm if the largest 
controlling shareholder of that firm, who is either a family member or an 
individual, holds at least 10 per cent of the voting rights. In this thesis a family 
firm has been defined as a firm in which a 20 per cent share of ownership or 
voting rights (either direct or indirect) is held by family members, and at least one 
member of the controlling family holds a managerial position such as board 
member, CEO or chairman. However, additional analyses were also undertaken 
by using different levels of family ownership.  
 
The third study in this thesis relates to politically connected firms. There is 
also no common definition for politically-connected firms. Prior research 
identifies politically-connected firms in various ways. For example, Hillman 
(2005) considers a firm to be politically-connected if any member of the board 
was politically elected or appointed at the local or national level. Goldman et al. 
(2009) identify a firm as being politically-connected if a board member at any 
time in his or her past has held a position such as senator, Member of the House of 
Representatives, or member of the administration, or has been a director of an 
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organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency. Faccio (2006) defines a firm 
as politically-connected if at least one of its large shareholders or one of its top 
officers such as CEO, president, vice-president, chairman or secretary, is a current 
member of parliament, or a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or 
party. However, this study identifies a firm to be politically connected firm when 
a director is a member of parliament or a minister, and/or is publicly reported as 
having close relationships with politicians (e.g., in the news media). Further, a 
third criterion, that is, whether a director is a member of a political party who has 
contested previous elections, and/or is a committee member of a political party, 
has also been used. In doing so, it aims to get a clear identification of the levels of 
political power held by firms connected directly to a minister or Member of 
Parliament verses other connections.  
 
This thesis used the five most commonly-used board structure variables, 
namely, board independence, board size, CEO duality, female directors and 
foreign directors, consistent with prior literature. Other potentially critical factors 
that were not explored include director remuneration, directors with multiple 
appointments (board business), and directors’ interlocking. For example, family 
firms tend to have many personal connections and some of these connections 
through director interlocks. As such, only a limited number of variables related to 
board structure that were addressed in this thesis somewhat limits the 
generalisability of the findings. 
 
The conception of family firms is based on publicly available data. This 
study did not systematically assess differences in the extent of family members’ 
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involvement in fostering political connections, nor differences in the 
organisational identity and motivations of family members across generations. 
Furthermore, the data set at hand does not allow for the testing of specific benefits 
that accrue to firms from the perspective of political connections. In a similar 
vein, the study does not provide specific assessment of the benefits that accrue 
through political connections based on different types of political connections. 
Last but not least, the three empirical studies undertaken in this thesis are subject 
to the usual caveats associated with cross-sectional data and a limited time frame. 
 
7.6 FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several potential avenues for future research and improvements. 
This section highlights some specific areas where further research can be 
conducted.  
 
Both the first and second studies can be extended by addressing other 
characteristics of boards, such as busy directors (in terms of multiple 
directorships), directors’ interlocking, board members’ age and qualifications. For 
example, previous studies by Sarkar and Sarkar (2009), Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard (2003), Kiel and Nicholson (2003), and Harris and Shimizu (2004) 
found that board characteristics such as busy directors and directors’ interlocks 
have the potential to influence firm performance since these add resources to the 
board. However, their impacts on family firm performance are unclear. These 
board characteristics are not employed in this thesis largely due to unavailability 
of data in the annual reports. Possibly a survey or an interview can be undertaken 
to obtain such data.   
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This study could also be extended in other developing countries by 
addressing different characteristics within family firms. For example, following 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), family firms can be categorised into three groups: (1) 
family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms (dual-share classes, pyramids, 
cross-holdings, or voting agreements) and a family CEO; (2) family firms with 
control-enhancing mechanisms but no family CEO; and (3) family firms with a 
family CEO but no control-enhancing mechanisms. They argue that the first 
category of firms might have Agency Problem II but not Agency Problem I, the 
second category of firms might have both types of agency problems and the third 
category of firms might not have either type of agency problem. They use these 
classifications to test the impact of the two types of agency problems (Type I and 
Type II), either alone or in combination with each other on firm performance.  
 
Corbetta and Salvato (2004b) argue that family firms can also be classified 
into three groups based on ownership, the presence of shareholders and managers 
external to the family, active involvement of family members, and number of 
generations involved in the firm. The resulting family firm types are: (1) the 
founder-centered family firm; (2) the sibling or cousin consortium, which is fully 
owned and managed by families; and (3) the open family firm, in which 
ownership is partially shared with non-family shareholders. They further argue 
that the agency costs of these three types of firms could be different. Therefore, 
the differences in board structure and its impact on firm performance can be 
further extended for these three types of family firm by future studies. 
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Future work could also be undertaken to examine the impact of political 
connections on performance of family firms in developed market settings. Though 
prior studies (Hillman, 2005; Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 2010) in the 
context of developed countries found that political connection improves 
performance since they are the valuable resources of the firms, these studies fail to 
address the family ownership effect. Moreover, another promising avenue for 
further research is to investigate the specific economic benefits that accrue to 
family firms through political connections. For example Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
document that politically connected firms enjoy easier access to debt financing by 
exercising their political influence on bank employees. Further, De Soto (1989) 
finds that politically connected firms enjoy preferential tax treatment. It will be 
interesting to investigate whether family firms enjoy similar benefits from 
political connections in a capital market environment with lower investor 
protection and high private benefits of control. 
 
Further research could be carried out by replicating these studies using a 
sample of non-listed / private firms. Since managers of private firms have more 
voting power, the potential consequences for agency problems may be more 
severe in privately held firms (Mantecon, 2008). A survey method can be 
conducted as obtaining data from private firms are difficult.. Finally, a cross-
country study could be undertaken to get a better understanding of board 
structure, political connections and performance of family firms. Such studies 
have the potential to further reveal the influence of legal, economic and 
institutional differences on the board structure, political connections and family 
firm performance. 
209 
 
7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of the three empirical studies with 
respect to family firms, and the conclusions reached. It has also discussed the 
contributions and the possible research implications of the thesis. Finally, it 
acknowledges the limitations as well as proposes some directions for further 
research. 
 
The overall thesis presents some unique and robust results. Family firms in 
Bangladesh adopt a distinctly different board structure from non-family firms. 
Moreover, the effects of board structure on firm performance are also different in 
family firms from those in non-family firms. This study also finds significant 
interaction between political connections and family ownership affecting firm 
performance. While for family firms, political connections are seen to have a 
positive impact on firm performance, the opposite effect is evident for non-family 
firms.  
 
Collectively, this thesis provides critical empirical evidence on family firm 
governance structures and their impacts on firm performance while taking 
political connections into consideration as well. As such, this thesis raises many 
new ideas and possibilities for extending extant literature on family firm 
governance and its impact on firm performance given the growing challenges 
faced by family firms and their continued importance to the economy. Therefore 
this thesis is both timely and warranted. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Table A.1: Regression Results: Relationship between family firms and board 
structure (OLS; alternative definitions of family firms) 
Variable Board 
Independence 
(Model 1) 
 
Board size 
(Model 2) 
CEO duality 
(Logit-
Model 3) 
Female 
Director 
(Model 4) 
Foreign 
Director 
(Model 5) 
Constant 0.068 
(0.154) 
0.360 
(0.436) 
-3.198 
(0.128) 
97 
(0.000) 
-0.035 
(0.594) 
Family firm -0.014 
(0.039) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
0.219 
(0.041) 
0.075 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.067) 
Board 
Independence 
------ 0.106 
(0.027) 
-3.074 
(0.047) 
-0.047 
(0.533) 
0.038 
(0.481) 
Board size 0.054 
(0.023) 
------- -2.180 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.898) 
-0.003 
(0.919) 
CEO duality -0.027 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(0.000) 
------ 0.049 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.061) 
Female director -0.018 
(0.344) 
0.076 
(0.011) 
-0.071 
(0.903) 
------ 0.013 
(0.609) 
Foreign director 0.095 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.356) 
1.529 
(0.225) 
-0.107 
(0.208) 
------ 
Board ownership -0.041 
(0.079) 
-------- -------- -------- ------- 
Firm age 0.005 
(0.089) 
-0.001 
(0.077) 
0.013 
(0.181) 
-0.001 
(0.079) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
Firm size -0.002 
(0.718) 
0.053 
(0.000) 
0.342 
(0.047) 
-0.042 
(0.000) 
0.09 
(0.197) 
Growth 0.004 
(0.709) 
-0.007 
(0.681) 
0.441 
(0.113) 
0.033 
(0.057) 
0.035 
(0.007) 
Leverage -0.013 
(0.004) 
-0.356 
(0.388) 
-0.318 
(0.018) 
-0.016 
(0.054) 
0.008 
(0.149) 
Performance 
(Lag) 
----- 0.203 
(0.004) 
------ ------ ------ 
CEO tenure ----- ----- 0.095 
(0.000) 
------- ------- 
Female CEO ----- ----- ----- 0.254 
(0.000) 
-------- 
Foreign 
ownership 
----- ----- ----- ------ 0.619 
(0.000) 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted 
R2/Pseudo R2 
0.274 0.149 0.141 
 
0.339 0.424 
Total 
observations 
 
654 
 
654 
 
654 
 
654 
 
654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and family firms. Variables are defined 
as follows: Family firms are those where family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at 
least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-
family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated 
as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured by 
the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board ownership is the percentage 
of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural 
log of the number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total 
debt to book value of total assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. Lag 
performance –previous year’s ROA. CEO tenure – number of years served by the current CEO. Female CEO 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership - foreign 
ownership represents ownership by foreigners. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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Table A.2: Regression Results:  Relationship between family firms and board 
structure (3SLS; alternative definitions of family firms) 
 
 
Variable 
Board 
Independence 
 
Board size 
 
CEO duality 
Female 
Director 
Foreign 
Director 
Constant 0.042 
(0.388) 
-1.225 
(0.277) 
-0.014 
(0.953) 
0.639 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.657) 
Family firm 
 
-0.009 
(0.096) 
-0.127 
(0.076) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
0.079 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.047) 
Board 
Independence 
------ 2.701 
(0.004) 
-1.515 
(0.000) 
-0.153 
(0.135) 
0.219 
(0.001) 
Board size 0.002 
(0.082) 
------- -0.024 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.667) 
-0.002 
(0.512) 
CEO Duality -0.028 
(0.000) 
-0.605 
(0.005) 
------ -0.047 
(0.314) 
0.029 
(0.268) 
Female directors -0.011 
(0.607) 
-0.687 
(0.176) 
-0.027 
(0.805) 
------- -0.021 
(0.297) 
Foreign Directors 0.106 
(0.000) 
-0.435 
(0.438) 
-0.269 
(0.003) 
-0.065 
(0.097) 
------- 
Board ownership 0.001 
(0.995) 
-------- -------- --------- -------- 
Firm age -0.001 
(0.867) 
-0.011 
(0.140) 
0.035 
(0.302) 
-0.001 
(0.175) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
Firm size 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.352 
(0.022) 
0.038 
(0.180) 
0.056 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.401) 
Growth 0.007 
(0.407) 
-0.275 
(0.215) 
0.076 
(0.023) 
0.037 
(0.057) 
0.032 
(0.019) 
Leverage -0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.261 
(0.031) 
0.003 
(0.863) 
-0.006 
(0.452) 
0.011 
(0.053) 
Performance 
(Lag) 
----- 0.471 
(0.000) 
------ ------ ------ 
CEO tenure ----- ----- 0.014 
(0.000) 
------- ------ 
Female CEO ----- ------ -------- 0.245 
(0.000) 
------- 
Foreign 
ownership 
----- ------ ------- ------ 0.623 
(0.000) 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.171 0.103 0.352 0.279 
Total observation 654 654 654 654 654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and family firms. Variables are 
defined as follows: Family firms are those where family members hold at least 20 per cent equity 
ownership and at least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise 
firms are considered non-family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. 
Board independence is calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the 
board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
Female and foreign directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the 
board, respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding 
family directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of the number of years since the 
firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total 
assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. Lag performance –
previous year’s ROA. CEO tenure – number of years served by the current CEO. Female CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership - foreign 
ownership represents ownership by foreigners. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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Table A.3: Regression Results: Relationship between family firms and board 
structure (measuring board independence that excludes family board 
members in the denominator (i.e., board size) 
 
Variable 
Modified 
Board 
Independence 
(Model 1) 
 
 
Board size 
(Model 2) 
CEO 
duality 
(Logit-
Model 3) 
 
Female 
Director 
(Model 4) 
 
Foreign 
Director 
(Model 5) 
Constant 0.356 
(0.037) 
0.428 
(0.000) 
-1.973 
(0.252) 
0.245 
(0.002) 
-0.077 
(0.278) 
Family firm 
 
-0.074 
(0.013) 
-0.027 
(0.039) 
0.589 
(0.038) 
0.125 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.076) 
Modified Board 
Independence 
------ 0.023 
(0.109) 
-2.198 
(0.000) 
-0.063 
(0.233) 
0.023 
(0.211) 
Board size 0.081 
(0.341) 
------- -3.127 
(0.000) 
0.119 
(0.021) 
-0.039 
(0.302) 
CEO duality -0.121 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
(0.000) 
------ 0.041 
(0.002) 
-0.024 
(0.031) 
Female director 0.107 
(0.031) 
0.083 
(0.027) 
1.066 
(0.157) 
------ 0.065 
(0.061) 
Foreign director 0.107 
(0.113) 
0.009 
(0.787) 
1.757 
(0.025) 
-0.039 
(0.245) 
------ 
Board ownership -0.219 
(0.011) 
-------- -------- -------- ------- 
Firm age 0.003 
(0.024) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.366) 
-0.001 
(0.349) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Firm size -0.022 
(0.221) 
0.049 
(0.000) 
0.211 
(0.273) 
-0.032 
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.027) 
Growth 0.039 
(0.192) 
-0.014 
(0.364) 
0.327 
(0.259) 
0.009 
(0.558) 
0.031 
(0.047) 
Leverage -0.037 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.264) 
-0.313 
(0.022) 
-0.011 
(0.092) 
0.009 
(0.121) 
Performance 
(Lag) 
----- 0.201 
(0.001) 
------ ------ ------ 
CEO tenure ----- ----- 0.085 
(0.000) 
------- ------- 
Female CEO ----- ----- ----- 0.194 
(0.000) 
-------- 
Foreign 
ownership 
----- ----- ----- ------ 0.627 
(0.000) 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted 
R2/Pseudo R2 
0.149 0.149 0.159 0.391 0.471 
Total observation 654 654 654 654 654 
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and family firms. Variables are defined 
as follows: Family firms are those where family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at 
least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-
family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated 
as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board (excluding family board members). 
CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and 
foreign directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. 
Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family director’s ownership) 
on the board. Firm age is the natural log of number of years since firm inception. Leverage is calculated as 
the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the 
firm’s assets growth ratio. Lag performance – previous year’s ROA. CEO tenure – number of years served by 
the current CEO. Female CEO is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign ownership - foreign ownership represents ownership by foreigners. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. 
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Table B.1: Regression Results: Board structure and firms’ performance in 
family firms (excluding leverage) 
  OLS IV FE 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 6.304 0.000 6.365 0.000 3.987 0.000 
Family firm 0.295 0.038 0.229 0.057 0.187 0.074 
Board ownership -0.934 0.008 -1.002 0.012 -0.781 0.054 
Board independence 2.267 0.007 -2.908 0.169 1.702 0.063 
Board size 0.032 0.298 0.039 0.066 0.081 0.074 
CEO duality -0.695 0.004 -1.281 0.005 -0.608 0.047 
Female directors 0.402 0.539 0.253 0.157 0.109 0.306 
Foreign directors 2.796 0.000 0.291 0.001 0.459 0.006 
Firm age 0.015 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.017 0.000 
Risk -1.902 0.272 -1.637 0.368 -0.761 0.072 
Firm size -0.474 0.000 -0.496 0.000 -0.208 0.046 
Growth 0.049 0.694 -0.004 0.971 -0.002 0.651 
Family firm*board 
independence -0.859 0.417 -0.135 0.064 -0.174 0.079 
Family firm*board size -0.013 0.062 0.001 0.981 -0.004 0.087 
Family firm*CEO duality 1.014 0.000 1.614 0.000 0.896 0.045 
Family firm* female director -1.123 0.111 -2.983 0.061 -0.891 0.153 
Family firm*foreign director -2.552 0.000 -3.056 0.002 -1.287 0.192 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.277 0.256 0.598 
F-statistic 11.903 10.171 17.982 
Total observation 654  654  654  
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Family firms are those where the 
family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. 
Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as 
the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign 
directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, 
respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family 
directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of number of years since firm 
inception. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month 
period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking 
the firm’s assets growth ratio. The reported results are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent.
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Appendix B (Cont) 
Table B.4: Regression Results: Firm performance (Tobin’s Q), board 
structure and family firms (alternative definitions of family firms) 
  OLS IV FE 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 2.291 0.000 2.381 0.000 1.698 0.189 
Family firm 0.523 0.021 0.455 0.091 0.692 0.087 
Board ownership -0.627 0.026 -0.668 0.025 -0.328 0.076 
Board independence 1.103 0.042 2.771 0.007 1.184 0.692 
Board size 0.033 0.108 0.055 0.072 0.041 0.081 
CEO duality -0.165 0.056 -0.367 0.042 -0.261 0.072 
Female directors 0.338 0.192 -0.303 0.417 0.441 0.206 
Foreign directors 1.439 0.000 1.533 0.000 1.621 0.003 
Firm age -0.003 0.429 -0.004 0.303 -0.007 0.405 
Leverage 0.917 0.000 0.953 0.000 0.802 0.000 
Risk 0.814 0.514 0.643 0.675 0.654 0.921 
Firm size -0.178 0.005 -0.213 0.003 -0.171 0.007 
Growth -0.021 0.847 -0.049 0.669 -0.062 0.871 
Family firm*board 
independence -1.289 0.062 -0.735 0.071 -1.174 0.054 
Family firm*board size -0.087 0.043 -0.068 0.024 -0.061 0.126 
Family firm*CEO duality 0.143 0.143 0.303 0.027 0.607 0.094 
Family firm*female 
directors -0.113 0.813 -0.087 0.886 -0.072 0.516 
Family firm*foreign 
directors -1.056 0.087 -1.091 0.065 -0.891 0.064 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.442 0.428 0.591 
F-statistic 23.519 22.329 31.654 
Total observation 654  654  654  
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Family firms are those where the 
family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership, and at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. 
Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as 
the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign 
directors are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, 
respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family 
directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of the number of years since the 
firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of 
total assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month 
period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking 
the firm’s assets growth ratio. The reported results are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent. 
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Appendix B (Cont) 
Table B.5: Regression Results: Firm performance (ROA), board structure 
and family firms (alternative definitions of family firms) 
  OLS IV FE 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 0.089 0.064 0.093 0.076 0.174 0.046 
Family firm 0.024 0.041 0.027 0.067 0.031 0.086 
Board ownership -0.061 0.009 -0.056 0.029 -0.067 0.041 
Board independence 0.143 0.002 0.254 0.003 0.154 0.174 
Board size 0.004 0.041 0.002 0.052 0.006 0.029 
CEO duality -0.013 0.175 -0.013 0.563 -0.018 0.064 
Female directors 0.008 0.698 0.011 0.727 0.005 0.627 
Foreign directors 0.102 0.000 0.096 0.003 0.087 0.005 
Firm age 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.017 0.004 0.065 
Leverage -0.046 0.000 -0.045 0.000 -0.061 0.000 
Risk -0.395 0.002 -0.373 0.000 -0.401 0.006 
Firm size -0.004 0.445 -0.004 0.529 0.003 0.842 
Growth 0.014 0.131 0.017 0.074 0.021 0.158 
Family firm*board 
independence -0.085 0.034 -0.059 0.095 -0.092 0.063 
Family firm*board size -0.008 0.018 -0.009 0.036 -0.004 0.043 
Family firm*CEO duality 0.033 0.032 0.026 0.108 0.045 0.129 
Family firm*female 
directors -0.005 0.829 -0.019 0.685 0.105 0.582 
Family firm*foreign 
directors -0.221 0.005 -0.107 0.061 -0.157 0.053 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes No 
Adjusted R-squared 0.316 0.312 0.411 
F-statistic 14.072 13.247 16.714 
Total observation  654   654   654  
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. Variables are defined as follows: ROA is the ratio of profit after tax and book value of 
total assets. Family firms are those where the family members hold at least 20 per cent equity 
ownership, and at least one member of the controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise 
firms are considered non-family firms. Board size is defined as the number of directors on the board. 
Board independence is calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by the size of the 
board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 
otherwise. Female and foreign director are measured by the proportion of female and foreign 
directors on the board, respectively. Board ownership is the percentage of directors’ total 
shareholdings (excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. Firm age is the natural log of 
the number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of 
total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock 
return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of assets. Growth 
of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. The reported results are 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. 
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Appendix B (Cont) 
Table B.6: Regression Results: Firm performance, board structure and 
family firms (controlling GFC) 
  OLS IV 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 1.974 0.000 4.239 0.000 
Family firm 0.398 0.091 0.024 0.0644 
Board ownership -0.767 0.013 -0.821 0.059 
Board independence 1.494 0.037 0.242 0.089 
Board size 0.073 0.006 0.071 0.147 
CEO duality -0.529 0.002 -0.139 0.017 
Female directors 0.506 0.529 2.193 0.256 
Foreign directors 2.216 0.003 2.495 0.004 
Firm age -0.004 0.208 0.022 0.000 
Leverage 0.089 0.000 0.091 0.000 
Risk 1.377 0.349 1.221 0.461 
Firm size -0.191 0.003 -0.193 0.008 
Growth 0.059 0.587 -0.001 0.982 
Family firm*board independence -0.974 0.089 -1.532 0.082 
Family firm*board size -0.052 0.015 -0.084 0.047 
Family firm*CEO duality 0.573 0.004 1.064 0.019 
Family firm*female directors -0.875 0.197 -1.861 0.627 
Family firm*foreign directors -2.138 0.000 1.932 0.018 
Year 2008 0.149 0.896 0.067 0.513 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.443 
F-statistic 26.783 24.191 
Total observation 654  654  
The above table reports the regression results relating board structure and firm performance in 
family firms. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Family firms are those where the family 
members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at least one member of the controlling family 
holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. Board size is defined as 
the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as the number of 
independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 
when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured by 
the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board ownership is the 
percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family directors’ ownership) on the board. 
Firm age is the natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is 
calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is the natural 
log of book value of assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. 
The reported results are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1: Regression Results: Political connections and firms’ performance 
in family firms (first-stage regression) 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
C -13.718 0.000 
Capital city 0.322 0.027 
Board independence 2.822 0.068 
Board size 0.136 0.003 
CEO duality 0.606 0.009 
Female directors 3.474 0.000 
Foreign directors -6.229 0.000 
Growth -0.114 0.635 
Risk 0.381 0.001 
Leverage 2.028 0.570 
Age -0.022 0.034 
Size 1.451 0.000 
Year dummies Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
McFadden R-squared 0.201 
LR statistic 35.862 
The above table reports the first-stage regression results relating political connection and 
firm performance in family firms and non-family firms. Variables are defined as follows: 
Capital City is the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is located in the capital 
city of the country, and 0 otherwise. Board size is defined as the number of directors on 
the board. Board independence is calculated as the number of independent directors 
scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured by 
the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Firm age is the 
natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the 
ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is the 
natural log of book value of assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s 
assets growth ratio. 
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Appendix C (Cont) 
Table C.2: Regression Results: Political connections and firms’ performance 
in family firms (firm age) 
 Family firms 
 Model 3 (Tobin’s Q) Model 4 (ROA) 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
Constant 4.342 0.000 0.048 0.427 
Political 
connections 0.202 0.084 0.004 0.075 
Political 
connections*age -0.177 0.285 0.022 0.159 
Board 
independence -2.318 0.000 0.100 0.171 
Board size -0.003 0.904 0.002 0.346 
CEO duality 0.103 0.232 -0.003 0.754 
Female directors -0.154 0.490 -0.036 0.089 
Foreign directors 0.202 0.517 -0.005 0.877 
Growth 0.067 0.492 0.011 0.255 
Leverage 0.865 0.000 -0.012 0.071 
Risk -1.854 0.000 -1.206 0.000 
Age -0.210 0.131 0.003 0.844 
Firm size -0.239 0.000 0.005 0.430 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.462 0.195 
F-statistic 19.901 6.323 
Total observation 419  419  
The above table reports the regression results relating political connection and firm performance in 
family firms and non-family firms. Variables are defined as follows: Family firms are those where 
the family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by book value of 
total assets. ROA is the ratio of profit after tax and book value of total assets. Political connection 
is defined if: (i) the board of directors is a sitting member of parliament or a minister or member of 
a political party; and/or (ii) is closely related to political party as described in the press. This study 
uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is politically-connected, and 0 otherwise. Board size is 
defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as the number 
of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 
1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured 
by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Firm age is the 
natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of 
book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of 
assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. 
 
 
 
25
2 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
C
 (C
on
t) 
T
ab
le
 C
.3
: R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
: P
ol
iti
ca
l c
on
ne
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 fi
rm
s’
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
 fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s (
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
le
ct
io
n 
ye
ar
 2
00
8)
 
 
A
ll 
fir
m
s 
Fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s 
N
on
-f
am
ily
 fi
rm
s 
 
M
od
el
 1
 (T
ob
in
’s
 Q
) 
M
od
el
 2
 (R
O
A)
 
M
od
el
 3
 (T
ob
in
’s
 Q
) 
M
od
el
 4
 (R
O
A)
 
M
od
el
 5
 (T
ob
in
’s
 Q
) 
M
od
el
 6
 (R
O
A)
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Pr
ob
. 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Pr
ob
. 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Pr
ob
. 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Pr
ob
. 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Pr
ob
. 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
Pr
ob
. 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
1.
70
2 
0.
00
3 
0.
04
8 
0.
33
7 
2.
02
5 
0.
00
2 
0.
09
9 
0.
08
5 
2.
41
4 
0.
04
3 
-0
.0
24
 
0.
79
0 
Po
lit
ic
al
 
co
nn
ec
tio
ns
 
-0
.2
25
 
0.
07
6 
-0
.0
07
 
0.
05
2 
0.
07
8 
0.
04
3 
0.
02
1 
0.
01
4 
-0
.1
12
 
0.
04
5 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
09
4 
Fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s 
-0
.2
40
 
0.
30
5 
0.
01
2 
0.
25
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s 
*P
ol
iti
ca
l 
co
nn
ec
tio
ns
 
0.
34
5 
0.
02
6 
0.
02
9 
0.
03
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
oa
rd
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
1.
27
0 
0.
00
7 
0.
14
6 
0.
00
0 
0.
63
7 
0.
27
5 
0.
09
4 
0.
20
7 
1.
71
5 
0.
03
1 
0.
12
3 
0.
04
2 
B
oa
rd
 si
ze
 
0.
05
2 
0.
00
8 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
0 
0.
01
0 
0.
69
6 
0.
00
5 
0.
32
1 
0.
09
6 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
5 
0.
03
3 
C
EO
 d
ua
lit
y 
-0
.0
99
 
0.
25
9 
0.
00
1 
0.
87
1 
0.
02
3 
0.
81
2 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
80
7 
-0
.6
32
 
0.
00
1 
-0
.0
24
 
0.
08
9 
Fe
m
al
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
-0
.2
72
 
0.
26
5 
-0
.0
10
 
0.
64
1 
-0
.2
25
 
0.
37
4 
-0
.0
26
 
0.
23
9 
0.
73
9 
0.
23
7 
0.
16
9 
0.
68
3 
Fo
re
ig
n 
di
re
ct
or
s 
1.
22
0 
0.
00
0 
0.
08
2 
0.
00
0 
0.
05
3 
0.
87
9 
-0
.0
04
 
0.
89
2 
2.
34
1 
0.
00
0 
0.
16
7 
0.
00
0 
G
ro
w
th
 
0.
01
1 
0.
92
3 
0.
01
2 
0.
18
4 
0.
10
4 
0.
34
3 
0.
01
8 
0.
05
7 
0.
26
4 
0.
42
3 
0.
05
4 
0.
03
2 
Le
ve
ra
ge
 
0.
91
7 
0.
00
0 
-0
.0
46
 
0.
00
0 
1.
01
8 
0.
00
0 
-0
.0
19
 
0.
01
6 
0.
79
3 
0.
00
0 
-0
.0
63
 
0.
00
0 
R
is
k 
0.
85
4 
0.
57
1 
-0
.4
29
 
0.
00
1 
-4
.9
01
 
0.
17
2 
-1
.3
89
 
0.
00
0 
1.
44
7 
0.
41
7 
-0
.1
62
 
0.
23
5 
A
ge
 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
66
0 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
00
0 
-0
.0
12
 
0.
01
0 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
36
6 
0.
01
7 
0.
13
7 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
00
0 
Fi
rm
 si
ze
 
-0
.1
40
 
0.
03
7 
-0
.0
03
 
0.
57
1 
-0
.1
42
 
0.
05
4 
-0
.0
04
 
0.
56
7 
-0
.3
16
 
0.
03
2 
0.
00
2 
0.
87
3 
Y
ea
r 2
00
8 
0.
12
7 
0.
16
2 
-0
.0
03
 
0.
72
6 
0.
23
5 
0.
20
3 
0.
00
6 
0.
50
1 
0.
03
7 
0.
81
6 
-0
.0
07
 
0.
55
4 
In
du
st
ry
 
du
m
m
ie
s 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
 
A
dj
us
te
d 
R
-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
42
2 
 
0.
28
7 
 
0.
30
5 
 
0.
11
2 
 
0.
54
4 
 
0.
56
5 
 
F-
st
at
is
tic
 
27
.4
87
 
 
14
.8
24
 
 
14
.1
03
 
 
4.
77
9 
 
24
.3
03
 
 
26
.3
22
 
 
N
 
65
4 
 
 
 
41
9 
 
 
 
23
5 
 
 
 
Th
e 
ab
ov
e 
ta
bl
e 
re
po
rts
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 re
su
lts
 re
la
tin
g 
po
lit
ic
al
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
an
d 
fir
m
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
 fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s 
an
d 
no
n-
fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s. 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 F
am
ily
 fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
th
os
e 
w
he
re
 th
e 
fa
m
ily
 m
em
be
rs
 h
ol
d 
at
 le
as
t 2
0 
pe
r c
en
t e
qu
ity
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
at
 le
as
t o
ne
 m
em
be
r o
f 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fa
m
ily
 h
ol
ds
 a
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l p
os
iti
on
, o
th
er
w
is
e 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
no
n-
fa
m
ily
 fi
rm
s. 
To
bi
n’
s 
Q
 is
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 p
lu
s 
th
e 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 d
eb
t d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
RO
A 
is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f p
ro
fit
 a
fte
r t
ax
 a
nd
 b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. P
ol
iti
ca
l c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 if
: (
i) 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 d
ire
ct
or
s i
s a
 si
tti
ng
 m
em
be
r o
f p
ar
lia
m
en
t o
r a
 m
in
is
te
r o
r m
em
be
r o
f p
ol
iti
ca
l p
ar
ty
; a
nd
/o
r (
ii)
 is
 c
lo
se
ly
 re
la
te
d 
to
 a
 p
ol
iti
ca
l p
ar
ty
 
as
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 th
e 
pr
es
s. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 u
se
s 
a 
du
m
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
eq
ua
l t
o 
1 
if 
a 
fir
m
 is
 p
ol
iti
ca
lly
- 
co
nn
ec
te
d,
 a
nd
 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 B
oa
rd
 s
ize
 is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 d
ire
ct
or
s 
on
 th
e 
bo
ar
d.
 
Bo
ar
d 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 d
ire
ct
or
s 
sc
al
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
si
ze
 o
f t
he
 b
oa
rd
. C
EO
 d
ua
lit
y 
is
 a
 d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
eq
ua
l t
o 
1 
w
he
n 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
is
 th
e 
C
EO
, a
nd
 
0 
ot
he
rw
is
e.
 F
em
al
e 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
re
ct
or
s a
re
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 fe
m
al
e 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
di
re
ct
or
s o
n 
th
e 
bo
ar
d,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 F
ir
m
 a
ge
 is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
 o
f t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f y
ea
rs
 si
nc
e 
th
e 
fir
m
’s
 in
ce
pt
io
n.
 L
ev
er
ag
e 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 to
ta
l d
eb
t t
o 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
Ri
sk
 is
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fir
m
’s
 d
ai
ly
 s
to
ck
 re
tu
rn
 o
ve
r t
he
 p
rio
r 
12
-m
on
th
 p
er
io
d.
 F
ir
m
 si
ze
 is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
 o
f b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 a
ss
et
s. 
G
ro
wt
h 
of
 a
 fi
rm
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
fir
m
’s
 a
ss
et
s g
ro
w
th
 ra
tio
. 
253 
 
Appendix C (Cont) 
Table C.4: Regression Results: Political connections and firms’ performance 
in family firms (controlled for potential survivorship bias by using 122 firms 
sub-set of firms) 
 Model 1 (Tobin’s Q) Model 2 (ROA) 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
Intercept 1.692 0.006 0.086 0.012 
Political connections -0.203 0.108 -0.002 0.078 
Family firms -0.200 0.307 0.002 0.757 
Family firms *Political 
connections 
0.219 0.082 0.029 0.004 
Board independence 1.641 0.016 0.122 0.001 
Board size 0.051 0.000 0.003 0.004 
CEO duality -0.294 0.000 -0.013 0.056 
Female directors -0.237 0.409 0.033 0.102 
Foreign directors 0.402 0.000 0.140 0.000 
Growth 0.121 0.445 0.040 0.049 
Leverage 0.802 0.000 -0.053 0.000 
Risk 0.864 0.201 -0.360 0.003 
Age 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Firm size -0.165 0.001 -0.006 0.118 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R-squared 0.522  0.346  
F-statistic 35.775  17.901  
The above table reports the regression results relating political connection and firm performance in 
family firms and non-family firms. Variables are defined as follows: Family firms are those where 
the family members hold at least 20 per cent equity ownership and at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position, otherwise firms are considered non-family firms. 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by book value of 
total assets. ROA is the ratio of profit after tax and book value of total assets. Political connection 
is defined if: (i) the board of directors is a sitting member of parliament or a minister or member of 
political party; and/or (ii) is closely related to a political party as described in the press. This study 
uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is politically-connected, and 0 otherwise. Board size is 
defined as the number of directors on the board. Board independence is calculated as the number 
of independent directors scaled by the size of the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to 
1 when the chairperson is the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Female and foreign directors are measured 
by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Firm age is the 
natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of 
book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size is the natural log of book value of 
assets. Growth of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. 
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